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My dissertation explores Nietzsche’s claims to originality as a new kind of philosophical 
psychologist.  My argument proceeds through an elaboration and defense of three basic and 
interrelated interpretive claims about Nietzsche’s claims to originality in psychology: 1.) The 
most original goals in Nietzsche’s psychology are therapeutic rather than theoretical in their 
orientation and outlook.  2.) Nietzsche aims to facilitate these therapeutic goals through an 
experimental style of thinking and writing.  3.) Nietzsche’s understanding of “psychology” is 
therefore far less familiar than has been previously supposed by many of his commentators. 
In Chapters One and Two, I make a preliminary case for reading the most original 
features of Nietzsche’s psychology in terms of his therapeutic ambitions.  I argue that many 
current trends within Nietzsche scholarship fail to appreciate that he often he views his readers as 
not only interlocutors of his philosophical ideas but also as patients who stand in need of a cure.  
This therapeutic analogy, however, is not without its own interpretive difficulties.  I survey some 
failed strategies of making sense of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project that portray him as a self-help 
guru, an exemplar of ancient practices of the ‘art of living,’ and also as a Wittgensteinian 
quietist.  Finally, at the end of the chapter I argue that Nietzsche’s unconventional style of 
philosophical writing offers us a clue to his therapeutic ambitions.                
In Chapters Three and Four, I offer a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
diagnosis of humanity’s problematic relationship with its own self-worth through the lens of the 
concepts of optimism and pessimism.  According to Nietzsche, the history of Western 
civilization has been guided by traditional ideals that manage to combine a highly ambitious and 





view of their own self-worth when their mere embodied, temporal, and natural selves are 
compared to their own transcendent ideals.  I focus particularly on Nietzsche’s diagnosis of how 
a certain picture of human life—the ascetic ideal—has instilled within humanity a pervasive 
sense that our natural selves and the natural world are deficient, impure, corrupt, and therefore 
stand in need of redemption by a higher metaphysical world.       
Chapter Five turns to a critical discussion of one of Nietzsche’s most famous figurative 
images: the death of God.  I propose that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the death of God is best 
understood to express a cultural death that focusses on the failure of the Western tradition as a 
particular way of life.  I then survey two failed responses to the problem posed by the death of 
God through an analysis of Nietzsche’s figurative images of the Madman and the Last Man.  
Both of these responses fail, I argue, because each figure fails to take risks that would allow 
them to envision alternative possibilities for a meaningful life after God’s death.    
In the sixth and final chapter of the dissertation I offer an account of the kind of 
affirmative therapeutic experience that Nietzsche is trying to cultivate in his readers that would 
allow them to maintain a new kind of cheerfulness in the face of the death of God.  According to 
Nietzsche, we have inherited a tradition that has habituated us to need deep assurances of 
wholeness, completeness, and cosmic security when thinking about the meaning of our lives.  In 
order to overcome our need for traditional assurances of cosmic security, Nietzsche claims that 
we must learn to engage in new kinds of risk-taking and adventure.  What is most valuable in 
Nietzsche’s thinking when viewed from the standpoint of a therapeutic ideal rather than a 
theoretical system, I suggest, is not a catalogue of settled doctrines but rather a new experimental 
sensibility that continually seeks to explore the possibility of an open-ended, highly provisional, 
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NIETZSCHE, PSYCHOLOGY, ORIGINALITY  
 
“All psychology so far has been stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has 
not ventured into the depths” (BGE 23) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Towards the end of his highly unusual intellectual autobiography, Ecce Homo, Friedrich 
Nietzsche poses the following question to his readers: “What philosopher before me was a 
psychologist instead of its opposite, a higher ‘fraud?’”  He then proceeds to answer his own 
question in characteristically bold fashion: “Psychology did not exist until I appeared—To be the 
first here may be a curse; it is at any rate a destiny” (EH ‘Destiny’ 6.)  The claim is provocative, 
flamboyant, and peculiar, but hardly isolated or without precedent.  Nietzsche’s high estimation 
of his own psychological insights, observations, and aptitudes is a guiding theme that is evident 
throughout his writings and one that becomes especially prominent in the context of his later 
work.   
In fact, throughout his later writings, Nietzsche readily encourages his readers to 
understand his overall claims to philosophical originality in terms of his development of a highly 
original brand of psychology.  Some pages earlier in Ecce Homo, he informs us that: “The fact 
that a psychologist without equal is speaking in my works, this is perhaps the first thing a good 
reader will realize” (EH ‘Good Books’ 5.)  But just what original insights Nietzsche wants those 
of us who aspire to be “good readers” of his work to discover in his new psychology 
immediately raises several basic but quite thorny interpretive questions about what he means 





We might begin, for example, by asking how Nietzsche’s newly proposed psychology 
(whatever that turns out to be) differs from more traditional forms of philosophical argument, 
inquiry, and discourse.  Or why he so often chooses to highlight his claims to psychological 
originality when engaging in his own frequent self-assessments of his claims to philosophical 
originality more generally.  And perhaps most importantly, we might ask what specific features 
of this new psychology could justify the highly ambitious claim that his psychology is not just 
original, but somehow inaugural.  What could Nietzsche possibly mean when he claims that he 
is the first psychologist in an apparently otherwise “fraudulent” philosophical field?     
Formulating answers to these basic questions, however, turns out to be no easy exegetical 
task.  Despite Nietzsche’s many bold assertions and assurances about the world-historical 
importance of his new psychology, he offers readers little by way of direct guidance when it 
comes to explaining why he holds the inaugural status of his psychology in such incredibly high 
esteem or even what basic goals this new psychology purports to achieve.  Rather, Nietzsche’s 
extreme confidence in his own originality as a psychologist is most often conveyed to his readers 
through a variety of indirect suggestions and allusions, elusive figurative images, and seemingly 
hyperbolic boasts that tend to be far more prophetic in their tone (his psychology is both a 
“curse” and a “destiny”) than they are programmatic in their explanation.  As a result, many of 
Nietzsche’s readers, perhaps even many of his “good readers,” soon find themselves in a position 
of considerably less confidence than Nietzsche himself, when they begin to critically assess, or 
even attempt to describe, the original merits, or perhaps even the singularly original merits, of 
this elusive inaugural psychological approach to the problems of philosophy.        
This dissertation will offer an interpretation of what Nietzsche means when he calls 





that he is the first psychologist amongst the philosophers.  While the claim that psychology did 
not exist before him might appear, at first glance, to amount to no more than a bit of literary 
showboating on Nietzsche’s behalf, I will argue that his enthusiastic but elusive claim that the 
most original aspects of his thinking constitutes a distinctly new kind of psychology is not only 
well deserved but also offers his readers (per his own advice) one of the best points of entry into 
a better understanding of his equally enthusiastic but also equally elusive overall claims to 
originality within the philosophical tradition.   
Nietzsche’s writings are, of course, well known for making highly ambitious claims 
about the status of his originality in relation to the history of philosophy.  At first glance, 
Nietzsche’s claim to be the first psychologist of the philosophical tradition would appear to be 
either outrageously hyperbolic or just patently false.  Psychology, in some general sense of that 
term, has a history that reaches back to antiquity.1  Moreover, for most of that history, 
psychology was still considered to be a branch of philosophy until it began to emerge as an 
autonomous discipline in the early parts of the last century.  For this reason, few commentators 
have taken Nietzsche’s inaugural claim all that seriously.  Rather, Nietzsche’s originality has 
most often been assessed in terms of the various theoretical traditions (such as naturalism, 
psychoanalysis, contemporary moral psychology) that he is held to have either influenced or 
anticipated.   
The present study will take a different approach to Nietzsche’s claims to be first.  While 
considerations of Nietzsche’s psychological originality avant la lettre are undoubtedly an 
important part of his intellectual legacy, I hope to show in what follows that we must look to 
other, perhaps more unusual, features of his new psychology if it is to live up to its own proposed 
                                                      
1 See Daniel N. Robinson An Intellectual History of Psychology (1995) for a good account of the intertwined history 





inaugural status.  In order to do so, however, I will ask readers (as will Nietzsche) to set aside 
some of their inherited assumptions about what “psychology” is supposed to mean and what it is 
supposed to do.  We must ask new questions.  What if, for example, we ask whether Nietzsche’s 
claim to be the first psychologist could be understood in terms of an attitude rather than an 
argument?  What if his claim to originality is trying to promote a new kind of experience of 
ourselves and the world rather than to establish a new kind of kind of theoretical system?  On my 
reading, a careful consideration of these questions will reveal that the most original features of 
Nietzsche’s psychology are fundamentally practical rather than theoretical in their orientation.  
The boasts and braggadocio that so often accompany Nietzsche’s flamboyant claims to 
originality in psychology, I will suggest, take on new meaning if we interpret his inaugural 
claims to be expressive less of his confidence in the priority of some new psychological theory 
that he wants to establish within tradition philosophical discourse than they are expressions of his 
confidence in a practical stance that attempts to cultivate a novel set of attitudes and experiences 
in his readers that are both therapeutic and adventurous.    
One of the main reasons that Nietzsche thinks his readers need to acquire a new set of 
evaluative sensibilities is best understood against the background of his more general diagnosis 
and response to what he perceives as an emerging crisis of meaning in modern life.  The crisis, 
put simply, is that modern human beings are becoming increasingly unable to make sense of the 
value of their own lives from the standpoint of traditional philosophical and religious narratives.  
The threat of unintelligibility faced by the modern self is the result of a series of cognitive and 
cultural failures within modern life.  From a cognitive standpoint, Nietzsche claims that the 
metaphysical and epistemological standards that we have traditionally employed to determine 





up to their own lofty transcendent requirements.  From a cultural standpoint, he claims that our 
equally transcendent-based traditional standards for determining the nature and goals of the good 
life have now degenerated into modern lives no longer characterized by greatness but rather by 
petty desires, low-mindedness, hypocrisy, and mass consumerism.   
Nietzsche refers to this general axiological failure of intelligibility in modern life quite 
dramatically as the “death of God.”  But his proclamation that “God is dead” means something 
more than an expression of simple atheism.  Rather, he is expressing a much deeper worry that 
the credibility of any transcendent narrative that seeks to explain the goal and meaning of human 
life is becoming unbelievable.  What has “died,” according to Nietzsche, is our previously 
unquestioned faith in these various traditional narratives that place humanity in the context of 
some larger cosmic narrative.  Our once assured place in the universe has suddenly become 
smaller, more contingent, and much more uncertain.     
While the cognitive and cultural failures that constitute the death of God are a uniquely 
modern event, Nietzsche also claims that these failures are only the latest and most dramatic 
episode in the drama of humanity’s longstanding struggles with its own sense of self-worth.  
Humanity’s struggles with its own self-esteem, on Nietzsche’s diagnosis, can be traced back well 
over two millennia to the very origins of Western culture.  According to Nietzsche, a certain 
form of self-hatred has been built into our attempts to affirm the highest ideals of the Western 
tradition.  In a series of sweeping historical claims, he informs us that the highest values of 
Western civilization have been generated out a basic logic of ascetic self-denial that 
systematically devalues the lived natural constitution of human existence and even promotes a 





We consequently now find ourselves in an evaluative double-bind in regard to questions 
about the meaning of human life.  On the one hand, we still find ourselves nostalgically beholden 
to past transcendent narratives and evaluative traditions that once gave us a sense of purpose and 
meaning but at the tremendous expense of devaluing our ability to affirm our lives in this world.  
On the other hand, these old transcendent narratives, themselves, are “dying” and the very idea 
of purpose and meaning in human life is becoming increasing unintelligible.  Both of these 
narratives, Nietzsche suggests, are profoundly unsuitable at valuing the types of beings that we 
are.     
To put this all more succinctly, Nietzsche claims the modern self needs not only critical 
but also clinical help.  The death of God turns out to be an event that will require more than a 
critical inventory of old beliefs but also something like a new kind of philosophical therapy.  
What is needed, according to Nietzsche, is a new self-image for humanity that more accurately 
reflects the natural and cultural dimensions of who we are and who we might become.  In order 
to achieve this new sense of self-worth, however, Nietzsche claims that we must first radically 
revalue our inherited assumptions about the value of our own lives in order to set the stage for 
the possibility of new forms of higher humanity and higher spirituality that he envisions for our 
not yet determined future.               
One of the most original features of Nietzsche’s practical psychology, I will argue, is 
discovered in his attempts to facilitate this therapeutic process through the implementation of an 
experimental approach to humanity’s longstanding self-esteem problems.  Nietzsche’s 
psychology, I will suggest, is best understood to be diagnostic, interpretive, and interrogatory 
rather than just explanatory.  His practical goal for his readers is radical self-cultivation rather 





another subcategory of philosophy to be placed alongside metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and 
so on.  When Nietzsche tells us in Beyond Good and Evil that psychology is the new “queen of 
the sciences” (BGE 23) he is not merely trying to subvert traditional philosophical hierarchies.  
Rather, he is trying to introduce us to a new kind of activity—a new kind of questioning—that he 
hopes will open up a new kind of second-order diagnostic sensibility towards these ordinary 
categories of philosophy and towards our ordinary understanding of own lives.  
The aim of Nietzschean therapy, on my reading, therefore turns out to be less akin to 
learning a new theory, or gaining explicit mastery over a new Nietzschean concept, than it is akin 
to the process through which one might overcome a set of pervasive and mostly unacknowledged 
habits.  In this case, Nietzsche has in mind a series of deeply embedded habits of thinking, 
valuing, and feeling that have historically structured our personal lives and social institutions for 
over two millennia.  It is only by bringing these bad habits from the background to the 
foreground that we can begin to envision new possibilities for ourselves.  In order to envision 
these new possibilities, Nietzsche claims that we must now learn to take new risks, break out of 
our old habits, and begin to ask dangerous questions.   
In fact, I will argue that Nietzsche’s therapeutic ambitions as a whole are perhaps best 
understood in terms of a radical risk-taking adventure.  It is hardly an accident that Nietzsche so 
often characterizes his philosophical project in terms of the figurative imagery of an explorer 
who has set out for a new destination that is not yet known.  Nietzsche asks his readers to “send 
your ships into uncharted seas!” (GS 283.)  If Nietzsche is the first psychologist, then his sense 
of being “first” is unique in so far as he does not already know the final destination of his 





new believers but rather an adventurer setting out for unknown lands who invites us along for the 
ride.      
In what follows, I will argue that one of Nietzsche’s most underappreciated and original 
goals is to help his readers develop a taste for the provisional and the adventurous.  We must, 
Nietzsche informs us, learn to become the “heroes of our own lives” (GS 299.)  In order to do so, 
he also informs us that we must learn to become more critically open-minded about new 
possibilities for our lives.  Psychology, in this sense, represents the beginning of a new kind of 
risky interrogatory adventure that helps his readers experimentally work through the practical 
implications of the death of God. 
 
1.2 Outline of Chapters to Come 
 
My argument in the chapters to follow will proceed through an elaboration and defense of 
three basic and interrelated interpretive claims about Nietzsche’s claims to originality in 
psychology: 1.) The most original goals in Nietzsche’s psychology are therapeutic in their 
orientation and outlook.  2.) Nietzsche aims to facilitate these therapeutic goals through an 
experimental style of thinking and writing.  3.) Nietzsche’s understanding of “psychology” is 
therefore far less familiar than has been previously supposed by many of his commentators.   
I have not attempted in what follows to offer anything like a comprehensive 
interpretation of every aspect of Nietzsche’s psychology.  In particular, I have chosen to focus on 
what one might call the first-personal, experiential, and normative aspects of Nietzsche’s 
psychology as opposed to the third-personal, theoretical, and explanatory aspects of his 
psychology.  Undoubtedly, this leaves to the side many important and interesting features of his 





originality in psychology that have gone largely unappreciated.  The overall structure of the 
dissertation will proceed as follows.   
Chapter Two makes a preliminary case for reading the most original features of 
Nietzsche’s psychology in terms of his therapeutic ambitions.  I start by taking brief stock of 
some current trends in Nietzsche scholarship that interpret his goals through the lens of 
contemporary theory.  What is lacking in such contemporary readings, I suggest, is an awareness 
that Nietzsche not only views his readers as interlocutors of his philosophical ideas but also as 
patients who stand in need of a cure.  This therapeutic analogy, however, is not without its own 
interpretive difficulties.  I survey some failed strategies of making sense of the therapeutic 
analogy that portray Nietzsche as a self-help guru, an exemplar of ancient practices of the ‘art of 
living,’ and also as a Wittgensteinian quietist.  Finally, at the end of the chapter I argue that 
Nietzsche’s unconventional style of philosophical writing offers us a clue to his therapeutic 
ambitions.  Nietzsche’s writing style, I suggest, is integral rather than accidental to the basic 
goals of his therapeutic philosophy and seeks to disrupt the inherited evaluative habits and 
assumptions that have traditionally conditioned his readers’ self-image of who they are and who 
they might become.              
In Chapter Three, I offer a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s genealogical diagnosis of 
humanity’s problematic relationship with its own self-worth through the lens of the concepts of 
optimism and pessimism.  According to Nietzsche, the history of Western civilization has been 
guided by traditional ideals that manage to combine a highly ambitious and very optimistic belief 
about the cosmic importance of human beings with a deeply pessimistic view of their own self-
worth when their mere embodied, temporal, and natural selves are compared to their own 





human life—the ascetic ideal—has instilled within humanity a pervasive sense that our natural 
selves and the natural world are deficient, impure, corrupt, and therefore stand in need of 
redemption by a higher metaphysical world.  A central feature of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project, 
I will argue, attempts to show his readers that their traditionally optimistic orientation towards 
belief in a higher reality beyond this world also entails a deep pessimism towards questions 
about whether we could ever value ourselves without such transcendent assurances.     
Chapter Four continues the discussion of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of humanity’s 
problematic relationship with its own sense of self-worth through an exploration of his 
assessment of the relationship between the ascetic ideal and our modern scientific worldview.  I 
frame the discussion through a comparison of the divergent answers that Nietzsche and Sigmund 
Freud offer in response to questions about the impact of modern science on our ability to answer 
questions about the meaning of life.  It has become almost orthodoxy to interpret Nietzsche’s 
claims to originality in psychology in terms of his anticipation of and possible influence upon 
Freud and the psychoanalytic movement.  I push back against this standardized reading and 
argue that Nietzsche’s concerns about the threat of meaninglessness posed by our modern 
scientific worldview stands in stark contrast to Freud’s scientistic dismissal of traditional 
concerns about human meaning.  On my view, Freud turns out to embrace a pessimistic and 
scientistic version of the ascetic ideal that Nietzsche’s own psychological project is trying to 
overcome.       
Chapter Five then turns to a critical discussion of one of Nietzsche’s most famous 
figurative images: the death of God.  Against cognitive readings that focus on God’s death in 
terms of the loss of belief, I propose that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the death of God is best 





particular way of life.  I then survey two failed responses to the problem posed by the death of 
God through an analysis of Nietzsche’s figurative images of the Madman and the Last Man.  
Both of these responses fail, I argue, because each figure fails to take risks that would allow 
them to envision alternative possibilities for a meaningful life after God’s death.    
In the sixth and final chapter of the dissertation I offer an account of the kind of attitude 
that Nietzsche is trying to cultivate in his readers that would allow them to maintain a new kind 
of “cheerfulness [Heiterkeit]” in the face of the death of God.  According to Nietzsche, we have 
inherited a tradition that has habituated us to need deep assurances of wholeness, completeness, 
and cosmic security when thinking about the meaning of our lives.  But we now stand in the 
position of an unrequited lover who keeps asking the universe to love us back, but then receives 
no response.  In order to overcome our need for traditional assurances of cosmic security, 
Nietzsche claims that we must learn to engage in new kinds of risk-taking and adventure.   
I propose that we take Nietzsche’s numerous descriptions of his own project in terms of 
an adventurer setting forth for unknown destinations seriously and suggest that it functions as a 
kind of master metaphor for the overall therapeutic ideal that his practical psychology is trying to 
facilitate.  Psychology, in this adventurous sense, represents a new kind of therapeutic and 
diagnostic activity that attempts to cultivate new experiences of experimental open-mindedness 
in his readers that will help to set the stage for future forms of evaluation and self-esteem in a 
post-transcendent world.       
I end the dissertation with the suggestion that an underappreciated aspect of Nietzsche’s 
claims to originality is that he, himself, understands his own project to be ongoing, in process, 
still out to sea.  Rather than reading Nietzsche as thinker with fully worked out ideas and 





repeatedly advocates the therapeutic ideal: “Versuchen wir’s! [Let’s try it!]” (GS 51.)  What is 
most valuable in Nietzsche’s thinking when viewed from the standpoint of a therapeutic ideal 
rather than a theoretical system, I suggest, is not a catalogue of settled doctrines but rather an 
adventurous and experimental sensibility that continually seeks to explore the possibility of an 
open-ended, highly provisional, and yet-to-be-written future for philosophy.   
 
1.3 Calibrating Expectations  
 
Two final quick notes to calibrate expectations for what will follow.  This study will 
focus primarily on Nietzsche’s writings from the Gay Science onward: a period that begins in the 
early 1880’s and ends in a series of writings that he completed just prior to his mental collapse in 
1889; a collapse that effectively ends Nietzsche’s productive intellectual life.2  Undoubtedly, a 
wider net could have been cast when fishing for answers to the question of what Nietzsche 
means when he calls himself a psychologist.  His first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), 
already frames many philosophical questions about the nature of human suffering, life 
affirmation, and cultural renewal in broadly psychological terms.  In middle works such as 
Human, All Too Human (1878-1880) and Daybreak (1881) Nietzsche also frequently identifies 
himself as a psychologist while offering a wealth of psychological observations that begin to 
highlight the role that a naturalistically informed psychology might play in his overall 
explanations and assessments of human life.  But it is only in the context of the last decade of 
Nietzsche’s writings, or so I shall argue, that a distinctly new kind of practical psychology begins 
to emerge in his writings.  It is here that we find Nietzsche’s most significant, most original, and 
                                                      
2 The principal works of this period that Nietzsche either published (or at least prepared for publication) will 
therefore include: The Gay Science Parts I-IV (1882)/Part IV (1887), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885), Beyond 
Good and Evil (1886), The Genealogy of Morals (1887), Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, and Ecce Homo 





certainly most elusive conceptions of himself as a radically new kind of psychologist.  For these 
reasons, I have chosen to focus primarily on this last decade of Nietzsche’s writing and thinking, 
although I will occasionally draw upon his earlier writings where I think they would benefit the 
discussion. 
Additionally, aside from a few minor supplementary citations, I have opted to use 
Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks sparingly in this project.  Within Nietzsche scholarship there 
are now many well-rehearsed reasons for either including or excluding Nietzsche’s Nachlass 
when one attempts to understand, articulate, and assess his various philosophical positions, 
arguments, and goals.  One advantage of using his notebooks is that he often presents his ideas 
and arguments in fairly straightforward prose that is free of the figurative language and rhetorical 
pomp that often accompanies his presentation of ideas within his published writings—and 
particularly, in his later writings.3  One possible disadvantage of using Nietzsche’s notebooks, 
however, is that it is not always clear which of his entries are representative of his decided views 
on a subject and which entries may have been jotted down only to be later discarded or 
significantly revised at a later date.4  Moreover, the fact that Nietzsche consistently chose to 
publish his ideas in a far more elusive, rhetorical, and figurative fashion than offered in his 
notebooks should at least be taken into consideration when trying to assess what sorts of goals he 
is trying to achieve by writing in this way.  
                                                      
3 For that reason, some of the most influential studies of Nietzsche’s thought in the last few decades have utilized his 
notebooks to great effect when trying to bring clarity to many of his philosophical positions that remain obscure 
within his published writings.  See Richard Schacht’s Nietzsche (1983), Peter Poellner’s Nietzsche’s Metaphysics 
(1995), John Richardson’s Nietzsche’s System (1996) and Bernard Reginster The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on 
Overcoming Nihilism (2006.)     
4 The worry is articulated most forcefully and perhaps a bit over-dramatically by Bernd Magnus in his essay 
“Nietzsche Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the Übermensch,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 
(1986.)  More circumscribed worries about the value of Nietzsche’s notebooks are also presented by Maudemarie 
Clark Nietzsche and Truth and Philosophy (1991) and Brian Leiter Nietzsche on Morality (2002.) pp. xvii.    
 





My own view is that the debate over Nietzsche’s notebooks need not be an all or nothing 
affair.  There are some topics and themes in Nietzsche’s thinking that are more amenable to the 
use of his notebooks than others.  If this project were trying to understand and explain 
Nietzsche’s views on metaphysics, or his views on the history of nihilism, for example, I might 
well be inclined to avail myself of the rich material on those topics in his unpublished work.  The 
project at hand, however, focuses more narrowly on Nietzsche’s psychology as a kind of writing 
and questioning that aims to create an unsettling experience for his readers through the 
purposefully unconventional presentation of his ideas in his published texts.  For these reasons, I 
have chosen to work within the confines of those works he published or had deemed ready for 
publication.  
   
1.4 Nietzsche and New Beginnings   
  
Nietzsche boldly claims that his thinking marks a radically new beginning for 
philosophy.  His claim to originality in that regard is hardly distinctive.  All of the great 
philosophers have proposed similar claims to originality.  In fact, at least one way to read the 
history of philosophy is to interpret it as nothing other than a long succession of individuals who 
claim that their thinking now marks a new beginning for philosophy.  Despite their 
disagreements, however, most philosophers within the tradition have also shared a number of 
basic assumptions about what a new beginning for philosophy should look like.   
Most traditional philosophers, for example, have historically assumed that the objects of 
our ultimate philosophical concern must be located in an otherworldly or abstract beyond: true 
being, God, or more recently, the mathematical world of science.  Likewise, most traditional 
philosophers have sought to justify some genuine human connection with this otherworldly 





species to be cosmically unique in light of our possession of eternal souls, a rational essence, or a 
universal set of values or norms.  While answers to the question of the meaning of life might 
vary, one discovers within the tradition a shared and distinctly optimistic faith in the meaning of 
human life that aspires to something above and beyond what our various tribes, histories, and 
local practices have ascribed to it.   
The reason for this shared optimism, according to Nietzsche, is that humanity has always 
been a contingency-averse species and consequently has traditionally gone through great lengths 
to cling tightly to a particular redemption story; even when this story has become less believable 
in the modern era.  But what happens when we reach a point where we can no longer believe our 
own traditional answers about what counts as a meaningful life?  “The trust in life is gone,” 
Nietzsche informs us in his 1886 Preface to the Gay Science, “life, itself, has become a problem” 
(GS P:3.)  What happens when our traditional assumptions about meaning, themselves, have 
become a problem?       
One of the most original features in Nietzsche’s therapeutic project, or so I will argue, is 
found in his attempts to help us work through our newfound lack of trust in the cosmos.  In the 
process, Nietzsche also seeks to uncover a uniquely human vulnerability that over two millennia 
of philosophy and religion has sought to avoid.  One vulnerability that all species face, including 
our own, is the possibility of their own extinction.  Humans could easily go by way of the 
dinosaur or Dodo bird.  We live in troubling times.  It is hardly an insignificant worry.  
Nietzsche’s therapeutic concerns, however, ask a different question.  What happens if our species 
doesn’t go extinct—human life goes on—but it now goes on in ways where nothing really 
matters anymore.  What happens if mattering, itself, ceases to matter?  This danger, according to 





(pick any term you want) highlights a unique risk that has always been present for our species 
but is just now coming to realization in our modern consciousness. 
Nietzsche does not have a fully worked out therapeutic solution to this problem.  He 
speculates that it may take centuries of unprecedented philosophical and cultural change before 
his critical diagnosis and the questions that emerge from it are even fully intelligible.  But he 
does think a solution is possible.  After he informs us that our traditional trust in life has died, 
Nietzsche goes on to claim in that same 1886 Preface, “Yet one should not jump to the 
conclusion that this necessarily makes one gloomy.  Even love of life is still possible—only one 
loves differently” (GS P.)  Everything, of course, depends on what “differently” means here and 
part my project that follows will attempt to explore what kind of new evaluative attitude 
Nietzsche thinks would allow a new love of life to become possible.  What is clear is that 
Nietzsche thinks that if we are ever to come to love ourselves in a universe of doubt we must 
learn to take new risks, to ask new questions, and engage in a philosophical adventure.  But there 
are no assurances.  According to Nietzsche, we are engaged in a risky philosophical 
















NIETZSCHEAN THERAPY  
 
“Where are the new physicians of the soul?” (D 52) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Nietzsche informs his readers frequently and seemingly with great confidence that his 
most original contributions to philosophy are best understood in the context of his development 
of a radically new kind of psychology.  In his most enthusiastic moments, he even suggests that 
his originality reveals to his readers not just a good psychologist in some ordinary sense of that 
term but rather something like the invention of an entirely new kind of psychology.  It is this 
inaugural sense of his own originality that leads Nietzsche to pose the question, “What 
philosopher before me was a psychologist instead of its opposite, a ‘higher fraud’?” and then 
offer his readers the bold response: “Psychology did not exist until I appeared” (EH Destiny 6.)  
Nietzsche is far less outspoken and far more elusive, however, when it comes to offering his 
readers any specific details that might help them to better understand just what he means when 
he claims to be the first psychologist in an otherwise fraudulent philosophical field. 
In Chapter One, I suggested that Nietzsche’s claim to be the first psychologist is best 
understood in terms of his practical attempts to enact a radical transformation in his readers’ 
evaluative lives.  On my reading, Nietzsche’s inaugural claims are expressive less of his 
confidence in the priority of some new theoretical position that he attempts to advance than they 
are expressive of his confidence in novel attitudes that he wants to cultivate in his readers.  The 
modern self, according to Nietzsche, is facing a crisis of meaning that can be solved neither by 
simply taking a critical inventory of our current theoretical beliefs nor by introducing a new 





confrontation with the death of God and the nihilism that may follow demands something that is 
closer to therapy than to theory.   
The purpose of this chapter is to make a preliminary case for reading some of the most 
original features of Nietzsche’s thinking and writing in terms of his therapeutic ambitions.  The 
chapter will proceed as follows.  In section 2.2, I take stock of some recent trends in Nietzsche 
scholarship and assess some of the basic exegetical problems that arise when Nietzsche’s goals 
are read through the theoretical lens of contemporary philosophical commitments.  Section 2.3 
then makes a broad case for a therapeutic reading of Nietzsche, while also acknowledging that 
the term “therapeutic” has been interpreted variously and, at times, in ways not particularly 
helpful to our assessments of Nietzsche’s goals.  Section 2.4 contrasts Nietzsche’s therapeutic 
ambitions with a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of philosophical therapy and highlights 
some of the key differences between these two thinkers’ respective projects.  Finally, Section 2.5 
argues that Nietzsche’s unconventional style of philosophical writing is integral rather than 
accidental to the basic goals of his therapeutic philosophy.   
 
2.2 Nietzsche’s Goals: Theoretical and Therapeutic   
 
What are Nietzsche’s goals?  A central claim of this project is that we would do 
Nietzsche’s own understanding of himself as a psychologist a considerable disservice if we were 
to only describe his project as one that attempts to offer us “theories”—at least as that term is 
standardly employed today—at the expense of some of the practical and normative ambitions of 
his new psychology.  In what follows, I will attempt to make the case that his most original 
ambitions for his new psychology are therapeutic rather than theoretical.  To anticipate one 





there are no such things as theories or theoretical positions to be discovered in Nietzsche’s 
psychology, or for that matter, in his philosophy more generally.   
Nietzsche’s writings, in fact, offer us a wealth of psychological observations that display 
various speculative theoretical insights about the nature of the self, the intelligibility of human 
action, the role that unconscious forces and hidden drives [Triebe] might play in human 
motivation, self-deception, and so on.  These constructive speculative psychological insights are, 
in turn, aspects of Nietzsche’s overall theoretical critique of a number of traditional accounts of 
the self that are rooted in a libertarian conception of free will and moral responsibility; an 
essentialist picture of personal identity that defines the “true self” in terms of an enduring 
substance or immortal soul; and a traditional conception of “mind” and “will” that treats such 
entities as wholly transparent and accessible to introspection.  These various general critiques of 
the traditional self are themselves also, in turn, nested within Nietzsche’s much more expansive 
theoretical critique of the philosophical tradition that seeks to discredit belief in the existence of 
a supersensible world that exists independently of the natural world; to undermine a supernatural 
ontology of human value; and to call into question a providential and/or positivistic conception 
of historical, moral, political and philosophical progress. 
All of these critical and constructive theoretical views, however, have been the subject of 
intense interpretive controversy over the years.  One might claim that the sheer diversity of 
theoretical positions attributed to Nietzsche over the last century stands as testament to both his 
fecundity as a thinker and also his elusiveness as a writer.  Nietzsche once claimed that it would 
be at least two hundred years before anybody understood him (GM III: 27.)  By all evidence 
from the last century, it would appear that he is coming in slightly ahead of schedule.  Perhaps 





Nietzsche is just how many theoretical traditions now lay claim to him as their theoretical 
precursor.  In fact, Nietzsche has been held to anticipate most of the theoretical traditions of 
twentieth century ranging from analytic philosophy, existentialism, poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, pragmatism, and naturalism.5    
The history of Nietzsche scholarship has, in many ways, always been a hermeneutically 
promiscuous enterprise.  As Richard Schacht once remarked, “the more attention Nietzsche 
receives, the more Nietzsche’s there come to be.”6  While Nietzsche’s prediction in Ecce Homo 
that future academic chairs would be dedicated to the study of his Zarathustra (EH ‘Good 
Books’ 1) has not yet materialized; it is safe to say that his writings are now widely read, 
discussed, and debated with many contemporary academic departments.  The ever-growing 
variety of “isms” attributed to Nietzsche sees no signs of abating.    
The plentitude of “Nietzsche’s” who currently exist, however, was not always case.  The 
last half century has undergone a significant transformation in relation to questions about how 
Nietzsche can be read, and even, whether he should be read as a philosopher.  There was a time 
not so long ago where one might have to defend Nietzsche against charges of being a 
philosophical enabler of Leopold and Loeb, or of being a precursor to Nazism, or to use Bertrand 
Russell’s dismissive quip, of being merely a “literary philosopher” rather than a real one.7  
Starting with Walter Kaufmann’s 1950 book on Nietzsche, however, the latter half of the 
twentieth century has seen an influential line of commentators who have shown, in a variety of 
ways, that Nietzsche is a thinker who can be understood to be advancing significant 
philosophical positions and arguments and someone who deserves to take his place alongside 
                                                      
5 See Ashley Woodard’s Understanding Nietzscheanism (2011) for a helpful general survey of Nietzsche’s 
anticipation of many of these 20th century movements. 
6 Richard Schacht, Making Sense of Nietzsche (1995) p. 102 





thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Hume, and Kant as one of the great philosophers in the history 
Western tradition.8  More specifically, some of Nietzsche’s most interesting and most elusive 
concepts such as the Will to Power, the Eternal Return, and Perspectivism were shown to make 
novel and important contributions to a number of longstanding debates in the history of 
philosophy. 
What has emerged out of this rich interpretive legacy is not only a diverse Nietzsche—
there are many different interpretations of him—but also a shared agreement that he is a 
legitimate philosopher and someone who can be taken seriously.9  The emergence of a serious 
Nietzsche is due in part to the work of the generations of Nietzsche’s commentators who have 
shown readers that he can be read as a philosopher.  Not unrelated, one might also claim that the 
atmosphere of philosophical scholarship today is more amenable to taking a thinker like 
Nietzsche seriously.  The austere purity laws once instituted and so rigidly enforced by early 
analytic philosophy have now been relaxed.  What counts as “philosophy” today is a much wider 
category than during the heyday of logical positivism.  Russell’s dismissal of Nietzsche as a 
                                                      
8Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (1950.)  A list of the commentators in the 
Anglophone tradition who have contributed to serious philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought is 
growing every year but the most notable commentators of the last half-century who have made the idea of a 
philosophical Nietzsche possible would surely include: Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965); Richard 
Schacht, Nietzsche (1983); Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1987); and Maudemarie Clark, 
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (1991.)  It is also worth acknowledging George Morgan’s early work What 
Nietzsche Means (1941) which did not have the impact of Kaufmann’s book but certainly influenced many of the 
commentators on Nietzsche that would follow.        
9 My comments here have focused almost exclusively on the Anglophone reception of Nietzsche that led to a new 
respect for him as a philosopher.  For a more in-depth survey of Nietzsche’s influence and possible anticipation of 
analytic philosophy, see Simon Robertson and David Owen “Nietzsche’s Influence on Analytic Philosophy” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (2013) pp. 185-206.  There is, of course, another path to Nietzsche’s legitimacy 
found in his European reception.  Heidegger’s highly influential lectures on Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of 
the West have also significantly influenced the legitimacy of Nietzsche as a thinker in the twentieth century.  See 
Heidegger Nietzsche Vol. 1 & Vol. 2 (1979).  For a more in-depth study of Nietzsche’s anticipation of and influence 
on European postmodernism and poststructuralism, see Alan Schrift’s Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of 





mere “literary” philosopher seems almost quaint today and no longer carries the same cautionary 
tones that it did half a century ago.  All in all, the state of Nietzsche studies looks good.    
The last two decades, however, have witnessed the emergence of another new Nietzsche 
that offers us what we might call a distinctly theoretical reading of his philosophy.  Here we find 
new interpretations of Nietzsche that not only present him as a thinker who holds philosophical 
positions and engages in traditional philosophical debates but also as someone who anticipates, 
and perhaps even advocates, a number of extremely fine-grained contemporary theoretical views.  
A survey of recent interpretations of Nietzsche’s metaethical views, to take just one example, 
offers readings that frame his theoretical commitments in terms of both an anticipation and 
endorsement of a wide array of contemporary theories ranging from fictionalism to expressivism 
to constitutivism to motivational internalism to contemporary ethical naturalism.10        
At first glance, one might assume that the variety of contemporary theories now 
attributed to Nietzsche is just a natural extension of his newfound legitimacy in the academic 
world and, therefore, a natural extension of the ongoing interpretive controversies that have 
always accompanied his writings.  Whereas we used to debate about whether Nietzsche was a 
precursor to existentialism, or deconstruction, or ordinary language philosophy, we now are 
engaged in more circumscribed debates about whether Nietzsche is a precursor to fictionalism, or 
constitutivism, or norm-expressivism.  Simon Robertson gives voice to this general attitude in a 
recent review article on contemporary developments in Nietzsche scholarship:   
there is a growing appreciation that however novel his methods and radical his 
conclusions, many of Nietzsche’s central concerns arise from and engage with the same 
                                                      
10For an example of Fictionalism: see Nadeem Hussain’s “Nietzsche’s fictionalism”; Norm Expressivism: see 
Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “Nietzsche and moral objectivity: The development of Nietzsche’s 
metaethics” in ed. Leiter & Sinhababu Nietzsche and Morality (2007); ; Motivational Internalism: see Simon 
Robertson “Normativity for Free Spirits” Inquiry (2011); Consitutivism: see Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the 
Foundation of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism (2013); Contemporary Ethical Naturalism: see Brian Leiter, 





traditions that shape contemporary ethical thought: and so it is a welcome sight to see an 
increasing number of commentators connecting his ethics to ongoing topics of 
contemporary inquiry”11    
 
Questions about which of these contemporary theoretical positions Nietzsche might actually hold 
have been interpreted variously, even hotly disputed, but the emergence of a distinctly theoretical 
Nietzsche in the last few decades appears to be guided by a basic hopeful attitude, stated quite 
clearly by Robertson above, that the unconventional presentation of Nietzsche’s ideas can be 
rationally reconstructed into more circumscribed and more conventional contemporary 
theoretical commitments without losing sight of his basic goals.  That is, the goals that 
Nietzsche’s commentators variously reconstruct for him in the form of explicit theoretical 
positions and methodological frameworks are held to be the same goals that Nietzsche, himself, 
has chosen to express indirectly through aphorism, parody, parable, and pun, and elusive 
figurative images.       
One problem with Robertson’s hopeful attitude, however, is a worry about whether the 
contemporary “isms” currently being attributed to this new theoretical Nietzsche are actually 
doing something more ambitious than past interpretive attempts to place him within a general 
philosophical tradition such as existentialism, poststructuralism, or even analytic philosophy.  To 
claim that Nietzsche is a precursor to any of these general traditions of philosophy still allows for 
plenty of interpretive leeway in terms of how one might describe Nietzsche as a member of that 
tradition.  The philosophical clubs to which this new theoretical Nietzsche is now being 
auditioned, however, demand a far more restrictive membership.   
A rather obvious worry is that Nietzsche’s own understanding and presentation of what 
counts as an “argument” or “theory” is considerably looser than our own contemporary 
                                                      





standards.  As already noted, Nietzsche’s writings are significantly underdetermined when it 
comes to discovering various theories at work in his thinking.  My concern in what follows is not 
to evaluate whether fictionalism or norm-expressivism (or any of the other theories) might 
represent Nietzsche’s actual views.  Textual evidence, to a greater or lesser degree, can be found 
to support any of these contemporary readings.  For that very same reason, however, one might 
also worry that these types of narrow reconstructive efforts tend to yield a problematic 
theoretical bounty.  For once theoretical reconstruction begins in earnest the difficulty 
encountered when reading Nietzsche is hardly that one discovers too few theoretical positions 
within the many underdetermined passages that populate his writing but rather that one quickly 
discovers one theory too many.    
It is not clear that Nietzsche’s texts can support the kind of fine-grained consistency 
demanded by contemporary theory.  One cannot be both a fictionist and also a constitutivist at 
the same time upon pain of suffering a significant metaethical identity crisis.  In order to achieve 
the kind of consistency demanded by contemporary theory, it would appear that many 
commentators must often simply pick and choose those passages in Nietzsche that lend support 
to the particular “ism” they endorse while also discarding those passages that do not directly 
support—or perhaps even flagrantly contradict—the narrow theoretical commitments that they 
claim is Nietzsche’s own adopted view.  A more general worry is that many of these new 
contemporary theoretical readings can begin to resemble something like a philosophical 
Rorschach test where each reader sees their own theoretical commitments reflected back to them 
through the underdetermined nature of Nietzsche’s texts.12   
                                                      
12Maudemarie Clark seems, at times, to raise this kind of interpretive worry in her esoteric readings of Nietzsche.  
Clark claims that her reading of Nietzsche uncovers hidden messages in his writing: that Nietzsche sometimes not 
only does not say what he means but even states the exact opposite of what he means in order to throw off some of 





The amount of inconsistency discovered in Nietzsche’s texts at a theoretical level might 
not be an interpretive problem in and of itself.  Perhaps we might all admit that some kind of 
Rorshach test is possibly always at play in our various interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts.  
Nietzsche, himself, seems to endorse the view that different readers will see different things in 
work.  For example, in Ecce Homo he informs us that, “Anyone who thinks they have 
understood me has made me into something after their own image” (EH ‘Good Books’ 10.)  
Interpretive problems do arise, however, if we claim that these narrow contemporary theoretical 
commitments are Nietzsche’s actual goals—what he is trying to do—and in the process we then 
obfuscate, or outright ignore, many of the other goals he pursues that do not fit so neatly into 
contemporary theoretical debates.  The quest to turn Nietzsche into a savvy contemporary 
theoretician might very well vaunt him into a new level of academic prestige.   But such a 
translation project might also turn out to place significant limitations on our understanding of his 
more novel claims to originality.     
Worries about underdetermination and theoretical consistency pose one kind of 
interpretive problem for those who wish to enlist Nietzsche into the service of contemporary 
theory.  Worries about anachronism pose another.  Fine-grained views like fictionalism or 
constitutivism presuppose a set of background commitments about truth-apt propositions, 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism, the relation between semantics and normative analysis, as well 
as a host of other assumptions that accompany contemporary debates in metaethics today.  Given 
differences in vocabulary between Nietzsche and today, it is simply not clear that he shares these 
                                                      
evidence that does not support her views on Nietzsche she will often claim that Nietzsche has purposefully presented 
a “bad” argument to the reader and that the particular passage can either be disregarded or radically interpreted in 
ways that do support her view.  One problem with this strategy, of course, is that anyone can do it, including those 
who argue against Clark’s reading.  See Clark and David Dubrick’s recent book The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond 





background assumptions.  Given that most of these debates did not come into being until the 
middle of the twentieth century, it is also hard to assess whether he even could have shared these 
current assumptions, at least at the level of theoretical specificity they are held today.  Such 
concerns about anachronism have led some commentators like Brian Leiter to claim: “there are 
not simply adequate grounds for ‘assigning’ to Nietzsche a view on such subtle matters as 
whether ethical language is primarily cognitive or non-cognitive”13  In recent years, even 
previously ambitious commentators like Nadeem Hussain have begun to modify their own 
readings with an eye towards the dangers of aggressive anachronism within Nietzsche 
scholarship.  Hussain, for example, recently claimed that he still believes that Nietzsche’s 
metaethics embrace a general form of fictionalism but now adds the grudging admission that, 
“[Nietzsche’s] texts lack the granularity that would really be needed to resolve the claims of 
competing metaethical interpretations.”14 
One might object to my line of criticism by claiming that worries about anachronism in 
the history of philosophy are not only overblown but also unavoidable.  Each generation takes up 
the philosophical figures of the past and interprets them in light of their own problems and needs.  
It would be mere fantasy to think otherwise.  Perhaps more importantly, one might argue that 
each present generation should make the past speak in terms of the present if they want the 
history of philosophy to count for something more than mere antiquarian interest.  In this sense, 
the threat of anachronism is simply a necessary interpretive feature that one always faces when 
                                                      
13Brian Leiter “Nietzsche Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings,” European Journal of Philosophy (2000) p. 
278-279.  Although it should be noted that Leiter does not heed his own advice in all aspects of Nietzsche.  Leiter 
appears to claim to discover many contemporary commitments within Nietzsche’s psychology that appear to be at 
least as anachronistic as the metaethical appropriations of Nietzsche that he criticizes so severely.  For example, 
Leiter claims that, “Nietzsche’s naturalism [….] wins recent support from recent work on the will in empirical 
psychology.”  See Leiter, “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will” in (ed. Gemes and May) Nietzsche on Freedom and 
Autonomy, (2009) p. 107.     





doing the history of philosophy.  Richard Rorty sums up this interpretive dilemma well in one of 
his early essays on historiographical methodology:  
There seems to be a dilemma: either we anachronistically impose enough of our problems 
and vocabulary on the dead to make them conversational partners, or we confine our 
interpretive activity to making their falsehoods less silly by placing them in the context of 
the benighted times in which they were written.15 
 
Rorty is undoubtedly correct here.  Interpretations of Nietzsche, like any historical figure, will 
always be a negotiation between the past and the present.  Once again, Nietzsche appears to have 
anticipated some of these interpretive issues.  Nietzsche once imagined Beethoven coming back 
from the dead and hearing his symphonies performed in a contemporary style quite foreign to 
Beethoven’s own time.  Nietzsche then envisions Beethoven’s response: “that is neither I nor 
not-I but some third thing” (AOM 126.)  Perhaps we might look at the emergence of this newly 
theoretical Nietzsche as a third-thing as well.  It contains some parts of Nietzsche while perhaps 
leaving other parts out.  Few people would openly profess that their readings aspire to endorse 
some form of Nietzschean originalism.  It might be the case that there is value to be found in the 
task of articulating Nietzsche’s views in terms of contemporary theoretical commitments and 
vocabularies that he, himself, did not employ.    
  At the same time, a strong tendency to only treat the history of ideas in terms of a series 
of incomplete or eccentric contributions to one’s own present theoretical commitments can lead 
to a certain kind of blindness that cannot be ignored.  Bernard Williams once made fun of a 
certain strain of Oxford scholarship in ancient philosophy that took the form of a “triumphant 
anachronism” where everyone claims that, “we should approach the works of Plato as if they had 
appeared in last month’s issue of Mind.”16  Williams goes on to claim that highlighting the 
                                                      
15 Richard Rorty,“The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” in Rorty (ed.) Philosophy in History (1984) p. 1 





differences between ourselves and the past might often prove to be more philosophically 
important than simply highlighting the similarities.  The past, for example, might highlight a 
concept or idea that we have forgotten from our contemporary point of view.  Williams goes on, 
“One way in which the history of philosophy can help serve this purpose is the basic and familiar 
one of making the familiar seem strange, and conversely, but it needs to learn how to better do 
this” 17  
In his recent book on Nietzsche’s relation to and anticipation of contemporary theories in 
cognitive science, Rex Welshon sums up some of the problematic ambitions of the new 
theoretical Nietzsche while also offering us a cautionary example of Williams’ worries about 
distance and anachronism.  Welshon writes on some of the emerging trends in Nietzsche 
scholarship:     
This recent work [on Nietzsche] abjures the zing of Nietzsche’s style and the shocking 
extremes of expression to which he is prone, replacing them with the kind of careful 
explanation and scrutiny characteristic of the contemporary professor outfitted with all 
the gizmos found in the philosopher’s toolbox.18  
 
In one sense, Welshon reflects the same theoretical optimism towards Nietzsche’s relationship 
with contemporary trends in cognitive science that we saw earlier exhibited by Simon 
Robertson’s optimistic attitude towards Nietzsche’s relationship with contemporary metaethics.  
On Welshon’s view, we clearly have far more sophisticated philosophical tools at our disposal 
today than Nietzsche did well over a century ago.  So why not use them?  If one were given a 
choice to either have their appendix removed with nineteenth century technology or with the full 
resources of all of modern medicine’s wisdom and associated technological gizmos, few would 
choose the former.   
                                                      
17 Williams, Ibid. p. 259 





A problem with Welshon’s progressivist metaphor, however, is that it is hardly clear that 
the discipline of philosophy has access to some kind of universal toolbox that just keeps getting 
better throughout history.  What if some of Nietzsche’s own set of tools are better than 
contemporary philosophy at trying to diagnose a set of problems that he thinks have been hidden 
from traditional philosophy and, quite possibly, are still hidden from us today?  To return to 
Williams’ point, what might seem like the strangest features of Nietzsche’s thinking, those 
aspects most of step with contemporary philosophy, might very well turn out to be the features of 
Nietzsche’s thinking that might benefit us the most.  
Raymond Geuss has recently echoed many of Williams’ concerns with a particular focus 
on the way that much Post-Kantian European philosophy has been reinterpreted into the narrow 
theoretical frameworks of contemporary Anglo-American moral theory.  According to Geuss, 
recent attempts to place Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger within the context of 
contemporary moral theory often end up obfuscating some of the main goals that these thinkers 
are trying to accomplish.  Most of these thinkers, according to Geuss, are “deeply concerned with 
human life in its practical aspects,” and, consequently, “their theories don’t seem easily to fit into 
the usual categories [of philosophy], and to the extent to which they can be read as instances of 
deontological, consequentialist, perfectionist, eudaimonistic, or any of the other standard types of 
theories, the results can easily seem shallow or extremely implausible”19  Geuss goes on to claim 
that this does not mean that these thinkers cannot make significant contributions to contemporary 
theory but he does caution that, “it might suggest that if we wished to see whether there was 
                                                      





anything to be learned from them, it would behoove us to approach them in a way that is 
different from the ones that are customarily in use.”20 
To sum up, my contention so far is that the distinctly theoretical Nietzsche who has 
emerged out of some recent scholarship is not so much incorrect as he is incomplete.  If our 
focus lay solely with showing how Nietzsche’s writings might offer us eccentric versions of 
ordinary theory, then we might run the risk of not appreciating other elements of his thinking that 
integrate less well with the contemporary theoretical landscape.  The real question is whether we 
might interpret Nietzsche’s arguments to aspire to something more than the current commitments 
of contemporary theory.  Finding a solution to the death of God is likely not the same thing as 
finding a solution to the Gettier problem.  What if Nietzsche’s ultimate concerns aspire to 
something other than the goals taken up within standard theoretical views and philosophical 
debates?  It is here that Nietzsche’s own novel understanding of psychology helps to shed new 
light on the nature of his original goals.  For the most original problems that Nietzsche’s new 
psychology seeks to address are not found in the explicit foreground of the tradition and its 
history but rather are buried deeply in its implicit practical background.   
Nietzsche’s overall views on the nature of theoretical knowledge helps to introduce the 
role that psychology plays in his overall philosophical project.  When reading Nietzsche, we 
often find him more concerned with the diagnostic task of figuring out why a person, a group of 
people, or even a whole historical epoch might have chosen to hold a particular metaphysical, 
epistemological, or ethical view as opposed to whether that view is true or false relative to the 
context of conventional academic debates.  As Robert Solomon once put it, “Philosophers tend to 
                                                      
20 Ibid. p. 40. Christopher Janaway has also voiced similar concerns about how Nietzsche and the Post-Kantian 
philosophical tradition has been appropriated by contemporary theory.  He writes: “Nietzsche should not be treated  
as though he were some determinate species of theorist from the latter half of the twentieth century, or as though, 





insist on the truth of a belief, but psychologists are more interested in why one believes what one 
believes.”21  This general diagnostic feature of Nietzsche’s thinking is, in fact, almost exclusively 
associated with the psychological dimensions of his philosophical project.  Even critics who 
disagree with Nietzsche on most philosophical issues tend to give him high praise when it comes 
to assessing the diagnostic acuity of his psychological insights.22   
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant and most commented upon features of 
Nietzsche’s psychological approach to the problems of philosophy is found in his attempts to 
reveal to his readers that traditional appeals to the truth of various theoretical positions actually 
depend upon prior normative commitments.  According to Nietzsche, the traditional view of 
philosophical inquiry as a kind of magisterially impersonal and detached intellectual activity is 
deeply mistaken.  The arguments that a philosopher endorses are not chosen from the standpoint 
of neutral theoretical assessment.  Rather, a philosophical argument, a philosophical movement, 
and even the entire philosophical tradition, reflect back the self-image of the philosopher or 
philosophers who created them.  There is, Nietzsche tells us, a “hidden history of philosophers” 
(EH P: 3.)  Philosophy is always a “desire from the heart” (BGE 5) and represents a “confession 
of faith on the part of the author, and a type of involuntary and unself-conscious memoir” (BGE 
6.)     
What role this hidden history plays in our overall assessment of Nietzsche’s claims to 
originality as a psychologist will take some time to fill out in more detail in the pages that 
                                                      
21 Robert Solomon, Living With Nietzsche (2003) p. 19 
22 Two highly influential philosophical studies of modernity that strongly position themselves against Nietzsche’s 
general philosophical project (or at least what they take to be Nietzsche’s project) while also taking seriously 
Nietzsche’s psychological insights on the emergence of the modern self are Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue 
(1981) and Jurgen Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990.) For a critical response to 
Habermas see Alexander Nehamas, “Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Nietzsche (1995.) for an interesting response to MacIntyre.  For a critical response to Habermas, see Raymond 
Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy” European Journal of Philosophy (2005.)   





follow.  It should be noted at the outset, however, that the role that psychology plays in 
explaining what we might call Nietzsche’s unmasking of the implicit normative background of 
philosophy has been interpreted in a variety of ways.  One might claim, for example, that 
Nietzsche’s psychology is still offering us theories: a new kind of third personal psychological 
theory that explains why philosophers (or people generally) hold one set of particular views over 
others.  Brian Leiter, for example, draws on contemporary trait psychology in an influential 
naturalistic reading of Nietzsche’s psychology that claims that various individuals have essential 
“type-facts” (fixed physiological and psychological facts that determine their personality) that 
causally explain their moral and philosophical beliefs.23  Nietzsche’s ambiguous theory of human 
“drives [Triebe]” has also been used frequently in recent scholarship to offer a third personal 
casual account of the formulation of an individual’s values and beliefs.24  
Nietzsche does offer many different speculative third personal explanatory theories of the 
human self and human nature within his philosophical psychology.  What is often neglected, 
however, are some of the unique first personal features of Nietzsche’s new psychology that aim 
to be interpretive rather than explanatory and that seek to practically address his readers’ 
experience of their own lives.  To return for a moment to the quotation that inspired the topic of 
this dissertation, it is worth noting that Nietzsche does not claim that he is the first psychologist 
amongst the philosophers because he thinks that all of the philosophers’ theories were false.  
Rather, he claims to be the first psychologist because all of the other philosophical psychologists 
that came before him have been “frauds” (EH ‘Destiny’ 6.)  The remainder of this project might 
                                                      
23 See Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (2002) esp. chapter 1.  See also: Leiter and Joshua Knobe, “The Case for 
Nietzschean Moral Psychology in (ed. Leiter and Neil Sinhababu) Nietzsche and Morality (2007.) 
24 See: Paul Katsafanas “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology” in (ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson) The 
Oxford Handbook to Nietzsche (2013) pp. 727-756.  See also: Ken Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation” in 





be seen as a kind of extended meditation on what it might mean to experience the Western 
tradition as fraudulent rather than false.   
Nietzsche’s main criticism of the Western tradition is not primarily that it has managed to 
formulate bad theoretical positions (although he surely does think that) but rather that those bad 
theoretical positions are symptomatic of a much deeper problem with humanity’s own self-image 
of its sense of dignity, worth, and value.  What is fraudulent, according to Nietzsche, is that we 
have suffered for most of our history from a chronic lack of self-esteem because we have 
historically assessed the value of our lives as deficient versions of our own highest transcendent 
ideals: God, the Eternal, the Pure, the Absolute, the Good.  One of the more underappreciated 
features of Nietzsche’s new psychology, I will suggest, is discovered in his emancipatory 
attempts to help his readers practically assess their own experience of the fraudulence of the 
Western tradition with the hope that they can begin to experience themselves in new ways.               
In what follows, I will suggest that the practical goals that Nietzsche sets for his readers 
through his inaugural psychology might therefore be better described in terms of a therapeutic 
achievement rather than a technical mastery of any given theory or doctrine found within his 
philosophy.  But I see no reason to think that the therapeutic reading I develop in what follows is 
incompatible with an acknowledgement of the many theoretical components that also comprise 
his psychology, and his philosophical ambitions more generally.  That is, in addition to the much 
commented on explicit arguments that Nietzsche takes up against the philosophical tradition, one 
also finds a practical diagnosis of the various pathologies of modern life (and the historical 
pathologies that have influenced modern life) that have transformed his readers into sick, 
trapped, or disordered selves.  Much like the theoretical Nietzsche, however, we shall see the 





will attempt to sort through some of the various ways that we might call Nietzsche a therapeutic 
philosopher.    
   
2.3 The Idea of a Nietzschean Therapy  
 
I have opted to use the term “therapeutic” to describe the most original features in 
Nietzsche’s psychology with some hesitation.  The very idea of a therapeutic philosophy is 
admittedly a somewhat exotic and heady doctrine that is often employed in ways that admit of 
blurry boundaries and sometimes saccharine sensibilities.  “Existential” might also have served 
as a general term that captures my focus on Nietzsche’s engagement with his readers’ practical 
attitudes, although that term has also come to mean many different things over the years and 
equally suffers from ambiguity by overuse.25   
One benefit of using “therapy” is that it carries a connotation that a reader must not 
simply face up to their existential situation but must also undergo a conversion of sorts.  An 
obvious concern is that the idea of philosophical therapy would appear to draw its meaning from 
a fairly loose analogy with actual therapeutic practices.  Ken Gemes, for example, tries to explain 
the impact that Nietzsche’s writings might have on a reader’s unconscious affects with the 
following claim: “Like a clever psychoanalyst, he [Nietzsche] knows that a direct approach will 
merely awaken the patient’s/reader’s defenses and provoke a reflex denial and refusal to 
countenance his message.”26   
                                                      
25Nonetheless, existential still might be a good term to use.  In fact, the term “existential” has been used by some 
scholars to tease out some of the same original features of Nietzsche’s practical philosophy that I will try to develop 
in my own reading.  For example, see: Ivan Soll’s “Attitudes Towards Life: Nietzsche’s Existential Project” 
International Studies in Philosophy 34:3 (2002) and, also Bernd Magnus’s Nietzsche’s Existential Imperatives 
(1978.)                  
26 Ken Gemes, “We Remain of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves” in ed. Acampora, Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy 





At first glance, the general meaning of Gemes’s use of the therapeutic analogy comes 
across quite clearly.  But, upon second glance, some aspects of the analogy become problematic 
or, at least, in need of further discussion.  Nietzsche is not our psychotherapist.  We are not 
sitting on his couch halfway through a session.  No transference has occurred.  Actual 
therapeutic practice is a complex interpersonal activity that is interactive and dialogical in ways 
that are quite different from reading a book.  Such realizations soon lead to a variety of 
ambiguous questions such as: How does such a therapy work?  What does it mean to be sick? 
And what might count as a philosophical cure?         
There are, of course, other forms of therapy that might make an analogy with a 
philosophical text more amenable and do not require a therapist’s couch.  Take, for example, the 
genre of the self-help book.  Nietzsche’s writings have, in fact, been read in such a fashion and 
help to illustrate some of my anxieties about how quickly the idea of philosophical therapy as 
self-help can quickly collapse into superficial consolations, perhaps even comedy.   
Consider the case of a recently published book entitled Life Lessons From Nietzsche.27  
The book, itself, is part of a series entitled The School of Life edited by notable popularizer of 
philosophy as a form of self-help and self-improvement, Alain de Botton.28  The stated task of 
the book series is to show contemporary readers how various philosophical greats like Thomas 
Hobbes, Soren Kierkegaard, Henri Bergson, and Friedrich Nietzsche can help us to negotiate the 
daily difficulties of modern life.  At first glance, the overall proposal seems promising.  All of 
these thinkers are deeply concerned with the difficulties of modern life.  But a number of basic 
problems begin to quickly emerge with the therapeutic picture of Nietzsche presented in the text.  
The inside jacket cover of Life Lessons with Nietzsche announces:  
                                                      
27 John Armstrong, Life Lessons From Nietzsche (2013)  





You may ignore it, but Nietzsche’s thinking is immediately and easily applicable to our 
everyday lives.  The author inspired by the work just as much as by the life of the 
German thinker, extracts the very substance of his wisdom, and invites us to use it to live 
better.  Enriched with many quotes, understandable by everybody, this book will for sure 
be a valued companion on the road to happiness.   
 
With chapters boasting titles such as “How to Find Your Best Self” and “Be a Noble, Not a 
Slave,” one begins to wonder to what exact therapeutic purpose Nietzsche is being employed.  
Part of the problem here is not just an egregious misunderstanding of some of Nietzsche’s main 
concepts but also a significant distortion of the overall goals one might hope to achieve by 
reading a thinker like Nietzsche.  It is not clear that Nietzsche’s goal was be a “valued 
companion on the road to happiness.”29  At least, very few Nietzsche scholars would probably 
embrace this view.  Richard Schacht, for example, once referred to these kinds of optimistic new 
age readings of Nietzsche as committing the fallacy of reductio ad Californiam.30  Indeed, it 
would appear that much of the importance of Nietzsche’s thinking is displaced if we begin to 
think of him as some kind of nineteenth century Dr. Phil who is trying to peddle easy cures for 
the ailments of the modern soul.    
I raise concerns about the questionable scholarship underlying Life Lessons from 
Nietzsche somewhat playfully, but a serious question lies in the background.  One might claim 
that a significant theme that emerges out of the modern self-help movement is a preoccupation 
with offering readers the promise of a particular kind of consolation for their current problems 
that a thinker like Nietzsche is keen to rebut.  This consolation is most often articulated under the 
guise of ready-made advice for particular situations, workshops and personal inventories, and 
various procedural checklists that can be worked through stage by stage.  What is problematic 
about many of the thinkers who have been chosen to be featured in the de Botton’s School of Life 
                                                      
29 As Nietzsche once quipped, “Only the Englishman pursues happiness” (TI III, 12.)  





series is that none of them would appear to offer their readers the kind of ready-made consolation 
usually found in popularized self-help books.  Kierkegaard, for example, vows something like 
the exact opposite of ready-made consolation when he informs his readers in The Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript that he has made up his mind to make his reader’s lives more difficult 
rather than less so.  He writes:    
So only one lack remains [in our time]…the lack of difficulty.  Out of love of humankind, 
out of despair over my awkward predicament of having achieved nothing and out of 
being unable to make anything easier than it had already been made, out of genuine 
interest in those who make everything ease, I comprehended that it was my task: to make 
difficulties everywhere.31 
 
What bothers Kierkegaard is the sense of comfort that most modern readers simply take for 
granted when demanding a meaning for their lives.  I would venture that many of the other 
philosophers listed in the School of Life list might agree with Kierkegaard that philosophy rarely 
offers easy solutions to the problems of life.32  Perhaps Hobbes might be of help to someone who 
has just had a bad day at the office; but it is unlikely that he would offer them any easy 
consolation.   
The problem with self-help books, as Charles Guignon once pointed out, is that the 
human self is not so easy to help.33  As I hope to show in what follows, one of the basic points of 
Nietzsche’s assessment of the modern self is that we have become strangers to the possibilities of 
our own best selves.  The idea that, as Life Lessons from Nietzsche suggests, “Nietzsche’s 
thinking is immediately and easily applicable to our everyday lives” is quite possibly one of the 
                                                      
31 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) p. 157  
32This is also not to say there are not more serious treatments of philosophy as a genre of self-help.  For example, 
Lou Marinoff’s very popular Plato, Not Prozac (2000) attempts to show that personal self-reflection in addition to 
medication is an important aspect of the therapeutic process.  Moreover, the growing movement of philosophical 
therapy has actually created a market for patient-therapist dialogical relations that use philosophical readings in 
targeted ways to help clients work through their life problems.   
33 See: Charles Guignon Authenticity (2008.)  Guignon offers a critical and often hilarious philosophical assessment 





worst lessons that one could ever derive from his intended therapeutic project.  Learning to know 
ourselves in a new way cannot be accomplished by simply adopting a few Nietzschean catch 
phrases nor even by embracing a new set of concepts like Will to Power or the Übermensch.  
Rather, the task of learning to experience ourselves in new ways will require a significant 
revaluation of deeply entrenched habits and assumptions.  The risk Nietzsche asks his 
adventurously minded readers to undertake is not only extraordinarily dangerous but also by no 
means even assured to succeed.   
One might object that part of the difficulty encountered so far in our discussion of 
philosophical therapy is due to the fact that we have let ourselves get boxed into a far too narrow 
definition of what counts as therapy.  Perhaps if we broaden our horizons we might find a more 
meaningful conception of philosophical therapy that exists outside the provinces of 
psychoanalytic practice and the self-help industry.  Carl Jung has argued, for example, that the 
role of the psychotherapist is simply the modern successor to the sorts of therapeutic roles that 
have always been performed by various religious clergy throughout most of human history.  
Whereas we once might have gone to the country pastor for help in navigating the bumps and 
bruises of life, we now go to counseling.  Jung’s general point is that this sort of spiritual 
therapeutic work has always gone on in human history and that clinical therapy is best seen as 
supplanting the clergy as cultural caretakers of the meaning of life.34  Although himself a 
practicing psychotherapist, Jung claims a more robust understanding of therapeutic practice must 
recover a history that is more expansive than the narrow constraints of the self-help guru or 
professional psychotherapist.       
                                                      





To expand on Jung’s general point, the idea that philosophy, itself, could serve as a 
model for a kind of therapy of the self does have a long and rich history that reaches back to 
antiquity and, in particular, receives strong expression in Epicurean and Stoic views of the proper 
function of philosophy in a human life.  The last few decades have seen a revived interest in 
ancient practices of the ‘art of living’ as well as questions about how those practices might help 
those of us living today.  Much of this new interest can be traced back to influential studies of 
philosophical therapy in the ancient world by Pierre Hadot and Martha Nussbuam.35  Both Hadot 
and Nussbaum claim that much of Hellenistic philosophy is best understood not in terms of 
purely theoretical positions but rather in terms of various therapeutic practices to aim to achieve 
a healthy unified life.  
A number of commentators who have been significantly influenced by Hadot’s work 
have offered recent interpretations of Nietzsche’s writings (and particularly, his middle works) 
that portray his goals in terms of an attempt to recover ancient therapeutic practices of the self.36  
While the “return to the ancients” therapeutic readings (for lack of a better term) of Nietzsche 
differ in significant ways they all share a conviction that he has modeled his own account of 
therapeutic practice upon various ancient Stoic and Epicurean practices of self-cultivation.  It is 
through a recovery of ancient practices of the art of living, according to such readings, that 
Nietzsche seeks to heal the fragmented modern self by offering it a new sense of unity, 
wholeness, and health.  Keith Ansell-Pearson, for example, claims that Nietzsche’s central 
therapeutic goal in his middle writings is “centered on a concern with healing our own lives.”37  
                                                      
35 See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995) and Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (1994.)   
36 See: Horst Hutter, Shaping the Future: Nietzsche New Regime of the Soul and its Ascetic Practices, (2005); 
Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works (2008), and Keith Ansell Pearson “For 
Mortal Souls: Philosophy and Therapeia in Nietzsche’s Dawn,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 66 
(2010)   





Ansell Pearson directly acknowledges the influence of Hadot on his reading of Nietzsche and 
claims that a return to ancient practices is part of Nietzsche’s new goal to “search for an 
authentic mode of existence” and for envisioning “new possibilities for life.”38   
Most of the ‘return to the ancient’ readings also claim that Nietzsche’s extensive 
diagnostic and normative use of medical terminology such as health, healing, sickness, disease, 
and convalescence is drawn from ancient analogies between the health of the body and the health 
of the soul.39  For example, the Stoic Chysippus’ claims that, “It is not true that there exists an art 
that we call medicine, concerned with the diseased body, but no corresponding art concerned 
with the diseased soul.”40  Against some of the more reductive readings of Nietzsche’s use of 
organic terms, many of these commentators claim that Nietzsche is asking us to follow the 
ancient practice of viewing the health of the soul as an extension of the health of the body.  An 
example of this might be seen in the Stoic dictum that moderation in one’s physical appetites will 
lead to moderation in one’s emotional passions and, in turn, both will promote human 
flourishing.  Nietzsche, in his own way, continues this focus on the care of the self through his 
various counsels, admonitions, prescriptions, and advice that he offers his readers in hope that 
they can reclaim and cultivate a more unified sense of their own lives through an emulation of 
ancient practice of self-care.                   
There are many appealing features of the ‘return to the ancients’ view of Nietzsche’s 
therapeutic practices.  Many passages in Nietzsche’s writings (and particularly, in his middle 
writings) do seem to exemplify a philosophy of self-care that contains various counsels and 
                                                      
38 Ibid. 407 
39 See Michael Ure, “Nietzsche’s Free Spirit Trilogy and Stoic Therapy” for an in-depth discussion of the medical 
analogy in Stoicism and also of Nietzsche’s appropriation of this analogy.  Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38 (2009) 
pp. 61-65.   





maxims to his readers on how to lead a good life.  As Nietzsche tells us, “Oh those Greeks! They 
knew how to live” (GS P: 4.)  Given his philological background and longstanding admiration of 
Greek life, it makes plausible sense that his own therapeutic model of philosophy might have 
been inspired by ancient practices of the art of living.   
The ancient model of philosophical therapy also offers us some needed flexibility in 
terms of what the analogy between philosophy and therapeutic practice is supposed to mean.  
One cannot help but notice how often Nietzsche’s conception of philosophical therapy draws 
loosely on various medical analogies and figurative images of health and sickness in order to 
illustrate what might be best described as his ideal of spiritual health.  The theme of philosophy 
as a kind broadly cultural therapy is already found in his earliest writings and continues 
throughout his work. 41  He asks us, “Where are the new physicians of the soul?” (D 52.)  
Moreover, Nietzsche use of medical analogies to illustrate various forms of spiritual health is 
also a theme that continues on throughout most of his writings.   
In his 1886 Preface to the GS, for example, Nietzsche informs us that, “a psychologist 
knows few more fascinating questions than concerning the relationship between health and 
philosophy” (GS P:3.)  But it becomes quickly evident from this claim that Nietzsche is using 
words like “health [Gesundheit]” in a very broad sense.  For example, in the same Preface he 
speculates:    
I am still waiting for a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of that word—one 
who has to pursue the problem of the total health of a people, time, race, or of 
humanity—to muster the courage to push my suspicion to its limit and to risk the 
proposition: what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all ‘truth’ but 
something else—let us say, health, future, growth, power, life.” (GS P:2) 
 
                                                      
41 For example, see selections on “The Cultural Physician” from his early 1870’s notebooks collected in the ed. 





Nietzsche’s conception of “sickness [Krankheit]” is also often employed in a broadly figurative 
sense that encompasses both physical and spiritual ailments.  Nietzsche refers to human beings 
as “the sick animal” [Das kranke Their]” ( GM III:13.)  Zarathustra refers to our condition as 
“the disease called man” (Z II: ‘Of Great Events.’)  One of the main criticisms that Nietzsche 
offers against the ascetic ideal is that it has ruined “the health of the soul [seelische Gesundeit]” 
(GM III: 22.) 42  One great benefit of the ancient readings is that they offer a version of what 
today we might call holistic health that attempts to assess our overall condition—both physically 
and spiritually—in their various attempts to heal us from lives that have become sick or 
disordered.   
 It is this same appeal to an ancient holistic ideal, however, that also reveals some 
significant problems with reading Nietzsche’s therapeutic ideal back into the ideals promulgated 
by ancient practices of the self.  The ancient ideal of a whole self is reliant upon a holistic 
narrative of the good life and its place in the cosmos that is almost unintelligible from a modern 
point of view.  Modern life lacks the unity that the ancient world bestowed upon narratives of the 
good life.  While Nietzsche certainly admired the ancient world he also thought that the kinds of 
cosmic assurances found in ancient narratives of the self can simply no longer be guaranteed by 
modern life.        
In the same GS Preface where Nietzsche informs us that he is waiting for a new 
philosophical physician, he also informs us that: “the trust in life is gone: life itself has become a 
problem (GS P: 3.)  Later in the GS, Nietzsche claims that the modern self must now confront a 
new “terrifying question”—“Does existence have any meaning at all?” (GS 357.)  One of the 
                                                      
42 It is somewhat surprising this topic has not received more attention.  See Fredrick Neuhouser, “Nietzsche on 
Spiritual Illness and its Promise” in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies (2014) pp. 293-314.  See also: Schacht, “Spirit: 
a Plea for Geist” for an overall discussion on how we might think of Nietzsche’s views of spirituality in the context 





most notable features that one discovers from a quick survey of Nietzsche’s descriptions of the 
human self is just how profoundly unstable our modern lives have become.  Nietzsche claims 
that: “Humanity is an imperfect tense that can never be a perfect one” (HL 1.) We are the “not 
yet determined animal” (BGE 62.)  We are an “unstable equilibrium between angel and animal” 
(GM III: 2.)  Humanity is “an episode, a bridge, a great promise” (GM II:16.)  Zarathustra 
informs his audience that humanity is best understood as a tightrope strung between ape and 
Übermensch and that the journey from one to the other represents “a dangerous going-across, a 
dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and staying still” (Z 
P:3.) 
It is not clear, however, that any of the instabilities of our current sense of who we are 
could simply be cured by returning to past conceptions of a more stable human life.  We simply 
cannot go back.  Take for, example, the Stoic view that the good life is a life lived in accordance 
with nature.  Or that the self is a mirror of a larger cosmos and one is capable of putting one’s 
soul in good order if it reflects the order of the cosmos.  It is not clear that the distinct kind of 
axiological anomie that Nietzsche diagnoses in the modern self can be reconciled with the 
Stoic’s conception of one’s place in the cosmos.  Our cosmology no longer offers us normative 
guidance on how to live.  Nietzsche, in fact, explicitly critiques the idea that nature can mirror 
back to us a sense of the good life or that nature, the cosmos, can tell us how to live.  In reference 
to Stoic cosmology, Nietzsche comments that the Stoics are, in effect, simply projecting their 
own values onto nature:  
So you want to live ‘according to nature?’  Oh, you noble Stoics what a fraud is in this 
phrase!  […] Your pride wants to dictate and incorporate your morals and ideals into 
nature—yes, you want to make existence exist in your own image alone—as a huge 
eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism!  For all of your love of truth, you 





false, namely Stoic, view of nature, that you can no longer see it any other way […] 
(BGE 9)  
 
It is worth noting here that Nietzsche claims the Stoics view of nature is not only false but also a 
“fraud [Betrügerei.]”  Far from promoting the health of the soul, Nietzsche claims that there is 
something about the ancient ideal of viewing one’s life as a mirror of the cosmos that is actually 
symptomatic of a longstanding spiritual illness in humanity.  Nietzsche refers, for example to 
Plato’s otherworldly idealism as a kind of illness (GS 372.)  Once again, in the Preface to the 
GS, he also offers us some insight into what this kind of spiritual or existential sickness might 
look like:  
Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of 
happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, some final state of 
some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, 
Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not illness that inspired the 
philosopher (GS P:2 
 
While the ‘return to the ancients’ approach to Nietzschean therapy might offer us some 
individual insights about his various notions of health, one might also claim that it just as easily 
might offer us some insights on Nietzsche’s various notions of sickness as well.  It is simply too 
difficult to reconcile the immense gulf between the ancient normative background that would 
support these insights and Nietzsche’s own diagnosis of the uniquely modern problems now 
faced by the modern self.  Perhaps we will need to look to more contemporary philosophical 
sources in an attempt to understand Nietzsche’s own vision of what his therapeutic philosophy 
aims to achieve.    
 
2.4 Nietzsche and Wittgenstein  
 
I have proposed so far that some of the most original features of Nietzsche’s goals are 





his readers an opportunity to cultivate a new self-image of who they are and who they might 
become.  The therapeutic analogy, I suggested, helps us to understand Nietzsche as someone 
who views his readers not only as interlocutors of his philosophical arguments and ideas, but also 
as patients that stand in need of a cure.  To further extend the analogy: one way we might 
interpret Nietzsche’s overall project is to view him as offering a diagnosis of an ailment in the 
modern self, speculating about the origins the illness, and then proposing a possible treatment for 
his readers’ problems.   
As we have seen, however, the proposed analogy between philosophy and therapy is 
admittedly ambiguous.  Nietzsche is neither inviting us onto his counseling couch, nor is he 
offering us a self-book, nor is he trying to recover ancient practices of the ‘art of living.’  In the 
case of self-help books, the analogy seems too superficial.  In the case of ancient practices of the 
‘art of living, the analogy seemingly fails to capture the modern crisis of meaning that gave rise 
to the need for therapy in the first place.  Paying close attention to the philosophical import of the 
therapeutic analogy while also avoiding some of the interpretive pitfalls that result from 
awkward or overly literal readings of Nietzsche’s therapeutic ambitions will be one of the 
ongoing interpretive difficulties faced by this project in the pages that follow.    
A slightly more provincial philosophical difficulty arises in the context of the significant 
influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein on this topic.  When “philosophical therapy” is invoked today, 
it is doubtful that ancient practices of the self or Hobbesian inspired self-help books are the first 
things that come to mind.  Rather, it is probably Wittgenstein; a name that has become virtually 
synonymous with most contemporary discussions of therapeutic philosophy.  Despite his 
influence, however, it is by no means obvious that there is any clear agreement about what 





would appear there is at best a family resemblance between the many interpretations of 
Wittgenstein that attribute strong therapeutic tendencies to his thinking.  But given the enormous 
shadow that Wittgenstein casts over this topic, it is worth our while to briefly compare 
Wittgenstein with Nietzsche in terms of their respective therapeutic projects.   
Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein is also an extraordinarily elusive writer who rarely comes 
out and states his intentions explicitly.  We must therefore piece together his views on 
philosophical therapy.  His writings, and particularly, his later Philosophical Investigations, do 
avail themselves of a loose analogy between philosophical practice and therapeutic practice.43  
Wittgenstein famously states, for example, that “philosophies are like different therapies” 
(PI:129, 133) and that “[t]he philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an 
illness” (PI: 255.)  But the analogy, itself, is vague.  What Wittgenstein appears to offer us in 
these passages is a view of philosophy as a kind of therapy for conceptual confusions that arise 
from the nature of traditional philosophical questions.   
According to some highly influential interpretations of Wittgenstein, the goal of his 
writings—both his Investigations and possibly even his earlier writings—is not to advance any 
philosophical theories but rather to rid us—or cure us—of the need for those theories by 
revealing the intellectual pathologies that result from our attempts to ask traditional philosophical 
questions, to formulate traditional philosophical positions, and to engage in traditional 
philosophical debates.44  These strong therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
therefore portray his goals are almost exclusively diagnostic.  The purpose of Wittgenstein’s 
                                                      
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953.) Hereafter, cited parenthetically in text as PI plus 
section number. 
44Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Alice Crary, and James Conant are perhaps the most 
representative figures who push a very strong therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, sometimes known as the “New 
Wittgenstein.”  For representative examples of all of these commentator’s views of Wittgenstein’s therapy, see Alice 





writing is to free his readers from the grip of theory and, in the process, to free them from the 
grip of traditional philosophy.  The therapeutic Wittgenstein asks us to quit philosophy not 
because traditional philosophical questions admit of no answers (although that might be true) but 
because they are unnecessary.  To be cured amounts to a realization that traditional philosophy 
has been a “house of cards” that was merely pursuing an emptiness masquerading as grandiosity.  
A successful resolution to Wittgensteinian therapy, on this account, therefore amounts to 
something quite radical: the end of traditional philosophy itself.45     
In what follows, I will briefly attempt to unhinge Nietzsche’s expansive therapeutic 
project from what I view as Wittgenstein’s overly restrictive views on philosophical therapy.  
But it is first worth acknowledging that these two thinkers share much in common in terms of 
their overall philosophical commitments.  In fact, it is somewhat surprising that Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein are not more frequently compared.  Which is not to say their similarities have gone 
entirely unnoticed.  Perhaps the most noticeable and most commented point of comparison 
between the two thinkers is found in their remarkably similar style of philosophical writing that 
relies upon aphorisms, fragments, and remarks to address their readers, rather than complete 
essays or books.46  Both thinkers also frequently adopt a dialogical style of philosophy that 
                                                      
45 This strong therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein is not without its critics and it would surely be mistaken to claim 
that all of his commentators view him as a therapeutic philosopher.  For a representative criticism of the therapeutic 
reading, see P.M.S Hacker “Wittgenstein, Carnap, and the New American Wittgensteinians, Philosophical 
Quarterly 53 (2003) pp. 1-23.  Hacker raises the entirely reasonable point that many of the strong therapeutic 
readings tend to conveniently ignore the influence of Carnap, Russell, Moore on Wittgenstein’s approach to solving 
problems and often ignore those places in the Investigations where Wittgenstein appears to be trying to actually 
solve a problem by offering an answer to the problem rather than simply trying to therapeutically dispel the problem.  
46 For example, see: Eric Heller The Importance of Nietzsche (1959) pp. 40-48; Schacht Nietzsche, p. 4; Bernard 
Williams, “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality ed. Schacht (1994) pp. 
237-238; Randall Havas, Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge (1995) pp. 34-35 ; Raymond 
Geuss “Plato, Romanticism, and Thereafter” in Outside Ethics (2005) pp. 206-209; Christopher Janaway, Beyond 





functions more like a conversation between author and reader rather than simply a set of 
dictations to a passive audience.   
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein also exhibit a strong philosophical affinity in terms of their 
shared views on how the misuse and misunderstanding of everyday language is significantly 
responsible for the origin of many traditional philosophical problems.  As Wittgenstein warns us, 
“philosophy is a bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (PI 109.)  In strikingly 
similar ways, Nietzsche also warns his readers about the “seduction of language” (GM I:13) and 
the role that bad “grammatical habits” (BGE 16,17) play in the origin of our philosophical 
confusions.  Something has gone wrong, according to both thinkers, when philosophers detach 
language from its everyday usages and place words in the service of de-contextualized and 
disengaged forms of philosophical contemplation.    
We might claim more generally that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein also share a broadly 
anthropological approach to the problems of philosophy.  Philosophy has traditionally been 
understood as a form of inquiry that aspires to adopt a “view from nowhere” (to borrow Thomas 
Nagel’s famous phrase) that is capable of stepping outside of our local practices in an attempt to 
offer a general view of reality and human life that is not reducible to any particular way of life.  
Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein claim (in their own way) that one way we might rectify some of 
our past philosophical confusions is to place traditional problems back within the context of the 
everyday norms, shared forms of life, and cultural histories from which they arose.  Both 





reality but are better understood to be tools that aim to accomplish specific tasks.  As 
Wittgenstein states: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI: 43.)47   
Both thinkers also claim that we must learn to pay closer attention to the everyday natural 
history of human norms rather than to the puffed-up abstractions of those norms as they are 
presented to us within traditional philosophical discourse.  Wittgenstein, for example, offers the 
following description of his project:  
what we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are 
not contributing curiosities, however, but observations which no one has doubted, but 
which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes (PI 415.)   
 
One might claim that Wittgenstein’s remark about the need for close everyday 
observation would be right at home with many passages where Nietzsche also invokes the 
everyday.  For example, Nietzsche’s statement that:    
one does not make the closest things, for example eating, dwelling, dressing oneself, and 
social intercourse, the object of continuous uninhibited and general reflection and 
reformation; but rather because it is considered degrading, it becomes estranged from its 
artistic and intellectual seriousness (WS 50)48 
 
A few of Nietzsche’s commentators have made assessments that go beyond these general 
comparisons and have instead insisted that Nietzsche actually deserves much more credit for 
many aspects of philosophical originality that are commonly attributed to Wittgenstein.  
Raymond Geuss, for example, claims that Wittgenstein merely rediscovered his famous private 
language argument some seventy-five years after Nietzsche had already formulated it.49  Other 
                                                      
47 Nietzsche does not have a pithy quotation to match Wittgenstein on this point.  But one might consider 
Nietzsche’s elaborate etymological considerations in “Essay I” of the GM as an extended meditation on the idea that 
the meaning of words is found in their usage in both their everyday, historical, and cultural contexts.   
48 Nietzsche also encourages us to investigate “what food means” (BGE 234) or even to reconsider “one’s own kind 
of recreation” (EH “Clever” 3) 
49 Raymond Guess “Plato, Romanticism, and Thereafter” (2005) p. 209. Geuss does not cite any specific passages 
when he makes this accusation but presumably he has in mind GS 354 where Nietzsche claims that language is 
essentially social.  Walter Kaufmann also makes a similar comparison between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s Private 
Language Argument in footnote 297 to his Vintage translation of Nietzsche’s GS. (1979) and in footnote 80 of his 





commentators have responded that interpretations of Nietzsche’s anticipation of the private 
language argument, and other more technical matters attributable to Wittgenstein, are both 
anachronistic and merely apparent.50   
Such debates are hard to assess and beyond the scope of the present study.  It is always 
possible there are more subtle forms of similarity shared between these two thinkers that may 
have escaped our notice.  For example, Christopher Janaway has pointed out that Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein are the two most famous philosophers to have been significantly influenced by 
Arthur Schopenhauer.51  Perhaps Nietzsche and Wittgenstein did not just happen to stumble upon 
similar ideas but share a history that has simply been obscured by the sectarian politics of almost 
a century of analytic-continental tribal warfare.52   
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein undoubtedly share a number of philosophical affinities.  But 
when we now turn to their differences, we can begin to see why Nietzsche’s therapeutic project 
should not be read as merely a variation on Wittgensteinian themes.  To begin with the most 
obvious difference: Wittgenstein’s conception of the “problems of philosophy” is far more 
circumscribed than Nietzsche’s conception.  Wittgenstein, for the most part, associates the 
philosophical problems that he is trying to therapeutically dissolve with a fairly narrow set of 
technical problems and debates within epistemology, logic, the philosophy of language, and the 
philosophy of perception.53  More specifically, many of Wittgenstein’s philosophical problems 
                                                      
50 See Maria Alvarez and Aaron Ridley “Nietzsche on Language: Before and After Wittgenstein” Philosophical 
Topics Vol. 33, No. 2, (2005) pp. 1-17.  
51 See Christopher Janaway’s Schopenhauer (1994) p. 104 
52 See Dale Jacquette’s essay “Wittgenstein as a Trans-Analytic-Continental Philosopher” in Post-Analytic and 
Meta-Continental: Crossing the Divide ed. James Williams (2010) for an interesting treatment of Wittgenstein’s 
place in both the history of analytic and continental philosophy.  See also: Allen Janic and Stephen Toulmin’s 
Wittgenstein’s Vienna (1973) for an account of the many influences, including continental influences, that 
surrounded Wittgenstein in his own intellectual milieu.   
53 Both Schacht and Geuss take note of the differences of scope in terms of what a philosophical problem means for 






show up against the background of ongoing debates in logical and linguistic analysis, formal 
logic, sense-data, and various forms of skepticism about other minds and the external world 
inherited from the history of British Empiricism.    
Nietzsche’s therapy, as we have already seen, is considerably broader in scope and 
considerably more radical in its ambitions for what might count as a “problem” for philosophy.  
This is not to say, of course, that Wittgenstein’s thinking did not at times touch on existential 
issues.  It is obvious that Wittgenstein wrestled with personal issues of spirituality and the loss of 
meaning in the modern world.  But he did not appear to be particularly interested in pursuing 
these personal issues within his own circumscribed conception of what counts as philosophical 
inquiry.  Although this is also not to deny that many of Wittgenstein’s ideas might turn out to be 
well suited to be fruitfully applied to questions about the meaning of life.54 
The scope of each thinker’s conception of a philosophical problem is important because it 
bears directly on what would count as a successful resolution for each of their respective 
philosophical forms of therapy: that is, what might count as a cure.  It should not be surprising 
that Wittgenstein’s cure is also far more circumscribed than Nietzsche.  Wittgenstein’s cure is 
also, in some ways, far more radical.  According to the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, 
therapy resolves itself through the development of a strong form of quietism towards the 
problems of philosophy.  Wittgenstein, himself, offers some evidence for this reading.  He writes 
“[…]the philosophical problems should completely disappear.  The real discovery is the 
one…that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring 
                                                      
54For example, Stanley Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s account of skepticism in terms of ethics and tragedy in 
Part IV of the Claim of Reason (1979) seems much closer the types of problems that I will claim that Nietzsche’s 
therapy is trying to work through.  In that regard, I would be happy to admit there are many different 
“Wittgensteins” and that Cavell’s existential-themes and highly creative reading of Wittgenstein might very well 
bring the projects and goals of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein into closer proximity to one another.  I will return to 





itself in question” (PI 133.)  The most extreme forms of quietism, according to the strong 
therapeutic readings, aim for a kind of freedom that comes about through the dissolution of 
problems as opposed to any attempts to offer positive solutions to philosophical questions, 
problems, or debates.55   
Some interpreters of Nietzsche, however, have claimed that his overall philosophical 
project pursues therapeutic goals similar to Wittgenstein.  Bernard Williams, for example, offers 
a very influential, if not ambiguous, reading of Nietzsche that compares Nietzsche with 
Wittgenstein in terms of their shared quietist ambitions.56  Much like Wittgenstein, Williams 
claims that, “Nietzsche is not a source of philosophical theories.”57  Nietzsche’s resistance to 
theory, according to Williams, is due in part to the rather obvious difficulty of theoretical 
underdetermination discussed earlier in this chapter.  But Williams also claims to locate a far 
subtler aspect of Nietzsche’s theoretical ambiguity that reveals Nietzsche’s active resistance to 
theory.  What often appears, at first glance, to be a candidate for a substantial metaphysical, 
ethical, or epistemological theory in Nietzsche’s philosophy will, upon second glance, on 
Williams view, suddenly turn back upon itself and open up room for skepticism about what 
theoretical position he actually holds.   
In this way, Williams claims that Nietzsche chose a style of writing that is “booby-
trapped against recovering theory from it...]58  Just what exactly constitutes a Nietzschean 
“booby-trap” is not made entirely clear by Williams.  He offers us neither a blueprint of how 
such a textual trap might function nor any advice about how we might know when we have 
                                                      
55 See John McDowell “Wittgensteinian Quietism” in Common Knowledge (2009) (3) pp. 365-372 
56 Robert Pippin, for example, claims that his own deflationary reading of Nietzsche’s psychology has been 
significantly influenced by Williams’ quietist reading.  In fact, Pippin dedicates his own study of Nietzsche’s 
psychology to Williams.  See Pippin, Nietzsche, Psychology, & First Psychology (2010). 
57 Bernard Williams, “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality ed. Richard 
Schacht (1994) pp. 237. 





accidentally stumbled into one.  But his general point is clear enough: Nietzschean booby-traps 
do more than reveal that Nietzsche’s shifting styles of writing tend to make standard attempts at 
philosophical summary extraordinarily problematic but also, more subtly, offer a kind of 
performative demonstration of Nietzsche’s active opposition to theory.  A good reader of 
Nietzsche should therefore approach his writing with a heightened awareness that he has self-
consciously constructed his thinking to resist any straightforward attempts at systematic 
theoretical exegesis.   
Consequently, Williams goes on to claim that one does a considerable and ironic injustice 
to Nietzsche’s thought if one simply translates his claims to originality and his often peculiarly 
chosen form of philosophical expression back into a standard set of traditional philosophical 
concepts, terms, and general theories that he is not trying to engage but rather to escape.  Much 
like the later Wittgenstein, Williams suggests that Nietzsche’s basic philosophical goals are best 
understood in terms of a therapeutic attempt to bring a certain tradition of philosophical theory to 
an end.  Williams presents his claims in a highly compressed fashion.  But they at least offer us a 
sketch of what Nietzsche might look like when read as a Wittgensteinian quietist.  Nor is 
Williams the only commentator to hold such a view.  Some decades earlier, Bernd Magnus also 
offered a roughly Wittgensteinian/quietist/Richard Rorty-inspired reading of Nietzsche’s project 
that also framed his goals in terms of bringing philosophy to an end.59   
When assessing Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy in the context of philosophical 
quietism it is worth pausing for a second to note just how radical of a commitment that 
Wittgenstein quietism demands of its readers.  One might imagine an alternate philosophical 
                                                      
59See Bernd Magnus “Nietzsche and the Project of Bringing Philosophy to An End” in Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomenology Vol. 14 (1983.) Richard Rorty also often interprets Nietzsche and Nietzsche-related themes in 





therapy that claims that there are instances where the illusory problems of philosophy must be set 
aside in favor of the assurance of our everyday practices and enjoyments.  David Hume, at times, 
seems to offer readers something like this therapeutic strategy.  He famously counsels them at 
the end of his Treatise that if one becomes too overwhelmed by philosophical puzzles and the 
threats of skepticism then it might be time to take a step back into the everyday and go play a 
game of backgammon with one’s friends.60  There is something pathological, for Hume, about a 
person who cannot recognize the problems of philosophy for what they really are.  But Hume 
also believes that it is perfectly fine to wake up the next day and go back to doing philosophy 
once you have recovered.  Wittgensteinian therapy, at least in its most extreme versions, takes a 
more abolitionist stance and assigns itself no positive task for philosophy independent of the role 
that it plays in its own self-dissolution.  We clarify our problems only in order to learn how to get 
rid of them.  The end that the strong Wittgensteinian quietist envisions for traditional philosophy 
does not include any attempts at re-envisioning its philosophical replacement.    
It is when we raise the question of replacement that one begins to see a stark difference 
between the respective philosophical therapies of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.  Nietzsche’s claim 
that we must develop a new “philosophy of the future” that will replace traditional philosophy is 
arguably one of the central features of his later philosophical writings.  For example, he states 
that one of the main tasks of his genuine “philosophers of the future” (as opposed to mere 
philosophical laborers) is to create or “legislate” new values (BGE 211.)  In contrast to the 
Wittgensteinian quietist, Nietzsche also claims that critique and creation are inextricably linked 
together.  You cannot have one without the other.  He claims, for example, that “it is only as 
creators that we can destroy” (GS 58.)  In the GM, we find Nietzsche asking himself the 
                                                      





rhetorical question, “what are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?,” and 
then answering, “If a temple is to be erected a temple must be destroyed: that is the law—let 
anyone who can show me a case in which it is not fulfilled” (GM II: 24.)61  In EH, he tells us, 
“negating and destroying are a condition of saying Yes” (EH ‘Destiny’ 4.)   
It is difficult to read these passages and reach the conclusion that Nietzsche’s task was 
merely diagnostic in a narrow quietist sense.  Life goes on outside the Wittgensteinian flybottle.  
Nietzsche might well agree with Wittgenstein that there are some forms of philosophy that are 
probably best thrown in the trash bin, but Nietzsche also believes that something must replace 
our traditional practices of philosophy.  According to Nietzsche, philosophy is capable of both 
engaging in a critical assessment of everyday norms and their embedded philosophical 
assumptions while also being able to legislate a new role for philosophy in the future.   
In this respect, Nietzsche’s therapeutic project is both more traditional and also more 
radical Wittgenstein’s project.  Both thinkers ask us to pay closer attention to the everyday.  But 
Wittgenstein wants us to return to everyday practices as a process that purges us of our 
philosophical pathologies.  For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the everyday assumptions that 
pervade our daily practices are not the solutions to our therapeutic problems but, in fact, turn out 
to be their root cause.  One main reason that we might suppose that Nietzsche has less faith in the 
therapeutic balm of everyday practice than does Wittgenstein is because Nietzsche claims that 
the logic of our everyday practices, themselves, have already failed as practical standards for the 
leading of a meaningful human life in the modern world.   
                                                      
61Compare Nietzsche’s statement with Wittgenstein’s statement that: “All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. 
And that means not creating a new one—for instance as in “absence of an idol.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big 







For over two millennia we have engaged in various arguments, rituals, beliefs, and 
institutional practices that reveal an implicit framework of habits of thinking, feeling, and acting 
that have become so deeply engrained in our social institutions and everyday assessments of the 
value of our own lives that we simply take them for granted as the “everyday” and simple 
“common sense.”  If we are going to ever view ourselves in a new way, Nietzsche claims that we 
must first learn to question and disrupt this hidden history of our own habitual assessments.   
 
2.5 Writing, Habits, and Philosophical Therapy 
 
The last section of this chapter will focus on the role that Nietzsche’s chosen form of 
writing might play in his overall therapeutic project.  Part of my claim to follow will be that 
Nietzsche’s unconventional style of writing helps to explain some of the unconventional goals of 
his new psychology.  In this way, I will also claim that Nietzsche’s originality as a psychologist 
is inseparable from the originality of his own chosen style of writing.  What relationship 
Nietzsche’s writing bears to the philosophical content of his ideas is a big and, at times, 
controversial topic.  As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the fact that Nietzsche writes in a 
variety of literary styles is no longer taken as a reason to dismiss him as a serious philosopher.  
Yet, while Nietzsche’s distinctive writing style has certainly not gone unnoticed in scholarship 
there is still considerable disagreement among his commentators about why he would have 
chosen to write in the ways that he did.  His literary style, in turn, has been interpreted to be both 
accidental and integral to understanding his philosophical goals.   
In what follows, I will not attempt to address every feature of this controversy but rather 
will focus on one underappreciated function of Nietzsche’s chosen style of writing that is integral 





argue, aims to promote a radical disruption and revaluation of his readers’ basic habitual 
attitudes towards their experience of their own lives.   
We might begin this section with a broad claim: any attempt to understand Nietzsche 
must come to terms with his writing.  Few would dispute that Nietzsche writes differently than 
most philosophers, especially when judged by contemporary standards of philosophical writing.    
At the beginning of this chapter, I already raised some of the general difficulties one encounters 
when trying to make sense of Nietzsche.  For example, his writing is extraordinarily difficult to 
summarize in economic fashion and much of it would appear to be significantly underdetermined 
when judged by the contemporary standards of what a philosophical argument or theory is 
supposed to look like.  At the same time, he does not present his ideas to his readers in an overly 
technical matter.  Whatever the difficulties one finds in Nietzsche’s writing are not the same 
difficulties that one might encounter when confronting the technical vocabularies of a thinker 
like Hegel, or Heidegger, or for that matter, most of contemporary anglophone philosophy.      
The claim that Nietzsche writes differently from most philosophers therefore seems to be 
both obvious and elusive.  It is obvious in a rather straightforward sense that his chosen style of 
writing clearly departs from most of the conventional norms of philosophical inquiry and 
argument.  While Nietzsche does address many traditional philosophical debates and 
philosophical topics throughout his writings he rarely chooses to do so through direct argument, 
propositional claims, or appeal to readily stated positions that can be easily summarized.  Rather, 
he presents his views on various philosophical and cultural matters that concern him through a 
far more idiosyncratic, indirect, and highly literary style of writing that includes: essays, short 





historical narratives, poems, juicy gossip about other thinkers, passages that read something akin 
to personal diary entries, and even the occasion bit of dietary advice.   
Acknowledging these forms of Nietzsche’s literary distinctiveness, however, does not 
settle questions about his claims to originality so much as it leads us to ask a set of far more 
elusive questions that focus on why he might have chosen to write in this peculiar way.  What are 
his goals?  Is he trying to advance new doctrines or theories?  Is he just presenting ordinary 
arguments in eccentric ways?  Or has he chosen to write this way for some other purpose?  For a 
thinker who so often expresses deep anxieties about being misunderstood, Nietzsche is surprising 
elusive when it comes to telling us what he is trying to do.  No guide is offered to his readers on 
how they should read him.  As Robert Pippin once joked, “It would have been helpful if, in Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche had not just written the chapter “Why I Write Such Good Books” but “Why I 
Write Books at All.”62       
Such concerns might even lead us back to a more basic question: what is the function of 
philosophical writing?  The ambiguities of Nietzsche’s own chosen form of expression, I want to 
suggest, poses a challenge to the assumption that there is only one answer to this question.  Most 
of us have become accustomed to the idea that philosophical writing is primarily a vehicle for 
propositional content.  The philosopher makes arguments, justifies assertions, draws inferences 
and conclusions, and rebuts possible objections.  Nietzsche’s writings also often perform these 
functions, even if they are presented to his readers in sometimes unconventional ways.  But 
might philosophical writing serve other functions and still remain philosophical?  Nietzsche once 
claimed of himself that “I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style 
that has ever been at the disposal of one man.” (EH ‘Books’ 4.)  Could it be possible that an 
                                                      





underappreciated feature of Nietzsche’s multifarious style is not just that he writes in a variety of 
ways but also that his writing serves a variety of functions?       
In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to turn back briefly to our previous 
discussion of Wittgenstein and some of the noted similarities between his own style of writing 
and Nietzsche’s chosen forms of expression.  In the last section, I had discouraged the idea that 
Wittgenstein’s quietist therapy offers a good model for interpreting Nietzsche’s therapeutic 
project.  The two thinkers have different goals.  Wittgenstein sought to end philosophy by 
appealing to everyday practices while Nietzsche sought to radically transform philosophy 
through a critique of the background assumptions sedimented within our everyday practices.  
Nevertheless, some interpretations of why Wittgenstein might have chosen to write the way that 
he did can be useful to our own task of assessing the relationship between Nietzsche’s writings 
and his own elusive therapeutic goals.     
Stanley Cavell’s early essay “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” offers 
us a helpful place to start.  Cavell begins the essay with a diagnosis of an anxious mood that 
arises in many readers’ first encounter with the Wittgenstein’s later writings.  According to 
Cavell, a common reaction taken by first time readers of Wittgenstein might take the form of the 
question, “Why does he write that way?”—and even—“Why doesn’t he just say what he means, 
and draw instead of insinuate conclusions?”63  While Cavell acknowledges that such an initial 
reaction to Wittgenstein is perfectly understandable, he goes on to warn us that such leading 
questions already approach Wittgenstein with a mistaken set of philosophical assumptions.  For 
if Wittgenstein were forced to simply “say what he means” through recourse to standard 
philosophical prose and direct argument then the result would be that he would no longer be able 
                                                      






to mean what he wanted to say. To think otherwise, Cavell maintains here (and in many of his 
other writings) is to remain trapped in a kind of foundational philosophical fantasy that 
Wittgenstein is trying to dispel.  One might call this the fantasy of paraphrase where the different 
voices and perspectives, pictures, drawings, jokes, as well as odd stops, starts, and ambiguities 
that comprise a text like the Philosophical Investigations, are somehow easily detached from 
Wittgenstein’s genuine pursuit of a series of philosophical problems that could have easily been 
stated in a more direct, less “literary,” fashion.       
 Cavell goes on to claim that the odd ambiguities of Wittgenstein’s literary presentation 
of his ideas are not accidental features of the Investigations that could have, had Wittgenstein 
chosen otherwise, simply been expressed more clearly and directly.  Rather, Cavell asks us to 
envision the ambiguities that one encounters in Wittgenstein’s style of writing as central to the 
kinds of transformational philosophical goals that he is trying to achieve.  Cavell claims that 
Wittgenstein, like Freud, “wishes to prevent understanding that is unaccompanied by inner 
change.”64  Like a good therapist, Cavell claims that Wittgenstein realizes that offering his 
readers a series of direct arguments will not, alone, fully cure them of their philosophical 
pathologies.  Rather, what is needed is a certain mood and context that is created within 
Wittgenstein’s style of writing that allows the patient, herself, to become an active and engaged 
participant in their own critical and curative process.65    
A famous joke amongst practicing psychoanalysts helps to illustrate Cavell’s point: an 
analyst walks into a room and immediately informs his new patient, “well, you want to have sex 
                                                      
64 Cavell, ibid, p. 72 
65 Following Cavell, James Conant once helpfully referred to this therapeutic process in Wittgenstein in terms of a 
special kind of interpretive mirror that allows Wittgenstein’s readers to have their own confusions reflected back at 
them in a philosophically productive way.  See Conant, “Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism” In Alice Crary (ed.), 





with your mother and kill your father—that will be $75,000—I see no need for further 
treatment.”  The reason that we can understand this joke as a joke tells us something important 
about the way that practical knowledge works within a therapeutic setting.  If we laugh it is due 
to our awareness that the patient’s mere propositional knowledge of the diagnosis actually means 
very little without the patient’s own active attempts to work through and internalize the practical 
implications of this knowledge (an interpretive process that may, itself, unfold over years.)66 
Turning back to Nietzsche, the explicit literary character of his thinking is, of course, 
even more pronounced than that of Wittgenstein and also more widely acknowledged.  But one 
could easily envision a reader’s first response to Nietzsche to take the form of a similar question 
that asks, “why does he not simply say what he means and offer us direct arguments and explicit 
conclusions rather than all of this metaphor, allusion, indirect speech, and insinuation?”  In fact, 
various answers to this question have largely shaped the reception of Nietzsche scholarship over 
the last century.  Many of Nietzsche’s commentators over the years have set themselves to the 
task of showing us where we can find direct arguments and explicit claims in Nietzsche amidst 
all of the figurative, indirect, and implicit features of his writing.  But might Nietzsche, like 
Cavell’s Wittgenstein, also have chosen at times to write in ways that seek to promote inner 
transformation as well as ordinary forms of philosophical understanding? 
If Nietzsche and Wittgenstein—each in their own way—do aspire to incorporate 
therapeutic elements within their own understanding of philosophical writing, then they are also 
outliers to the dominant traditions of modern philosophical discourse.  I have always been struck 
by a line from Cavell’s earlier study of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden where he writes: “The 
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quest of this book is for the recovery of the self, as from an illness.”67  What strikes me most 
about this quote, and by extension the therapeutic reading I have been trying to develop, is how 
foreign such a project sounds to most of our contemporary conceptions of the function and 
purpose of philosophical discourse.  The last century of the anglophone tradition of philosophy, 
in particular, has exhibited a less than tolerant view towards various forms of literary philosophy 
and, especially, towards those books that profess a curative function for their readers.  In fact, the 
idea that philosophical writing was suited for anything other than technical work was often 
downright dismissed.  Take for example the following passage from W.V.O Quine.  In the midst 
of speculating about the proper function of philosophical writing, he offers the following 
counsel:    
Inspirational and edifying writing is admirable, but the place for it is in the novel, the 
poem, the sermon, or the literary essay.  Philosophers in the professional sense have no 
particular fitness for helping get society on an even keel, though we should do all we 
can.68 
 
The explicit claim here is that Quine does not have anything personally against the task of trying 
to edify the spirits of humanity, he just thinks that philosophy and philosophical writing are just 
not particularly good at achieving this task.  But one might also uncover a more implicit claim at 
work in Quine that holds that the task of edification is also the sort of thing that is beneath the 
dignity of any self-respecting philosopher.  Philosophy is simply not in the business of doing 
something other than the task of conveying explicit propositional knowledge and sussing out 
fallacies and errors in judgement.  Edification, in this case, is possibly just a nice word for being 
fuzzy-minded.   
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Such a dismissive attitude towards literature and the potential literary status of 
philosophy, however, hardly starts with Quine.  Philosophy has a long history of prejudices 
against forms of writing that appear to be too poetic, too figurative, or in a word, too “literary.”  
Starting with Plato there has always been a deep suspicion that figurative and poetic language 
can easily lead the genuine philosopher astray.  In Book X of the Republic, Plato has Socrates 
assess the value of poetry in terms of the question of “why poetry not only gives pleasure but is 
beneficial to human life?” 69  Plato’s negative response is that poetry not only fails to articulate 
the kind of essential propositional definitions that genuine philosophy demands but that even the 
supposed pleasure that poetry might offer to readers is ultimately detrimental.  Figurative 
language and literary discourse only serve to inflame the passions and, in the process, lead the 
philosopher even further away from the path to truth.  Nor did the prospects for literary 
philosophy fare much better for most of modern philosophy.  One might, for example, invoke 
John Locke’s famous claim that figurative language and rhetoric are only artificial forms of 
communication that are “perfect cheats” intended for manipulation and obfuscation rather than 
forms of discourse that properly aim for the truth.70  The function of philosophical writing, in 
other words, should aspire to say what it means, clearly and distinctly, and avoid whenever 
possible excessive emotion, edification, and figurative display.71     
Not all philosophers and philosophical traditions have, of course, fallen prey to this sort 
of propositional puritanism.  The history of philosophical writing is rich and varied.  But the 
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attitude that good philosophy should simply say what it means is pervasive enough that we might 
at least acknowledge that our mainstream conceptions of what good philosophical writing is 
supposed to look like and what it is supposed to accomplish have significantly constrained the 
possibilities that philosophy has at its disposal to express itself through writing and still retain the 
title of being called “philosophy.”  Starting again with Plato’s quarrel with the poets, 
philosophers have historically gone through great lengths to show that their own form of writing 
aspires to something more than those who are mere tellers of tales, fables, and myths.  
Philosophers have insisted on a form of writing that says what it means directly rather than 
engaging in various forms of indirect or figurative discourse, in part, because of a deeply rooted 
assumption that one only truly knows what they mean if what they know can be stated clearly, 
directly, and propositionally.  Perhaps one of the reasons that Cavell’s anxious reader is so 
perplexed by Wittgenstein’s writing is because she has already assumed a set of fixed 
expectations about what she should encounter when reading a work of philosophy.               
Take, for example, Arthur Danto’s assessment of Nietzsche’s literary style of writing in 
his early influential study of Nietzsche’s thought.  Danto asserts, “His [Nietzsche’s] language 
would have been less colorful had he known what he was trying to say.”72  Danto’s assumption, 
much like Cavell’s anxious readers of Wittgenstein, seems to suggest that if Nietzsche had truly 
understood what he was doing then he would have chosen to write in a clearer fashion.  The 
ambiguity of Nietzsche’s prose, for Danto, only serves to show us that his thinking was still a 
work in progress.  I actually agree with Danto that Nietzsche’s thinking was a work in progress.  
But I disagree with him in the assertion that had Nietzsche known what he wanted to say he 
would have chosen to say it more clearly.  Such a reading of Nietzsche’s rhetoric and figurative 
                                                      





uses of language ignores the possibility that he might have wanted his writing to perform 
functions other than those assumed by standard philosophical arguments.  What if, for example, 
the “colorful” ambiguities so often encountered in Nietzsche’s writings are central to the 
transformational philosophical goals that he is trying to achieve?  
Some of Nietzsche’s commentators have, in fact, suggested that one function of his 
chosen style of writing is to enact various kinds of therapeutic transformations in his readers.  
Bernd Magnus, who perhaps deserves credit for offering one of the first broadly therapeutic 
readings of Nietzsche, claims that, “Nietzsche invites a self-transformation on the part of the 
reader who is related to Nietzsche’s texts in a certain way.”73  James Conant has offered a 
perfectionist reading of Nietzsche’s early “Schopenhauer as Educator” that claims: “Nietzsche 
pictures you as split into two: you consist of who you are now and who (he thinks) you really 
are—the self you could or should be.  It is the latter for whom he is writing but it is the former to 
whom he writes.”74  More recently, Ken Gemes and Christopher Janway have both emphasized 
the role that Nietzsche’s unique style of writing plays in attempts to transform his reader’s 
affective states.75  According to Janaway:  
To treat Nietzsche’s ways of writing—explicitly or implicitly—as mere modes of 
presentation, detachable in principle from some elusive set of propositions in which his 
philosophy is thought to consist, is to miss a great part of Nietzsche’s real importance to 
philosophy.76  
 
                                                      
73 Bernd Magnus, “The Deification of the Commonplace: A Reading of Twilight of the Idols” in Reading Nietzsche 
ed. Solomon and Higgins (1988.) p. 153     
74 James Conant, “Nietzsche as Educator: A Reading of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ in ed. Schacht Nietzsche’s 
Postmoralism   P. 203 
75See Gemes “We Remain of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves: The Key Message of Nietzsche’s Genealogy” in C. 
Acampora (ed.), Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’: Critical Essays, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
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All of these transformational readings (for lack of a better term) capture an important aspect of 
how we might read Nietzsche as trying (to use Cavell’s phrase again) to promote understanding 
that is also accompanied by inner change.  But the majority of these transformational readings 
also tend to focus quite narrowly on just one aspect of this transformational process and, 
consequently, also quite narrowly on the question of what goals that Nietzsche is trying to 
achieve through his therapeutic project.   
Magnus’s reading, as mentioned earlier in our discussion of Williams, is committed to a 
broadly quietist reading of Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy that claims that his goal is to bring 
traditional philosophy to an end.  I have argued previously in the chapter that there is plenty of 
textual evidence to claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future aims at a revaluation rather 
than a dissolution of traditional philosophical practice.  Conant’s essay offers what is possibly 
one of the richest accounts of the role that the ideal of perfectionism might play in Nietzsche’s 
overall philosophical therapy.  But Conant also draws his reading of Nietzschean therapy almost 
exclusively from the early essay “Schopenhauer as Educator” and pays little attention to how 
Nietzsche’s later thinking may have diverged considerably from some of his earlier thoughts on 
self-transformation and self-cultivation.  Finally, both Janaway and Gemes offer very convincing 
accounts of the therapeutic role that Nietzsche’s writing might play in changing our emotions 
and affective states.  But their exclusive focus on affective states leaves out a number of 
experiential and cognitive states that might also contribute to Nietzsche’s therapeutic project.   
I would like to close this chapter with a brief sketch of an alternative and much more 
expansive view of the therapeutic relationship between Nietzsche’s writing and the 
transformational goals that he envisions for his readers that will be taken up and refined in the 





writing that he offers little by way of direct guidance to his readers about how they should read 
him.  At the same time, he is also a remarkably self-reflexive writer who is constantly engaged in 
various assessments and re-assessment of his own claims to originality.  There are times, for 
example, where Nietzsche does take stock of questions about his style of writing.  One such 
occasion is found in his 1886 re-written Preface to HH.77  There Nietzsche remarks:   
I have been told often enough, and always with an expression of great surprise, that all of 
my writings…have something that unites them together: they all of them, I have been 
given to understand, contain snares and nets for unwary birds and in effect a persistent 
invitation to the overturning of habitual evaluations and valued habits. (HH I: P 1) 
 
There are many different interpretations of why Nietzsche has chosen to write in the ways 
that he does and undoubtedly, he, himself, intends his writing to perform a variety of functions 
within his philosophy.  But in this passage, we encounter one of those rare moments where he 
actually tells us what one of those functions might be.  By his own admission, Nietzsche 
describes his writings in terms of various invitations to disrupt his readers’ evaluative habits and 
assumptions.  His books, he goes on to tell us in the same Preface, are best understood as 
exercises in the “schooling of suspicion” (HH P:1.)    
When thinking through the role that Nietzsche’s writing might play in the disruption of 
our habitual evaluations and assumptions it is worth noting that he anticipates many of the same 
kinds of questions and worries in his own readers that were proposed by Cavell’s anxious reader 
of Wittgenstein earlier in this section.  Nietzsche often acknowledges that experiences of 
uncertainty, frustration, and hesitation will significantly shape his own readers’ initial encounters 
with his writings.  In an early aphorism entitled “Against the short-sighted reader” he asks, “do 
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you think this work must be fragmentary because I give it to you (and have to give it to you) in 
fragments?” (AOM 128.)  But he also often responds to such anxieties by assuring his readers 
that their initial experiences with the incompleteness of his writing is, itself, somehow 
philosophical purposive and aims to open up new perspectives for them.  But first they must 
learn how to read him.  Nietzsche informs his readers, for example, that his books require 
“rumination” [Widerkäuen] (GM P:8) and also claims of his writing:  
this art does not so easily get anything done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, to read 
slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, 
with delicate eyes and fingers (D P:5.)   
 
Here some unique insights begin to emerge on the relation between Nietzsche’s chosen style of 
writing and the goals of his therapeutic project.  One of Nietzsche’s therapeutic goals, I will 
suggest, is found in his attempts to promote a radically new form of critical open-mindedness in 
his readers that presents them with an experimental form of writing that disrupts their habitual 
expectations of how they should assess the value of their lives.   
           “Your judgment ‘this is right,’” Nietzsche tells us, “has a prehistory in your drives, 
inclinations, aversions, and lack of experiences” (GS 335; see also GS 57.)  Most of us, 
according to Nietzsche, live our evaluative lives in ways that resemble:         
The fettered spirit [who] takes up his position, not for reasons, but out of habit; he is 
Christian, for example, not because he has knowledge of the various religions and has 
chosen between them…he encountered Christianity…adopted it without reasons, as a 
man born in wine-producing country becomes a wine-drinker. (HH I: 226)  
 
One difficulty, of course, with confronting one’s own habits and habitual assumptions is that we 
are often unaware that our habits are habits.  We just live them and take for granted that we are 
who we are.  Something must happen to me in order for a habit to be brought out of the tacit 
background of my life and into a level of awareness where I might become cognizant of my habit 





that makes me re-assess why I have always been a wine-drinker my whole life.  Or as a 
Christian, I might find myself at an interfaith conference that forces me to confront why I have 
chosen to be a Christian rather than a Sufi or other religious identity.  
Examples of one’s habitual beverage of choice, or even one’s unquestioned religious 
identity are, of course, illustrate of a fairly constrained confrontation with questions about one’s 
individual habits and their relation to one’s own sense of identity.  Although in the case of 
religion such a confrontation could certainly be profoundly transformational, even shattering.  
The disruptive function that Nietzsche envisions for his writing aims at a much deeper set of 
habitual assumptions that underlie our own sense of who we are.  What he has in mind are a 
series of deeply embedded habits of thinking, valuing, and feeling that have historically 
structured our personal lives and social institutions for over two millennia.  According to 
Nietzsche, it is only by disrupting our old evaluative assumptions in such a way that they are 
revealed to us as habits rather than eternal truths, divine commands, or universal values, that we 
can begin to slowly begin to envision new possibilities for assessing our lives.          
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that the underdetermined nature of Nietzsche’s 
writing is one of the most vexing exegetical problems that faces anyone who is trying to 
understand him.  Once again, the problem that we encountered is not that one discovers too few 
theories in Nietzsche’s writing, but rather we quickly discover one theory too many.  From the 
standpoint of contemporary theory, Nietzsche turns out to be highly resistant to easy or 
systematic summary.  What might look like a disjointed philosophical project from the 
standpoint of systematic theory, however, turns out to function extraordinary well from the 
standpoint of Nietzsche’s stated ambition of disrupting his readers’ experience of their own 





philosophy.  It is simply to state that if one only considers his many styles of writing in terms of 
various esoteric expressions of literary coyness that are hiding ordinary theories within various 
figurative images and aphorisms then one might miss out on other functions at work in his 
chosen style of writing.  
When Nietzsche asks us, for example, to imagine that truth is a woman, or when he 
informs us that a madman has pronounced that God has died, he is not merely engaging in a bit 
of figurative fancy that admits easily of plain paraphrase.  Rather, he is using figurative language 
that allows his readers to experience familiar concepts in unfamiliar ways with the intent of 
forcing them to confront the value of truth or the role that God has played in history in novel 
ways.  Likewise, when Nietzsche dramatically asks his readers why we have traditionally valued 
truth over error, or why we think that morality is always better than immorality, it is not obvious 
that he is trying to introduce a new theory of truth or a new theory of morality.  Rather, he is 
attempting to disrupt some of our most deeply held evaluative and institutional habits in the hope 
of opening up new possibilities and perspectives that we have not yet considered because we 
have always equated our habitual evaluative lives with what is normal, ordinary, and necessary.  
The resolution of Nietzschean therapy, on my reading, is therefore less akin to learning a 
new theory, or gaining explicit mastery over a new Nietzschean concept, than it is akin to the 
long process through which one might overcome a set of pervasive and mostly unacknowledged 
habits.  His goal is to transform us from dogmatists into experimenters.  As he tells us, “When I 
imagine a perfect reader, he always turns into a monster of courage and curiosity; moreover, 
supple, cunning, cautious; a born adventurer and discoverer” (EH Books 3.)  In order to become 





that we must first learn to take new risks and begin to ask new dangerous questions about our 
past evaluative lives.  
       
2.6 Conclusion  
 
By his own advice and admission, Nietzsche’s thought requires a good deal of 
deciphering when sorting through basic questions surrounding his overall claims to philosophical 
originality.  My aim in the chapter was to highlight just how many different ways—both 
theoretically and therapeutically—that his goals have been interpreted.  One underappreciated 
feature of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project, I suggested, is found in his attempts to experimentally 
disrupt our habitual sense of who we are.  What Nietzsche is trying to offer his readers through 
his therapeutic stance is cultivation of an explicit practical ability rather than a piece of 
theoretical knowledge.   
One last figurative image from Wittgenstein might be helpful to set up the arguments to 
be pursued in the next chapter.  In his Investigations, Wittgenstein famously claims of our 
encounter with traditional philosophical problems that, “A picture has held us captive, and we 
could not get outside of it” (PI 115.)  A picture, in Wittgenstein’s sense, represents something 
like the unarticulated framework of assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, and sensibilities that allow a 
particular problem to show up as a problem.  Part of the difficulty of being held captive by a 
picture, according to Wittgenstein, is that we often end up mistaking the edges of the picture 
frame for the edges of reality.  In order to escape our predicament, he claims that we need to 
learn to look at philosophical problems anew, with fresh eyes, until we can begin to recognize 
alternatives that might lay outside of the framework of philosophy that we have simply taken for 





As noted earlier in the chapter, Wittgenstein was focused on a far more circumscribed 
understanding of what a philosophical problem means than was Nietzsche.  But the image of 
being trapped within a picture, in Wittgenstein’s sense, offers a helpful starting point when trying 
to understand why Nietzsche thought it was so important for his readers to reassess not only their 
own evaluative background but also the entire history of interconnected hidden assumptions, 
habits, and tacit evaluative attitudes that constitute the history of Western civilization.  
According to Nietzsche, a certain form of self-contempt has been built into the history of our 
highest ideals.  A cure for our situation, according to Nietzsche, will entail an attempt to both 
understand our own evaluative past in order to free ourselves from this fraudulent picture of our 
own self-worth.  The next chapter will now turn to Nietzsche’s genealogical diagnosis of the 
various ways that the history of the Western tradition has trapped us within a life-averse picture 
















OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: A BRIEF HISTORY OF WESTERN IDEALS 
 
That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to humanity, however, is an expression 
of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal—and it would rather 
will nothingness than not will.—Am I understood?  Have I been 




3.1 Introduction  
 
In the last chapter, I proposed that an underappreciated aspect of Nietzsche’s confidence 
in his own originality is best understood through a therapeutic rather than a theoretical lens.  On 
my view, his wide-ranging therapeutic project aims to promote a radical disruption and 
revaluation of his readers’ basic habitual attitudes towards their own experience of their self-
worth in the face of an emerging crisis of meaning in modern life.  Self-esteem is admittedly not 
a subject that comes up often in most standard discussions of the history of philosophy, but over 
the course of the next two chapters I will argue that the topic is central to Nietzsche’s diagnosis 
of a number of unique problems faced by the modern self.  According to Nietzsche, humanity 
has always had a problematic relationship with its own sense of self-worth that can be traced 
back over two millennia to the origins of Western culture.  This chapter will now turn to 
Nietzsche’s unique genealogy of humanity’s self-esteem and will focus particularly on his 
diagnosis of the ways that the Western tradition has become trapped within a life-averse picture 
of human meaning.   
The chapter will proceed as follows.  In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I explore Nietzsche’s 
critical diagnosis of a highly ambitious implicit evaluative attitude within the history of the 
Western tradition that, following John Hick, I will refer to as “cosmic optimism.”  The attitude of 





reality not only exists, but also that access to this reality will be redemptive and even hospitable 
to human desires.  In Section 3.4, I raise some basic methodological questions about how to best 
understand the elusive generality that often characterizes Nietzsche’s sweeping criticisms of the 
Western tradition.  In Sections 3.5 and 3.6, I then turn to Nietzsche’s critical diagnosis of the 
Western tradition’s self-esteem problem.  According to Nietzsche, the traditional picture of a 
meaningful human life that is expressed through the general outlook of cosmic optimism is 
actually constituted by a framework of deeply embedded evaluative habits and institutional 
practices—the ascetic ideal—that have instilled within humanity a sense of their own low self-
worth and natural deficiencies that must be redeemed or made complete through transcendent 
ideals.  Nietzsche’s overall assessment of the ascetic ideal, I argue, reveals why the grand 
tradition of cosmic optimism, upon close scrutiny, turns out to embody a deeply pessimistic, 
even masochistic hatred, of human life.    
        
        3.2 Cosmic Optimism 
  In his early essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” Nietzsche asks his 
readers to envision and assess the scope and significance of human history from a cosmic point 
of view.  He writes:      
In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of countless solar systems 
into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented 
cognition.  It was the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the ‘history of the 
world’; but a minute was all it was.  After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the 
planet froze, and the clever animals had to die.  Someone could invent a fable like this 
and yet they would still not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how 
insubstantial and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks 
within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has 






Nietzsche would go on in later writings to change his mind considerably about many of the 
epistemological and linguistic assumptions that are set forth in this early unpublished essay 
fragment.78  But he never abandons this basic deflationary stance towards what he views as 
humanity’s traditionally overinflated sense of its own place in the universe.  In fact, one of the 
most interesting aspects of Nietzsche’s later writings is found in his various attempts to trace out 
a complicated genealogy of humanity’s precarious but grandiose sense of its own self-worth.  If I 
might expand on Nietzsche’s original fable, one might speculate that were an expedition of 
extraterrestrial anthropologists to visit the earth at various points in human history, one of the 
first things they might discover about the ethology of our species is a remarkable optimism and 
self-assurance directed towards their own perceived place in the universe.  The Western 
tradition, on Nietzsche’s view, has always had a penchant for cosmic narratives that feature 
human life as its main protagonist.              
I shall borrow John Hick’s term “cosmic optimism” to help make sense of this general 
evaluative attitude that humanity, for much of its history, has exhibited towards their own special 
place in the universe.  According to Hick, sometime between 800 BCE and 200 BCE a radical 
axial revolution occurred in human understanding that resulted in a major evaluative shift within 
the worldview of the human species.79  One result of this axial shift was the birth of metaphysics 
and, along with it, the birth of a highly optimistic attitude towards belief in an ideal of ultimate 
reality that Hick claims is found in almost all of the world’s religions.   
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Despite their many institutional, doctrinal, and cultural differences, Hick claims that what 
the Hindu’s Brahman, the Buddha’s Nirvana, Lao-Tzu’s the Tao, and the God of Abraham, all 
share is a new historically distinct belief in a form of a transcendent reality that not only exists 
apart from the everyday world of human beings but also represents a kind of reality—perhaps 
most clearly exemplified by the rise of monotheism—that is interactive and receptive to human 
aspiration, hope, and meaning.  These various belief systems reveal, according to Hick, “the 
proclamation of a limitlessly better possibility arising from another reality, transcendent to our 
present selves…we can express this abstractly by saying that post-axial religion embodies a 
cosmic optimism”80  Or as Hick puts the same point elsewhere, “The different traditions offer 
different pictures, but for all of them our present life is part of a cosmic process leading finally to 
a limitlessly good conclusion.”81 
Hick also claims, however, that the uniqueness of the axial revolution should not be 
defined solely in terms of metaphysical belief but is also exemplified through a basic set of 
moods.  Cosmic optimism amounts to something more than a series of propositional statements 
about true belief in the existence of ultimate reality but also entails an affective experience of 
ultimate reality as a kind of reality that is redemptive and receptive to human needs.  Hick 
describes this optimistic mood in terms of a “vision of the ultimately benign character of the 
universe as it affects human beings, and an anticipation in faith that the limitlessly good 
possibilities of existence will finally be realized.”82   
The attitudes exemplified by cosmic optimism therefore amount to something more than 
simply having a cheery outlook towards life.  Rather, they exemplify an experience of a basic 
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relationship of deep trust or optimistic assurance that our lives will have meaning even when we 
face the adversities and sufferings that confront us daily in this world.  Hick, for example, has 
described the moods of cosmic optimism elsewhere in terms of a basic assurance that reveals “an 
ultimate trust and confidence that the universe has meaning even in life’s darkest moments of 
suffering and sorrow.”83  
Nor is Hick alone in emphasizing such optimistic attitudes towards the universe as a core 
epistemic and experiential feature of most traditional religious narratives.  Charles Taylor, for 
example, makes the following observation about this unique period of human history that also 
captures a different aspect of the phenomena we are calling cosmic optimism.  Taylor writes:    
The axial revolution tended to place the Divine on the side of the ultimate good: while at 
the same time redefining this as something which goes beyond what is understood as 
ordinary human flourishing.84 
 
In his Varieties of Religious Experience, William James also sums up the value of 
religion in ways that bear a remarkable similarity to Hick’s account of cosmic optimism.  James 
writes:   
Religion says essentially two things…the best things are the more eternal things, the 
overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and 
say the final word…the second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now 
if we believe [religion’s] first affirmation to be true.” 85  
 
Finally, John Cottingham offers us a contemporary example of how one might describe this basic 
optimistic attitude towards ultimate reality in his defense of the role that religious faith plays in 
offering humanity a sense hope and assurance about their place in the universe.  Cottingham 
claims that:     
[…] because of the fragility of the human condition, we need more than a rational 
determination to orient ourselves towards the good.  We need to be sustained by a faith in 
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the ultimate resilience of the good; we need to live in the light of hope…Nothing in life is 
guaranteed, but if the path we follow is integrally linked, as good spiritual paths are, to 
right action and self-discovery and respect for others, then we have little to lose; and if 
the claims of religion are true, then we have everything to gain.86   
 
A survey of various religious narratives throughout human history would undoubtedly 
uncover countless more variations of these general themes of cosmic optimism.  The accounts 
offered by Hick and others, of course, paint the history of world religions with rather broad 
brushstrokes.  But my hope is that the general concept of cosmic optimism will serve as a useful 
structural starting point to investigate a basic question that Nietzsche pursues throughout most of 
his intellectual life: why did humanity never adopt the overt deflationary attitudes towards their 
own self-worth that he describes in his own early cosmic fable and instead embrace, for most of 
their history, such a deeply optimistic and soteriological standpoint towards their own place in 
the universe?  This question becomes particularly important when we turn to Nietzsche’s claim 
that he has uncovered a covert pessimism that lurks beneath the long history of optimistic 
attitudes that characterize the tradition of Western philosophy.         
 
3.3 Plato and Cosmic Optimism   
 
The general epistemic and experiential attitudes discovered in the phenomenon of cosmic 
optimism are hardly isolated to the history of religion.  For most of its history, philosophy has 
also expressed a distinctly cosmic belief in an ultimate transcendent reality in the form of Being, 
God, Reality, Truth, that exists apart from our everyday world.  Likewise, for most of its history, 
philosophy has also maintained that we are not only capable of knowing ultimate reality, but that 
                                                      





knowledge of this transcendent ‘true world’ will reveal itself to be amenable to human needs and 
human problems.87   
What is perhaps unique to the soteriology of the philosophical tradition in contrast to the 
religious tradition is that philosophy tends to forge a very strong optimistic connection between 
propositional knowledge and salvation.  Access to the divine in many religious traditions still 
often relies upon various accounts of ineffable mystical intuition or an indirect access to ultimate 
reality through the practices of prayer, myth, and ritual.  By contrast, the activity of philosophy, 
for most of its history, holds itself to be a cognitive discipline that aspires to discover abstract, 
objective, and universal forms of knowledge and truth that represent, or grant access to, ultimate 
reality.88  What is perhaps most unique about the distinctly cognitive form of cosmic optimism 
adopted by philosophy is therefore discovered in the conviction that genuine knowledge, rather 
than faith or ritual or divine providence, will grant us access to the ‘true world’ and that 
knowledge of this ultimate reality will also provide us with normative guidance for how to live a 
good life, or how to fulfill the purpose of human nature, or how to console ourselves when we 
confront various misfortunes and sufferings in the everyday world. 
While Nietzsche is highly critical of most religious forms of cosmic optimism, he takes a 
special critical interest in an ambitious form of cognitive cosmic optimism that he traces all the 
way back to the very beginning of the Western philosophical tradition.  According to Nietzsche, 
the first and most influential philosophical proponent of cosmic optimism is discovered in 
Plato’s depiction of the thought and character of Socrates.  The problem of Socratic optimism 
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and the influential image of philosophy that Plato presents to the world is a theme that will 
occupy Nietzsche from his very first published writings to his very last.89         
  “Socrates,” Nietzsche informs us in his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, “is the prototype 
of the theoretical optimist” (BT 15.)  Plato’s great seduction of philosophy, according to 
Nietzsche, is found in Socrates’s repeated assurances that once humanity has made cognitive 
sense of reality then that same reality will also make moral sense.  Socratic optimism builds itself 
upon the, “the unshakeable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the 
deepest abysses of being, that thought is capable of not only knowing being but even of 
correcting it” (BT 15.)  What the character of Socrates reveals, according to Nietzsche, is an 
ambitious new worldview in the form of a hyper-rationalized moralism that announces, “the 
depths of nature can be fathomed and knowledge can heal all ills” (BT 17.)   
With the introduction of this highly optimistic marriage between metaphysics and moral 
promise, Nietzsche also claims that the Socratic project attempts to bestow “on life and action 
the greatest possible significance” (HH 7) that will prove to have a significant influence on 
philosophy in a variety of ways over the next two thousand years.  Perhaps the most influential 
aspect of Plato’s idealized portrayal of the life of Socrates is discovered in his representation of 
the goals of the genuine philosopher: what philosophy, itself, should aspire to achieve.  The goal 
of philosophy, according to the Socratic project, is to show with absolute certainty that genuine 
                                                      
89 This section will focus closely on Nietzsche’s criticisms of Plato’s depiction of Socrates and how that depiction 
influenced the birth of the general phenomenon of cosmic optimism in the philosophical tradition.  But it is worth 
keeping in mind that Nietzsche maintains an extraordinarily complex relationship with both Plato and Socrates.  It is 
true that Nietzsche calls Socrates “ugly” in Twilight of the Idols and Plato comes in for more abuse than virtually 
any other thinker in Nietzsche’s corpus.  But it is also clear that Nietzsche admired Plato and the historical Socrates 
greatly and often views himself to be in a more respectful competition with their own philosophical views.  For an 
account of Nietzsche’s positive views on Plato and Socrates, see Walter Kaufmann’s “Nietzsche’s Attitude towards 
Socrates” in his Nietzsche (1950) and also Alexander Nehamas’, “A Reason for Socrates’ Face: Nietzsche on ‘The 





belief and moral judgement are not just local expressions of our particular tribe but rather are 
universal expressions of an unconditional and unconditioned higher reality.   
Throughout Plato’s dialogues, and particularly in the middle and later dialogues, 
Socrates’ overall philosophical project is portrayed in terms of his various attempts to show his 
interlocutors that we can and should alleviate our doubts about the instabilities of this world 
through access to an ideal world of stable and transcendent standards, the Forms, that already 
contain definitive answers to our questions about what truth means, or how the authority of our 
norms can be objectively justified, or how to live a good life.   
The epistemic and moral implications of Plato’s own cognitive version of cosmic 
optimism are perhaps seen most clearly in Socrates’ various attempts to convince his fellow 
interlocutors that something cannot count as a genuine instance of knowledge unless it can be 
formulated in terms of an essential definition that will defeat all possible exceptions and 
counterexamples.  Persons cannot be truly courageous or pious unless until they can offer a 
definition of the essence of courage or piety.  To fail to do so, and all of Socrates’ interlocutors 
eventually do fail, is to reveal oneself as deficient, or to reveal oneself as an imposter, who 
understands neither one’s own life nor one’s own proclaimed area of expertise.  Since the 
demands of this type of genuine knowledge have little hope of being satisfied within the 
changing world of sense perception, Athenian folk wisdom, or mere opinion, Socrates repeatedly 
attempts to show his various interlocutors that the true nature of these concepts must be located 
in a higher transcendent world that offers a more suitable home for such high definitional 
standards.    
But Plato’s high definitional standards extend far beyond individual concepts like “piety” 





is understood in terms of a universal definition of a transcendent ideal.  Plato’s ideal of the good 
life, for example, is defined in terms of a life that is always consistent and that avoids confusion, 
contradiction, and error.  The good life should also free itself from the unstable and pernicious 
influence of the emotions and bodily appetites by placing these features of human existence 
under the sole guidance of rationality.90  And perhaps most bewildering for Nietzsche, Plato 
claims that the ability to theoretically understand the good life and its associated virtues is 
sufficient for someone to have the practical knowledge to be able to lead a good life.  As 
Nietzsche states in TI, “I am trying to figure out which idiosyncrasy gave rise to that Socratic 
equation of reason = virtue = happiness: the most bizarre of all equations, which is opposed to all 
the instincts of earlier Greeks” (TI ‘Socrates’ 4.)91  Only ignorance, on the Platonic model, is 
ever responsible for immorality.  Socrates assures us that no person with genuine knowledge of 
the Good would ever harm willingly92 and even that no harm will ever occur to a truly good 
person.93   
Socrates famously claims that his various conversations with his fellow Athenians are 
motivated by an overriding desire for truth.  But Nietzsche diagnoses a different set of 
motivations deep at work within the Socratic project.  Plato’s unyielding conviction that 
something is valuable only if it can be known, and that something can only be known if it can be 
unconditionally defined, can just as easily be enlisted in the service of repression as it can be 
                                                      
90 It is worth again noting that Plato’s own philosophy offers a far more complicated picture of human desire than 
Nietzsche’s critique often allows.  Plato’s Symposium, for example, offers a different picture of human desire—
particularly, sexual desire—that portrays our animal desires in terms of a first step on the way to transcendence.  But 
it is also important to note that even this less repressive model claims that sexual desire, in itself, has no value in its 
merely ephemeral bodily instantiation.  It is merely an instrumental means—a low rung on the ladder—to the 
attainment of a higher transcendent form of beauty.  
91 Nietzsche had already formulated a similar version of this criticism in BT: “Virtue is knowledge; sin is only 
committed out of ignorance; the virtuous man is the happy man; in these three basic forms of optimism lies the death 
of tragedy” (BT 14) 
92 Plato, Protagoras, 352c  





viewed as a model of liberation.  Plato’s optimism, Nietzsche suggests, turned “reason into a 
tyrant” (TI ‘Ancients’ 10) not in order to liberate his fellow Athenians but in order to assuage 
Plato’s own deep anxieties about the role that contingency, luck, error, finitude, and suffering 
play in shaping our understanding of the meaning of human life. 
The presentation of human meaning and suffering in Greek tragedy, a topic that also 
occupies Nietzsche from his first writings to his last, offers a contrasting picture to Socratic 
optimism.  The tragic worldview denies the rational promise of a meaningful life that Socratic 
optimism seems so intent to establish.  As we have seen, the Socratic project equates the good 
life with a life that is free of contingency and assures us that genuine knowledge will render us 
immune to the accidents and misfortunes that may befall us.  Socratic optimism also maintains 
that the attainment of truth will inevitably lead to human happiness.   
Nietzsche claims that tragedy, by contrast, reveals a very different truth about human 
existence that expresses rather than represses the reality of human fragility.  Tragedy reveals to 
us how even the most well-intentioned, well-informed, and well-planned-out life is open to the 
possibility of failure, destruction, and countless other aspects of luck that lay outside of the 
powers of our rational control.  In contrast to the assurances of cosmic optimism, tragedy also 
reveals to us a picture of the universe that is largely indifferent to human aspiration.  In this way, 
Nietzsche claims that, “tragedies have to do with precisely what is incurable, unavoidable, 
inescapable in human character and destiny” (AOM, 23.)   
But the Greek tragic affirmation of these basic truths, on Nietzsche’s view, could not 
sustain itself in the face of the emerging influence of Socrates’ theoretical optimism.  The birth 





suicide actually, performed by Euripides with Socrates serving the role of an ultra-rational 
philosophical Dr. Kevorkian (BT 11.)   
While Nietzsche’s philosophical views on many topics change considerably from his 
earlier to his later writings, he remains remarkably consistent in his charge that Plato’s 
rationalized version of cosmic optimism, along with his postulation of an ideal world of the 
Forms to support it, was not born out of a quest for truth but rather out of a basic inability to face 
up to the realities of human life.  While he begins this line of criticism in BT, it is taken up by 
Nietzsche again in one of his last engagements with Plato where informs us of his preference for 
Thucydides over Plato.  Nietzsche tells us, “my vacation, my preference, my cure for all things 
Platonic has always been Thucydides” (TI ‘Ancient’ 2.)  And then he goes on to explain what he 
so admires the Greek historian:    
In the end, it is courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like Thucydides 
from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he escapes into the ideal; 
Thucydides has control of himself and consequently has control over things as well…” 
(Ibid) 
 
Much like his early praise for the Greek tragedians Aeschylus and Sophocles, Nietzsche claims 
that what is so admirable about Thucydides is that he did not need to idealize human life in order 
to explain it.  Nietzsche refers to Thucydides’ histories, “as the grand summation, the last 
manifestation of that strong, stern, hard matter-of-factness instinctive to the older Hellenes” 
(Ibid.)  Thucydides has a “sense of the facts” and the “honesty [Redlichkeit]” to explain human 
life as a messy, complex, not always fully intelligible affair, that demands careful investigation 





nations.  These thick explanations of human meaning and motivation, for Nietzsche, are both 
more realistic and more flexible than Plato’s moralized picture of the good life.94    
In the History of the Peloponnesian War, for example, we are told stories about human 
beings who are motivated by honor, courage, and goodness; but we are also told stories of people 
motivated by pride, self-interest, and power.  Plato, of course, also presents us with human 
beings who are motivated by pride, self-interest, and power in characters like Thrasymachus or 
Callicles.  But these immoralist characters are always set up to fail in the face of Plato’s own 
transcendent ideal.  Thucydides, by contrast, does not advocate, but also does not deny, the roles 
that egoism and immoralist motivations might play in a realistic explanation of the intelligible 
motivations of human life.  Bad things sometimes happen in life; sometimes, the bad person 
wins.95   
At times, Nietzsche seems to leave open the idea that the fate of Plato and the influential 
legacy of Socratic optimism that followed him could have been otherwise.  In HH, for example, 
Nietzsche poses the following conjecture:   
It is by no means an idle question whether Plato, had he remained free of enchantment by 
Socrates, might not have found an even higher type of philosophical man, which is lost to 
us forever.  When one looks at the period before Plato one seems to be gazing into a 
workshop for forming such types” (HH I 261.)   
 
It is an interesting thought.  Perhaps the trajectory of Western culture all comes down to the 
contingent fact that a talented young poet happened to fall in with the wrong crowd.  If Plato had 
chosen to emulate someone more like Thucydides and less like Socrates, then perhaps the history 
of philosophy might have turned out differently.  
                                                      
94 See Scott Jenken’s “What Does Nietzsche Owe Thucydides?” in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies (42) (2011) pp. 
32-50 for a comprehensive account of Nietzsche’s lifelong admiration of Thucydides’ social psychology.  See also 
Raymond Geuss, “Thucydides, Nietzsche, and Williams” in Outside Ethics (2005) for an interesting account of what 
Geuss sees as alternative realistic moral psychology to Plato’s idealism. 
95 See Bernard Willliams’ “Plato Against the Immoralist” in Senses of the Past (2006) for a detailed account of 






3.4 Cosmic Optimism and Nietzsche’s Critique of the Tradition    
  
  But it was Plato, of course, “the most beautiful and diseased flower of antiquity” (BGE 
P) and not Thucydides who shaped the subsequent course of philosophical history.  As Nietzsche 
writes, “after Socrates, the mystagogue of science, one school of philosophy follows another, 
like a wave upon wave […] one cannot do other than regard Socrates as the vortex and turning 
point of so-called world-history” (BT 15.)  As Nietzsche will later state in BGE:   
Plato wanted to use all of his strength (the greatest strength a philosopher ever had at his 
disposal!) to prove to himself that reason and the instincts converge independently on a 
single goal, on the Good, or ‘God’; and ever since Plato, all theologians and philosophers 
have been on the same track” (BGE 191.) 
 
Plato’s fundamental error, according to Nietzsche, was the “invention of pure spirit and the Good 
in itself” (BGE P) and he claims that the history of Western culture, despite many surface 
differences, can be understood in terms of minor variations on two basic assumptions discovered 
in Plato’s version of cosmic optimism: 1) that ultimate reality can be understood through the 
contemplation of transcendent standards that are ontologically distinct from local history, 
cultural prejudice, and personal preference, and 2) that if we can make cognitive sense of reality 
then this same reality will make moral sense.  In addition, these assumptions reveal, for 
Nietzsche, a psychological history within the Western tradition that, like Plato, also exhibits an 
inability to face up to the realities of change, luck, suffering, tragedy, and death through the 
adoption of various transcendent standards that offer human beings the assurances of safety, 
security, and stability in an otherworldly or abstract beyond.   
Richard Schacht once noted in reference to Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition that, 
“Seen in this light, the history of philosophy consists far less in a series of objective and 





from reality.”96  Schacht’s suggestion that we might read Nietzsche’s criticisms of the history of 
the Western tradition in terms of various case studies that highlight a more general pathology 
offers us a helpful way to frame my overall reconstruction of Nietzsche’s critical diagnosis of the 
evaluative worldview of cosmic optimism.  Nietzsche’s discussion of Plato, for example, offers 
one prominent example of just such a case study.  But the task of reconstructing a general 
pathology out of Nietzsche’s various engagements with particular arguments and historical 
individuals throughout the tradition also raises a number of exegetical difficulties.   
Perhaps the most obvious exegetical difficulty is that Nietzsche does not offer us an 
overview of his general criticism of the Western tradition within the confines of one particular 
book or essay.  Rather, as with most topics in his thinking, his overall critique must be 
reconstructed from various observations, arguments, and remarks that are scattered throughout 
his writings.  The interpretive problems posed by such reconstructive efforts are poorly 
formulated if one conceives of this task as simply assembling his various views together in the 
same way that one might assemble together a jigsaw puzzle from its various pieces.  For one 
tends to find multiple, and often quite different, critical narratives at work within Nietzsche’s 
various texts that do not always match up well.  To continue the jigsaw metaphor, the 
interpretive problem we face is that it is not always clear whether all of Nietzsche’s pieces 
belong to the same puzzle, or whether, when reading him we might be encountering many 
different pieces that actually belong to many different puzzles.     
My own attempts to frame Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the tradition in terms of a general 
pathology that expresses itself through the moods and metaphysics of cosmic optimism offers a 
case in point.  At times, Nietzsche tends to focus his criticism rather narrowly on the ways that a 
                                                      





specific Platonic-Christian worldview—Nietzsche refers to Christianity as “Platonism for the 
People” (BGE P)—has shaped our understanding of the history of metaphysics and morality.  
The Platonic-Christian narrative, for example, draws a sharp metaphysical distinction between 
appearance and reality which, in turn, reinforces a strong normative distinction between our 
fallen, sinful, or imperfect status in this world and our subsequent chance for redemption in a 
higher world of the Forms or Heaven.  At other times, however, Nietzsche expands the scope of 
his critique considerably to include a much broader diagnosis of a number of modern pathologies 
that he claims are hidden implicit continuations of the Platonic-Christian project that now 
express themselves under the guise of Kantian ethics and various secular movements ranging 
from socialism, democracy, Wagnerism, utilitarianism, German nationalism, and feminism, to 
name just a few.   
If we now return to Nietzsche’s claim that all of philosophy and religion has been “on the 
same track” since Plato, or that the whole of Western culture fails to face up to reality, it turns 
out that the case studies, themselves, reveal a general diagnosis that is far more complicated than 
it might initially appear.  Or at least we must admit that his general diagnosis of the history of the 
tradition appears to take on different senses when applied to different case studies and, at first 
glance, it is unclear whether all of these senses fit together into one coherent narrative of 
Western pathology.  What we appear to find in place of a general narrative is something closer to 
a collection of loose family resemblances of various pathological conditions that Nietzsche’s 
discovers within our long evaluative history.          
It is certainly tempting, given Nietzsche’s diversity of views, to try and organize his 
critique of the history of philosophy, religion, and culture through the lens of one specific 





Nietzsche’s major concepts have been chosen at one time or another to serve as the key to 
understanding his overall critical story.97  But I also think we must exercise caution to not 
mistake an interesting subplot for the larger narrative.  My reservation is simply that it seems 
highly unlikely that one master concept will offer a narrative framework that will be able to 
capture all aspects of Nietzsche’s protean diagnosis of the history of the Western tradition.   
To put the same point in a positive rather than a negative way, I am willing to 
acknowledge that there is a fair amount of pathological pluralism at work in Nietzsche’s overall 
critique of our evaluative history.  Different pathologies come to the foreground when viewed 
through the lens of some aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking while others might fade into the 
background.  Different strategies of reading Nietzsche through different concepts are likely to 
yield different insights.  I raise these interpretive issues now by way of openly acknowledging 
that my own reconstruction of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the history of Western culture will be 
selective.  I have opted to set aside some of Nietzsche’s more well-known concepts in order to 
focus more closely on his overall critical account of the various ways that humanity’s own 
understanding of its self-worth fits within the larger historical narrative of cosmic optimism that 
has been developed so far in this chapter.   
My choice, however, is not arbitrary.  Basic themes of optimism and pessimism are 
present everywhere in Nietzsche’s thinking.98  In fact, if pressed to summarize his entire 
philosophy within a single sentence, one could do worse than claim that Nietzsche’s critical 
project unmasks an ambitious attitude of otherworldly optimism within Western culture that 
                                                      
97 The temptation to do so bears some similarity to the temptation discussed in the last chapter where the diversity of 
Nietzsche’s views was organized under the guiding framework of his anticipation of one particular contemporary 
theory.  
98 It is certainly not by accident that when Nietzsche reissued the BT in 1886 that he changed the subtitle of the book 
to: Hellenism and Pessimism and claimed in his new Preface to the book that those parts of the book he still valued 





turns out to embrace a form of life-denying pessimism towards the value of life and, in turn, that 
his constructive project introduces us to a new form of pessimism towards transcendence that 
turns out to embrace a new attitude of life-affirming optimism about our prospects of finding 
meaning within the natural world.  The next section of the chapter will focus on some of the 
structural features of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of how our historically optimistic outlook on life 
reveals, upon close scrutiny, a basic pessimistic stance towards our own historical sense of our 
self-worth.  
3.5 The Ascetic Ideal: Masochistic Optimism and Constitutional Deficiency 
 
As a way of orientating ourselves within the basic themes of this section, I would like to 
begin with a quote from someone not usually associated with Nietzsche: John Dewey.  Towards 
the beginning of his book Art as Experience, Dewey asks the following questions:  
Why is the attempt to connect the higher and ideal things of experience with basic vital 
roots so often regarded as a betrayal of their nature and denial of their value?  Why is 
there repulsion when the high achievements of fine art are brought into connection with 
common life, the life we share with all living creatures?  Why is life thought of as an 
affair of low appetite, or at best, a thing of gross sensation, and ready to sink from its best 
to the level of lust and harsh cruelty?  A complete answer to this question would involve 
the writing of a history of morals that would set forth the conditions that have brought 
about contempt for the body, fear of the senses, and the opposition to flesh and spirit. 99  
 
While Nietzsche and Dewey differ stylistically (they write very, very differently) and on many 
substantive topics (they differ considerably, for example, on the value of democracy), it would 
be difficult to find two thinkers who share a closer affinity for exploring the various ways that 
the human experience of fragility, suffering, and uncertainty has shaped the formation of the 
                                                      





history of Western ideals and, particularly, the ways that the tradition has devalued the natural 
world in favor of various forms of transcendent reality.100   
A comparative study of these two thinkers is beyond the scope of this present study, but I 
chose Dewey’s quote because I think that Nietzsche’s later philosophy might be profitably read 
as an attempt to write a version of Dewey’s proposed evaluative history of our traditional 
contempt for the body, the senses, life, and the natural world.  Nietzsche offers us his own 
succinct one sentence summary of the plotline of this evaluative history when he states, “The 
wisest men in every age have reached the same conclusion about life, it’s no good” (TI 
‘Socrates’ 2.)  The overall story, however, is much more complicated and, as with many topics in 
Nietzsche, tends to venture out in many directions at the same time.  This section will focus on 
just one of those directions by looking more closely at Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the evaluative 
relationship between the Western tradition’s highest ideals and our historical sense of our own 
self-worth.    
According to Nietzsche, the Western tradition’s collective sense that life on earth is “no 
good” is discovered in the history of humanity’s perceived sense of its own constitutional 
deficiency.  That is, our basic conception of who we are, our basic nature, has historically been 
framed in terms of a sense that we are corrupt, confused, or impure beings.  We are beings who 
have historically and habitually assumed that we stand in need of some form of redemption.  
Further, Nietzsche claims that the traditional transcendent ideals that are supposed to redeem us 
from our inherent corruption, confusion, and impurity also reveal a deeply inculcated 
psychological need to debase or belittle ourselves.  As it turns out, our historically optimistic 
                                                      
100 It is unfortunate that these two thinkers are not read in conversation together more often.  Dewey’s Quest for 
Certainty (1929) and Essay III of Nietzsche’s GM, for example, say the same thing, only in different ways, and 





sense of ourselves as the main protagonists of the universe also reveals a deep pessimism about 
whether we could ever value ourselves without such cosmic assurances.         
In order to better understand this historically pessimistic stance towards human nature 
and the immanent value of life, Nietzsche claims that we must begin by asking basic questions 
about why humanity would have ever adopted this peculiar way of seeing ourselves as deficient 
beings in relation to our own highest ideals.  Aaron Ridley frames the question well when he 
claims that one of the main questions that Nietzsche pursues in his later writings is, “why would 
embodied, contingent, temporal souls insist on the worthlessness of their own embodiment, 
contingency, and temporality?”101  Nietzsche’s answer to this question is discovered in his 
diagnosis of a historical evaluative framework of deeply embedded beliefs and institutional 
practices of self-denial that have generated humanity’s traditional sense of its own constitutional 
deficiency in an attempt to offer us something that we desperately need: a global sense of the 
meaning and purpose of human life.   
Nietzsche’s own term for this organizing evaluative framework of self-denial is the 
“ascetic ideal.”  According to Nietzsche, our highest values have been generated out of a basic 
ascetic denial of our natural lives and the natural world.  But before we turn to a discussion of the 
ascetic ideal, a brief cautionary note is in order.  In what follows, I will focus on the question of 
how the evaluative framework of the ascetic ideal helps to explain humanity’s sense of its own 
constitutional deficiency as well as the interplay of optimism and pessimism that Nietzsche 
claims to discover at the heart of the Western evaluative tradition.  In order to do so, I have set 
aside any detailed discussion of how Nietzsche’s general account of the ascetic ideal in Essay III 
of the GM fits together with his discussion of many of the other narratives and concepts of that 
                                                      





book that are presented in Essays I and II.  Such a choice presents its own interpretive risks.  As 
mentioned briefly in the last section, it is not obvious that any single concept within Nietzsche’s 
thought can (or was intended to) perform the meta-function of an organizing term for his entire 
protean critique of the Western tradition.  His discussion of the ascetic ideal stands as no 
exception.   
It is true that Nietzsche does often frame the ascetic ideal in terms of a grand historical 
meta-narrative of life-devaluation that I, myself, shall employ and that is often presented within 
various scholarly treatments of the GM.102  But he does not always do so.  Nietzsche, at times, 
also presents the ascetic ideal in terms of what might best be described as a practical pathology 
of the self.  In a rarely cited passage towards the end of GM III, for example, Nietzsche informs 
us that the ascetic ideal ranks alongside both syphilis and alcoholism as one of the main 
contributors to “the true doom in the history of European health” (GM III: 21.)  It is always 
possible, of course, that Nietzsche is just joking around here.  But it might also be the case that 
his decision to compare the unhealthy effects of the ascetic ideal to alcoholism and syphilis 
rather than, say, Platonic Realism (or some other grand philosophical theory) is intended to carry 
an implicit practical warning to his readers to not overly-intellectualize his diagnosis; to not 
simply treat his discussion of the ascetic ideal as an abstract philosophical argument.   
While Nietzsche does locate the ascetic ideal within the formal history of philosophical 
and theological arguments, he also claims to find it at work within the implicit framework of the 
various historical institutions, practices, customs and norms, that have shaped humanity’s lived 
                                                      
102 Essay III certainly takes a far more global stance towards the history of the Western tradition than the more 
historically constrained accounts of the slave revolt in morality offered in Essay I and the discussion of guilt and bad 





experience of the world and that have structured their practical evaluations of everyday life.103  
In this way, Nietzsche’s formal evaluation of the abstract arguments and normative commitments 
constituted by the ascetic ideal is quite often articulated alongside his evaluation of what we 
might call the ethos of the ascetic ideal: the general way it has structured a certain kind of 
historical experience of the value of self and world.  
Nietzsche’s general claim in Essay III of the GM is that humanity has traditionally 
embraced ascetic ideals—in both ethos and argument—that advocate the voluntary deprivation 
of the body and worldly desires as a means to make life meaningful.  While this strong emphasis 
on deprivation and self-denial has expressed itself in various ways—through artists, priests, 
philosophers, scientists, the disenfranchised masses—Nietzsche claims that all of these ascetic 
manifestations exhibit various stances of renunciation towards the world.  But Nietzsche is also 
careful to draw a distinction at the beginning of GM III between “ascetic ideals” (plural) and the 
“ascetic ideal” (singular) in terms of the scope of humanity’s various pursuits of meaning and 
also in terms of the various ways that humans have chosen to renounce the world.     
Nietzsche acknowledges that one finds various ascetic ideals (plural) such as “poverty, 
humility, and chastity” (GM III: 9) throughout human history that advocate the voluntary 
deprivation of the body and worldly desires as means to pursue the value of a particular way of 
life.  Nietzsche claims that the philosopher, for example, denies the sensual life because the 
pursuit of sensual pleasure is held to be incompatible with the pursuit of more spiritual and 
intellectual goals.  No self-respecting philosopher, Nietzsche informs us, has ever chosen to get 
married.104  At times, it might be necessary to renounce the pursuit of fame, luxury, sexual 
                                                      
103Nietzsche informs his readers, for example, in the Preface to the GM that his main target is “morality which has 
really existed, really been lived” (GM P 5.) 
104 Nietzsche notes that Socrates stands out as a notable exception in the history of philosophy, but then Nietzsche 





pleasure, and indulgence in too much Foie Gras, in order to achieve one’s higher ideals.  A 
certain kind of asceticism, Nietzsche suggests, might even be both the prerequisite and outcome 
of the “highest spirituality” (GM III: 9.)  As he notes, the greatest thinkers within the tradition 
have tended to adopt, “a certain asceticism, a hard and hearty renunciation with the best will 
possible” (GM III: 9.)105 
The ascetic ideal (in the singular), in contrast to various ascetic practices, represents the 
idealization of ascetic self-denial as a meta-narrative and global model of meaning for all of 
human existence.  The ascetic ideal as meta-narrative no longer treats acts of self-denial as an 
instrumental means to achieve a particular kind of life but rather aspires to depict the denial of 
natural existence, in toto, as the overriding purpose of human life.  In this sense, Nietzsche 
claims that the ambitions of the ascetic ideal represent an “aversion to life, a rebellion against the 
most fundamental prerequisites of life” that aspires to nothing short of the global goal of 
“renouncing the world” (GM III: 28.) 
How did a global renunciation of the value of our natural selves and the natural world 
come to be interpreted by humanity as the main ideal for a meaningful life; even as a gateway to 
another transcendent world?  As Nietzsche notes, the question is not insignificant given that the 
idealization of asceticism is hardly an “exception and curiosity” within human history but 
appears as “one of the most widespread and enduring of all phenomena” (GM III:11.)  
Everywhere within human history, and certainly within the history of the Western tradition, 
Nietzsche claims that one finds a basic ascetic theme that systematically devalues the natural 
constitution of life in favor of transcendentally structured narratives of human value.               
                                                      
105 One might claim that Nietzsche’s own life (and his own assessments of his life) would certainly fall under this 





Nietzsche goes on to speculate that one of the main reasons why this global ascetic stance 
towards life has proven to be so basic to traditional accounts of the meaning, purpose, and value 
of human existence is because the majority of human beings, prior to the emergence of the 
ascetic ideal, suffered from the problem of having no sense of meaning, no sense of purpose, and 
no sense of value in regard to their own existence.  As Nietzsche tells us, “if one disregards the 
ascetic ideal: man, the animal man, has until now had no meaning.” (GM III: 28.)  He goes on:  
This is what the ascetic ideal meant: something was missing, there was an immense 
lacuna around man,--he himself could think of no justification or explanation or 
affirmation, he suffered from the problem of what he meant. (GM III: 28.)  
 
The one thing, according to Nietzsche, that humanity has historically sought to avoid at all costs 
is a direct confrontation with the “horror vacui” of existence: a basic experience of human life 
and the universe as pointless, governed only chance, and devoid of any meaning and purpose.   
Nietzsche informs us that:      
“the human will […] needs a goal—and it would rather will nothingness than not will 
[…] man was rescued by [the ascetic ideal], he had a meaning […] now he could will 
something […]  And, to say again at the end what I said at the beginning: man would 
much rather will nothingness than not will.” (GM III: 28)   
 
It is worth emphasizing the distinction that Nietzsche makes between “not willing” and “willing 
nothingness” in this passage.  To “not will,” on this account, entails a state where humanity faces 
the horror vacui and is unable to give any sense of meaning or purpose to the emptiness and 
arbitrariness of its own existence.  “Willing nothingness,” on the other hand, entails a strategy for 
staving off the potential meaningless of human existence through the direct negation, even 
intense hatred, of our natural existence.  As Nietzsche explains in dramatic form at the very end 
of GM III:      
We can no longer conceal from ourselves what is expressed by all the willing that has 
taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the 





of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, 
death, wish, longing itself—all of this means—let us dare to grasp this—a will to 
nothingness […]” (GM III:28.) 
 
The ascetic ideal saved the will from “suicidal nihilism” and from the prospects of 
experiencing our lives as a mere “leaf in the wind, a plaything of nonsense” (GM III: 28.)  But in 
order to impose this sense of meaningful purpose upon our collective experience of the 
emptiness and pervasive suffering endemic to human existence, our species was forced to 
renounce the value of, and even cultivate an active hatred towards, its own animality, sensuality, 
and finitude in favor of various forms of “nothingness” discovered in transcendentally structured 
traditional narratives of meaning.106   
In one of the great axiological shifts within human history Nietzsche claims that the 
ascetic ideal has transformed us into a “life-inimical species” who appear to have paradoxically 
turned their own will against themselves in the interests of their own preservation (GM III:11.)107  
At bottom, we discover within the ascetic ideal, “man’s will to erect an ideal and in the face of it 
to feel the palpable certainty of his own absolute unworthiness” (GM II:22.)  Nietzsche offers us 
what is perhaps his clearest account of the immense scope of this grand ascetic narrative of 
meaning in his assessment of the evaluative ideal offered to us by the figure of the ascetic priest:    
The idea we are fighting about here is the valuation of our life on the part of the ascetic 
priest: he relates our life (together with that to which it belongs: ‘nature’, ‘world’, the 
entire sphere of becoming and transitoriness) to an entirely different kind of existence 
which it opposes and excludes, unless, perhaps it were to turn against itself, to negate 
                                                      
106 Nietzsche uses the term “nothingness” in this general sense in other writings as well.  For example, in the 
Antichrist he equates the concept of “nothingness” with “the Beyond, God, and the ‘true life” (A 7, 18, 43.)  
107 Nietzsche’s account of the various social, historical, and psychological factors that contributed to the turning of 
the human will against itself are discussed in more detail in his account of the emergence of ‘bad conscience’ and 
moralized guilt in GM II.  For the purposes of this chapter, I have largely set aside Nietzsche’s discussion of this 
important analysis of humanity’s prehistory and the various sorts of psychological and social transformations that 
humanity has undergone in order to become the kinds of normative beings who would be receptive to an evaluative 
narrative like the ascetic ideal.  For an interesting account of the overall role that GM II plays in the GM, as a whole, 
and also more broadly within Nietzsche’s philosophical anthropology, see Richard Schacht’s “Of Morals and 
Menschen” in ed. Schacht, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (1994.)  See also, Bernard Reginster’s “The Genealogy 
of Guilt” ed. Simon May in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (2011) for a helpful reconstruction of 





itself: in this case, the case of an ascetic life, life is held to be a bridge to another 
existence.  The ascetic treats life as a wrong path that one must finally retrace back to the 
point where it begins; or as an error that one refutes through deeds” (GM III: 11) 
 
Everything changes, according to Nietzsche, when humanity’s devaluation of the world 
and affirmation of a new transcendent world enables it to now interpret the reality of the natural 
world and its own animal self as deficient in relation to a new set of higher non-natural ideals.  
Our experience of the instability, the impurity, and contingent nature of the finite world—the 
primary source of our suffering—can now be interpreted in terms of various forms of 
incompleteness that stand in need of completion or redemption within a transcendent world that 
offers us stability, purity, and necessity.  The most valuable aspects of human existence—our 
rationality, our eternal souls, our values—are held to be wholly non-natural parts of human 
reality that, in turn, maintain a deep connection with a higher form of reality that is, itself, 
located in a non-natural world.   
Perhaps most importantly, Nietzsche claims that the ascetic ideal offers us a way to 
interpret our own suffering, and even our own finitude, as no longer arbitrary events but now as 
parts of a larger cosmic process.  With the emergence of this new cosmic narrative we discover 
not only a new mood of optimism but also a new conception of humanity’s own sense of its self-
worth that is deeply interwoven into what becomes one of the most basic narratives of human 
history: our natural lives are best understood in terms of a journey, a vehicle, a bridge, that is 
orientated towards a higher realm of being.     
The grand narrative that I have just described is, of course, nothing other than the basic 
evaluative narrative of cosmic optimism discussed earlier in the chapter, only now described 
from a different perspective.  At least one implication of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the ascetic 





cosmic assurance of human beings as the main protagonists within a moral universe that is 
receptive to humanity’s highest hopes and aspirations.  The idea that human life has traditionally 
promoted its own interests and established its highest values through various forms of self-hatred 
was clearly a source of great fascination for Nietzsche.  On his overall view, the general attitudes 
that characterize cosmic optimism soon begin to resemble a general structure of valuation that 
might be more appropriately re-named as masochistic optimism.  For the normative structure of 
the ascetic ideal not only inculcates a strategy of self-denial that encourages a hatred of our 
natural lives, it also encourages us to take pride in our own debasement.   
In fact, Nietzsche claims that the will to nothingness that structures the ascetic ideal 
interprets the act of overcoming the natural world and the animal body as an integral part of the 
agent’s redemption, even as a profound sense of accomplishment.  As Nietzsche states, “pleasure 
is looked for and found in decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, self-
destruction, self-flagellation, and self-sacrifice.” (GM III:11)108  The sting of the scourge, the 
itch of the hair shirt, the discipline of fasting, the virtue of selflessness, even the restraint of 
modesty in one’s thought, behavior, and dress, are interpreted as feats of the will in the service of 
liberation rather than simply as acts of denunciation.       
On Nietzsche’s account, a close relationship between traditional conceptions of human 
dignity and our propensity towards devaluation begins to emerge when viewed through the lens 
of the ascetic ideal.  On the one hand, we find that nature, life, the body and its associated 
desires, and the senses, are hated because of their low value in comparison to the non-natural 
                                                      
108As Nietzsche describes the inner logic of the ascetic priest, “As if by magic, the ‘no’ that he says to life brings to 
light an abundance of tender ‘yes’s,’ even when he wounds himself […] it is the wound itself that compels him to 
live” (GM III: 13) See Ivan Soll’s “Nietzsche in Cruelty, Asceticism, and the Failure of Hedonism” in ed. Schacht 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (1994) for an interesting discussion of the relationship between pleasure and pain in 







transcendent ideals that characterize the most valuable aspects of human reality.  On the other 
hand, we cannot simply wish away our animal bodies or the material world that surrounds us.  
The overcoming of the natural within our earthly existence therefore becomes a necessary 
requirement for our own transcendent aspirations.  It is through both the act and the ambition of 
overcoming our given nature in order to achieve higher transcendent ideals that generates the 
normative structure, meaning, and purpose of a traditional well-lived life.  The eternal, the 
spiritual, the true, and the pure all gain their elevated status, in part, through an agent’s ability to 
overcome the finite, the animal, the false, and the sullied.  The value of those desires, 
experiences, and aspects of human existence that are merely natural are interpreted primarily in 
terms of a series of obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve higher transcendent 
goals and values.  In this way, our animal bodies and the natural world are interpreted primarily 
in terms of a series of worldly trials that must be overcome in order to achieve higher 
transcendent goals and values.  
 
3.6 On the Same Track: Disunity and Deficiency in the Tradition  
 
Earlier in the chapter, I highlighted some interpretive difficulties that one might 
encounter when trying to make sense of Nietzsche’s overall critique of the Western tradition.  
His general diagnosis, I suggested, often seems to imply that the entire history of Western 
civilization suffers from some kind of basic evaluative pathology.  But the generality that 
characterizes his sweeping criticisms of the Western tradition tends to remain rather elusive 
when it comes to spelling out the precise details of his diagnosis.  As we have seen, for example, 
Nietzsche claims that all of philosophy and theology has been “on the same track” since Plato 
(BGE 191.)  What this track looks like, however, does not appear to be discovered in the 





supposedly unites the tradition together.  Rather, Nietzsche seems to be much more interested in 
uncovering a number of basic themes and tacit assumptions that lay hidden beneath the history of 
the various explicit arguments and theoretical commitments that constitute our ordinary 
understanding of our own history.       
I have suggested so far that one pervasive theme that might help to unite Nietzsche’s 
overall diagnosis of the tradition is found in his critical analysis of a general evaluative attitude 
that we have referred to as cosmic optimism.  On the surface, the attitudes of cosmic optimism 
can be described in terms of: 1) a cosmic belief or mood that affirms some form of transcendent 
reality that exists apart from the natural world and 2) an optimistic belief or mood that 
characterizes this form of transcendent reality as ultimately good and even wholly receptive to or 
redemptive of human aspirations.  When viewed through the lens of the ascetic ideal, however, 
we discovered that the same cosmic attitudes that optimistically say “yes” to humanity’s 
experience of its highest hopes within the realm of the transcendent also turn out to presuppose a 
pessimistic and even masochistic “no” towards our experience of the value of our natural selves 
and the natural world.   
According to Nietzsche, the “no” that categorizes the ascetic ideal is both experiential 
and discursive.  It is a “no” that not only highlights a key feature of our historical experience of 
humanity’s modes of valuation of the world, but also a “no” that is structurally instituted within 
the framework of the Western tradition itself.  The structural framework of the ascetic ideal is 
discovered, for example, within the Western tradition’s penchant for metaphysical dualisms such 
as Being/Becoming, Reality/Appearance, Soul/Body, Reason/Passion, Truth/Error that have 
traditionally divided human nature and reality into a disunity of distinctly transcendent and 





On Nietzsche’s view, the presence and persistence of these rigid binary oppositions 
between the transcendent and natural components of the universe should not be understood as 
simply a neutral history of attempts on the behalf of various thinkers to take a philosophical 
inventory of either human nature or human reality.  Rather, these traditional dualisms are, 
themselves, structural expressions of the ascetic ideal’s overall attempt to present us with a 
certain picture of the meaning of human life.  The various interpretations of structural disunity 
and natural deficiency expressed through these dualisms (soul/body, appearance/reality, etc.) 
present us with a traditional conception of human nature and human reality that facilitates the 
normative ambitions of the ascetic ideal: the best life is a life that wills to overcome the natural 
in order to achieve a transcendent ideal.  In the closing pages of the chapter, I will now turn to a 
few examples within the tradition that help to illustrate how Nietzsche’s analysis of the structural 
features of disunity and deficiency within various conceptions of the good life help to illustrate 
how we might understand how everyone has been on the “on the same track” since Plato.         
As already discussed in some detail earlier in the chapter, Plato often portrays human 
nature and human reality in terms of basic disunities and natural deficiencies when articulating 
his conception of the good life.  Plato, for example, routinely portrays the body and human 
animality as not part of one’s true self.  Rather, the body and its “lower” drives are experienced 
as deficient, even alien, aspects of one’s existence that must be subordinated and mastered by 
reason.109  This basic disunity of self, in turn, reflects Plato’s far more expansive vision of the 
disunity of reality which holds that the imperfections of change and contingency discovered in 
                                                      
109 Alexander Nehamas offers a helpful description of the specific disunity found in the Socratic self: “By giving 
[reason] absolute preeminence, Socrates convinced us not to think we comprise many things, of them equally part of 
what we are.  Instead, he persuaded us to identify ourselves with this one impulse, to consider it the seat of the self, 
the mark of the human, and to distrust everything else about us a lower, degenerate, as features simply of the body 





the deficiencies of the natural world can only be made complete and whole through the 
contemplation of a higher reality that is revealed to us by the unconditional and non-natural 
world of the Forms.   
Plato presents us with what is perhaps his most extreme and most influential version of 
this disunity thesis in the Phaedo.  There Plato informs us that the body and soul are not only 
distinct metaphysical entities with distinctly different origins, but also that the body is best 
understood as a kind of prison in which the soul is trapped.110  Human life, itself, is a peculiar 
phenomenon in which one’s true self has become trapped within an alien animal enclosure.  On 
Plato’s view, the philosopher leads the best life because she has chosen to lead an ascetic life in 
which the soul has become as detached as it can possibly be from the body.  The philosopher, in 
this way, leads the best life because it is a life that most closely resembles the state of death.  
Socrates informs us, on his own deathbed, that death is a blessing not only because it releases the 
soul from its imprisonment by the body but also because it allows the soul the opportunity to find 
its way back to its rightful transcendent home in another world.   
According to Nietzsche, the Christian tradition—“Platonism for the people” (BGE P)—
follows Plato’s basic assumption that the eternal soul is the identity of our true self and that our 
animal bodies and the natural world present themselves as obstacles that stand in the way of the 
soul’s pursuit of otherworldly redemption.  On both views, the overriding ascetic function of a 
human life manifests itself through an overriding desire to escape the natural world and one’s 
own animal body.  We find St. Paul, for example, imploring his readers to, “Put to 
death…whatever in you that is earthly…Set your minds on things that are above, not on things 
are on the earth.”111  Early in his Confessions, Augustine confides in his readers about his life 
                                                      
110 Plato, Phaedo, 82e2 and 92a1 





before he found God, “I was unhappy, and so every soul is unhappy which is tied to its love for 
mortal things.”112  The best life, on the Christian view, is an achievement that turns away from 
the ephemeral temptations and pleasures of the natural world in favor of the stability of 
happiness promised to us by an eternal world.   
But the Christian tradition also differs significantly from Plato’s vision of redemption 
through a higher world by implementing a distinctly moral interpretation of the disunity and 
deficiency that is discovered in the lived reality of the natural self and the natural world.  The 
doctrine of original sin, for example, holds humanity responsible for the introduction of a special 
kind of deficiency into the world.  The existence of human nature, itself, becomes something that 
must be forgiven by the grace of God.113  Lanier Anderson offers an excellent summary of the 
deep structure of psychological disunity discovered within the doctrine of original sin:    
Not only are we born into a state of sin, but sinful tendencies are built into our most 
unavoidable natural drives and desires, which lead us ineluctably to compound original 
sin by additional special sins of our own.  From a Christian point of view, our basic moral 
position is one of offense against the very God to whom we owe our existence.  What is 
worse, we lack any resource through which this offense might be redressed, and so we 
are trapped into a kind of slavery within sin—held hostage by our own nature.114  
 
Much like a highly moralized version of the psychological disunity discovered in Plato’s 
view of the self, the Christian self also experiences the appetitive and worldly drives of human 
existence as wholly alien to one’s best self.  It is one thing, as we have seen in the case of 
individual ascetic practices, to forgo sexual pleasure because the act of self-denial is instrumental 
to the achievement of a particular kind of life.  But it is quite another to view sexual desire, itself, 
as an impure or unwanted aspect of human existence; a blight against God; something that 
                                                      
112 Augustine, Confessions 4:6 
113 For a thoughtful defense of why humans need a sense of transcendent redemption through divine forgiveness, see 
Carl Vaught, The Quest for Wholeness (1982) 
114 Lanier Anderson, “Nietzsche on Redemption and Transfiguration” in ed. Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, The 





should be extirpated from one’s existence in the pursuit of a spiritual life. 115  As Nietzsche 
states, “The church combats the passions by cutting them off in every sense: its technique, its 
‘cure,’ is castration.”  (TI ‘Morality’ 1.)  The problem, of course, is that we can never fully wish 
away or completely extirpate our animal bodies or appetitive animal desires from our souls 
during our time here on earth.  Even the most pious Christian maintains a self that stands in a 
continual state of transgression towards God, a state that requires not only forgiveness from sin 
but that also incurs a debt to God that can never be repaid.    
It is out of this extreme sense of indebtedness to God that Christianity, according to 
Nietzsche, has taught humanity more than any other major world narrative that it deserves to 
suffer as penalty for its existence.  What is perhaps the most ingenious feature of Christianity’s 
own masochistic narrative of cosmic optimism, on Nietzsche’s view, is the extent that this 
ascetic narrative has made humanity, itself, fully accountable for both the cause of its own 
suffering and the deficiencies of its own human nature.  The most inescapable features of the 
human experience—pain, misfortune, disease, natural disasters, dissatisfaction, error, the death 
of oneself and others—are now closely associated with a profound sense of guilt that is not only 
attributed to humanity collectively but also to each individual’s experience of their own agency.  
Whereas Plato claims that the disunity that separates the apparent world from the true world of 
being stands in a relationship of deficiency and completion, the Christian claims that the disunity 
that separates our fallen nature from God’s divine kingdom now stands in a relationship of 
deficiency and atonement.  
                                                      
115 It is worth noting that Nietzsche tends (as usual) to attack the most extreme versions of Christian asceticism.  
Christian doctrines against the body and the potential sinfulness of its desires developed slowly in the severity of 
their stance from 1st to the 5th century, as the Christian began growing in influence.  Many early aspects of 
Christianity had a remarkably complicated relationship to sexual desire.  See Peter Brown: The Body in Society: 
Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (1988) for an interesting account of the increasing 





The Platonic-Christian view of the disunity of self and world is deeply tied to a certain 
interpretation of human nature that maintains that there is some unique part of our existence (our 
rationality, our immortal soul) that is capable (at least for some people) of accessing the ultimate 
reality that will redeem us.  But Nietzsche claims that one can also find similar ascetic 
expressions of disunity and deficiency in those thinkers within the tradition who deny that human 
beings have direct epistemic access to a higher metaphysical world.  Kant’s critical philosophy, 
for example, denies the grand aspirations of metaphysical realism that are found within Platonist 
or Christian justifications of the ultimate value of a supersensible world.   
According to Nietzsche, however, Kant situates human nature and human reality within a 
disunity of two worlds every bit as much as the Platonist or the Christian.  While Kant’s 
emphasis on epistemic humility curtails the grand metaphysical aspirations found in previous 
forms of cosmic optimism, the Kantian picture of human existence also presents the human 
being as a hybrid disunity who is composed of transcendent and natural components.  We live 
our lives as natural beings within an embodied contingent phenomenal world but the most 
important feature of our existence—reason—resides in the “real” noumenal world.  Reason, in 
fact, serves as the main bridge between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds.  Here too, 
Nietzsche claims, one finds a desire to locate our highest ideals in another non-natural world.       
On Nietzsche’s view, Kant’s own insistence on the disunity that separates our conception 
of reality and human existence is once again no mere neutral attempt to categorize reality but 
serves the more subterranean purpose of justifying the transcendent status that Kant grants to 
morality and the moral law within human life.  On Nietzsche’s account, Kant simply assumes 
that his own moral intuitions are universal and authoritative rather entertain the possibility that 





Nietzsche notes, that Kant finds “A hidden path to the old ideal […] the concept of a ‘true 
world’, the concept of morality as the essence of the world” (A 10; see also BGE 11.)  Kant 
claims that our experience of moral obligation—our wonder and reverence of the moral law—
must point to the existence of another higher intelligible world and a higher rational self that is 
not conditioned by the pushes and pulls of the natural world and the natural self.  Moreover, 
Kant claims that the supreme value of morality is discovered precisely in its immunity from 
contingency, luck, and the vicissitudes of the phenomenal world.116  According to Nietzsche, 
Kant needed to establish another world—to institute a gap between the world of appearance and 
the thing-in-itself—in order to justify the overriding authority that he demanded of the moral 
law.  As Nietzsche states:       
to create room for his ‘moral realm’ [Kant] saw himself obliged to posit an 
undemonstrable world, a logical ‘Beyond’—it was for precisely that that he had need of 
his critique of pure reason!  In other words: he would not have had need of it if one thing 
had not been more vital to him than anything else: to rend the ‘moral realm’ unassailable. 
(D P: 3, cf. GM II:25.)117 
 
In this way, Nietzsche claims that Kant not only reaffirms the basic orientation of cosmic 
optimism that posits a distinct reality that exists apart from our phenomenal experience of this 
world, but Kant also reaffirms the basic stance that ultimate reality must be moral in order for it 
to be intelligible.  While belief in God, the immortality of the soul, and free will cannot be 
                                                      
116 See Thomas Nagel’s “Moral Luck” in Mortal Questions (1979) for a classic examination of the role that luck and 
contingency play in Kant’s moral theory.  
117 Kant perhaps only comes in second to Plato for thinkers most abused by Nietzsche.  Kant is a “catastrophic 
spider” (AC 11) and “the most deformed conceptual cripple there has ever been” (TI ‘What Germans Lack’ 7)   
What Nietzsche seems most intent to criticize in Kant, however, is not found in any technical feature of his 
particular arguments but rather something more like an overall attitude or ethos in Kant’s thinking that manages to 
retain the main structure of cosmic optimism while also attempting to limit it.  From my own point of view, the main 
goal of Nietzsche’s criticisms aims to unmask those assumptions in Kant that show why he is still beholden to a 
traditional desire to escape this world.  Needless to say, there are interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism 
that avoid some of Nietzsche’s criticisms.  For example, one could claim that the thing-in-itself is posited to make a 
conceptual point about epistemic representation rather than an ontological point about a hidden transcendent reality.  





proven as matters of fact, Kant claims they must still be accepted as “matters of faith” in order to 
supply us with the conditions for maintaining the practical necessity of a moral image of the 
universe.  Kant, on Nietzsche’s view, does not represent a repudiation of cosmic optimism so 
much as its last line of defense.  For the Kantian critical project ends up both instituting the basic 
precepts of cosmic optimism while also opening the door to its demise.  As Nietzsche states:     
[T]he old Kant…had obtained the ‘thing-in-itself’ by stealth…and was punished for this 
when the ‘categorical imperative’ crept stealthily into his heart and led him astray—back 
to ‘God,’ ‘soul,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘immortality,’ like a fox who loses his way and goes 
astray back into his cage.  Yet it had been his strength and cleverness that had broken 
open the cage!” (GS 355) 
 
The structures of deficiency and disunity within human nature and human reality that 
have been presented so far have situated the realization or redemption of human existence in 
terms of its relationship to an optimistic evaluative narrative of transcendent reality: Plato’s 
Forms, Christianity’s Heaven, Kant’s Noumenal realm.  In each case, one finds a general 
evaluative stance that maintains the achievement of the most valuable aspects of human 
existence—our rational essence or immortal soul or respect for the moral law—is not only tied to 
a transcendent reality, but also entails the overcoming of some aspect of our natural existence in 
order for the transcendent ideal of human existence to be fully realized.  It is this deep structure 
of ascetic evaluation, according to Nietzsche, that binds together traditions as diverse as 
Platonism, Christianity, and Kantianism.  One must, for example, overcome the ephemeral flux 
of the senses in order to achieve the stable order of the Forms, or one must overcome the lure and 
pleasures of the flesh in order to achieve a purity of soul, or one must overcome mere inclination 
in order to achieve maxims that exhibit universal or categorical moral worth.       
But Nietzsche also claims that the idealization of self-denial that characterizes the core 





world and the natural self that holds out no hope for redemption in a higher transcendent world.  
The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, represents such a view.  Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy actually presents us with an interesting case study of the main themes of this chapter 
in so far as his view of the universe would appear, at first glance, to represent a complete 
inversion of the traditional picture of cosmic optimism presented so far.   
Schopenhauer, a professed atheist, bluntly rejects the claim that we live in a benevolent 
universe that is receptive to human needs and that will compensate us for our worldly suffering 
in the form of otherworldly redemption.  Rather, Schopenhauer argues that an attitude of 
pessimism towards the value of human life is the obvious position that any clear-minded 
individual should adopt when confronted with the sheer amount of unredeemed suffering that 
exists in this world.  In a representative passage, Schopenhauer writes:        
If we were to conduct the most hardened and calloused optimist through the hospitals, 
infirmaries, operating theaters, through prisons, torture chambers, and slave-hovels, over 
battlefields, and to places of execution; if we were to open to him all the dark abodes of 
misery, where it shuns the gaze of cold curiosity, and finally were allow him to glance 
into the dungeons of Ugolino where prisoners starved to death, he too would certainly see 
in the end what kind of world is this “best of all possible worlds.”  From whence did 
Dante get the material for his hell, if not from this actual world of ours.118  
 
The view presented by Schopenhauer in this passage (and countless others) might be easily 
described as a form of cosmic pessimism rather than cosmic optimism.  This passage also 
illustrates what Nietzsche most admired in Schopenhauer.  Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both 
agree that the universe admits of no intrinsic or ultimate purpose or telos and that one of the great 
challenges of modern life is discovered in our ability to face up to that fact.  Nietzsche claims 
that Schopenhauer, perhaps more than any thinker before him, was willing to raise the 
disquieting question about whether human existence had any meaning at all.  In fact, Nietzsche 
                                                      





routinely praises Schopenhauer for his honest assessment of the human condition and for being 
one of the first thinkers to embrace an “uncompromising atheism” (GS 357.)   
But Nietzsche, particularly in his later writings, is also highly critical of Schopenhauer’s 
overall pessimistic stance towards human life and his solution to the problem of human meaning 
within modern life.119  Despite Schopenhauer’s apparent radical departure from the hopeful 
message of cosmic optimism, Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer also embraces the core 
evaluative framework of the ascetic ideal.  Schopenhauer’s ascetic stance, although wholly 
secular, also maintains that the meaning of human life is discovered in a renunciation of the 
natural world and our natural selves.  According to Schopenhauer, the only solution to the 
problem of endemic suffering within human existence is discovered through the cessation of 
human desire.  This state of cessation can happen momentarily in the form of aesthetic 
contemplation, or more permanently in the form of the life of resignation exemplified by the 
ascetic saint and, of course, most permanently through death.  The best human life for 
Schopenhauer, as for the ascetic tradition at large, is still discovered in a life that withdraws itself 
from the world. 
As Nietzsche points out, Schopenhauer’s fundamentally ascetic stance towards the value 
of human life still follows Christianity in advocating castration as the fundamental stance 
towards one’s natural desires.  Nowhere is Schopenhauer’s moralized asceticism, and his 
proximity to Christian asceticism, more evident than in his evaluation of the value of human 
sexuality and sexual desire.  Schopenhauer, Nietzsche tells us, “treated sexuality as his personal 
                                                      
119 Nietzsche’s relationship with Schopenhauer is complicated and I have not done justice to all of its twist and turns 
in this very abbreviated discussion.  For a wonderful overall treatment of the relationship between these two thinkers 
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enemy” (GM III:7.)  Schopenhauer, himself, informs us that sexuality is a “malevolent demon, 
striving to pervert, confuse, and to overthrow everything.”120 
According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s overall renunciation of our natural drives 
reveals the extent to which he is still “stuck in those Christian and ascetic moral perspectives” 
(GS 357) and still draws his inspiration from the same normative ground as many of the 
traditional accounts of value revealed in the tradition of cosmic optimism.  Schopenhauer, 
himself, might well agree with Nietzsche’s assessment.  While Schopenhauer rejects Christian 
metaphysics, he also claims that Christianity, along with many of the other world religions, 
offers a strategy of self-denial that reveals a fundamental truth of human existence.  As 
Schopenhauer states:  
Christianity taught only what the whole of Asia knew already long before and even better 
(…) [T]hat great fundamental truth contained in Christianity as well as in Brahmanism 
and Buddhism, the need for salvation from existence given up to suffering and death, and 
its attainability through the denial of the will, hence by a decided opposition to nature, it 
is beyond all comparison the most important truth there can be.121   
 
It is in Schopenhauer’s praise of the idealization of self-denial that is discovered in the world’s 
religions that Nietzsche locates Schopenhauer’s own close association with the ascetic ideal.  For 
both Schopenhauer and the Christian, there is something terrible wrong—fallen—about the 
natural state of the world in which we live.  In this way, Nietzsche claims that the form of 
idealized asceticism shared by Schopenhauer and Christianity is best understood as two modes of 
the same ideal that ultimately describes the meaning of human life in terms of a desire escape 
from the world.  The difference between the two is that Schopenhauer substitutes an escape from 
this world into the ideal of non-existence in place of the Christian’s escape into a higher 
existence of a transcendent world.   
                                                      
120 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I (1958) p. 533 





But Schopenhauer’s “European Buddhism” also manages to hold onto the idealization of 
self-denial as a solution to the problem of the meaning of life while also abandoning the optimist 
mood that was exhibited in previous forms of cosmic optimism.  In this way, Schopenhauer’s 
disunity of self and world sets up a new distinction between misery and nothingness.  By making 
the true world no longer a transcendent world but rather a state of oblivion, Nietzsche claims that 
Schopenhauer simply makes explicit the “will to nothingness” that has been hiding all along 
within the evaluative background of the Western tradition.   
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
Our consideration of Schopenhauer’s bleak presentation of a purposeless universe full of 
unredeemable suffering would appear to have traveled a considerable distance from John Hick’s 
vision of the cosmos as a benign and benevolent stronghold of divinely organized trust that was 
presented at the beginning of this chapter.  If one peeks beneath the surface, however, Nietzsche 
claims that the evaluative attitudes of the Western tradition have actually remained surprisingly 
consistent in their overall pessimistic stance towards the value of our natural lives and the natural 
world.  In the case of Hick and most thinkers in the history of the tradition, some form of worldly 
pessimism is integral to the overall hopeful message conveyed through various forms of cosmic 
optimism: the meaning of the transcendent world is generated, in part, out of the denial of the 
natural world.  In the case of Schopenhauer, of course, that hope is now gone.  The denial of the 
natural world reveals a worldly pessimism that advocates oblivion rather than hope of salvation 
in a transcendent world.  But in each case, the goal and meaning of a human life is characterized 
by an ascetic conception of redemption that is deeply tied to a basic need to turn away from this 





At the beginning of the chapter, I conjectured that were an expedition of alien 
anthropologists to study the human species their initial assessment might highlight the 
remarkable optimism and self-confidence that is discovered in the shared narratives of a species 
who consistently depicts human life as the main protagonist of the universe.  What Nietzsche is 
suggesting through his diagnosis of the ascetic ideal is that were our extraterrestrial 
ethnographers to spend a little more time with this peculiar species they might begin to observe 
that underneath the veneer of the grand attitudes of cosmic optimism there is also an 
unprecedented capacity for self-loathing.  As Nietzsche, himself, tells us:  
Read from a distant star the majuscule script of our earthly existence would perhaps 
tempt one to conclude that the earth is the true ascetic star, a nook of disgruntled, 
arrogant, and repulsive creatures who could not get rid of a deep displeasure with 
themselves, with the earth, with all life and who caused as much pain as possible out of 
pleasure in causing pain:--probably their only pleasure (GM III:11.)   
 
But hatred, on Nietzsche’s view, has always been humanity’s most pervasive and most 
productive form of hope.  When given the choice between masochism and meaninglessness, 
Nietzsche claims that humanity has thus far always chosen masochism.  The next chapter will 
now turn to the question of how this traditional masochistic stance has been taken up within the 
context of our modern scientific worldview.          










NIETZSCHE AND FREUD ON COPERNICUS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE  
 
“when may we begin to naturalize ourselves in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly 
redeemed nature?” (GS 109) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter continues the discussion of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of humanity’s problematic 
sense of its own self-worth through an exploration of his assessment of the relationship between 
the ascetic ideal and our modern scientific worldview.  The discussion will be framed through a 
comparison of the divergent answers that Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud offer in response to 
concerns about the impact of modern science on our ability to answer questions about the 
meaning of human life.  Nietzsche’s claims to originality in psychology are commonly 
interpreted in terms of his anticipation of Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytic movement.  In 
what follows, I will argue that Nietzsche and Freud actually pursue quite different goals within 
the context of their respective psychological projects.  In fact, Freud turns out to embrace a 
pessimistic and scientistic version of the ascetic ideal that Nietzsche’s own naturalistic project is 
trying to overcome. 
The chapter will proceed as follows.  In section 4.2, I offer a brief overview of 
Nietzsche’s claim that modern science does not stand in opposition to the ascetic ideal but rather 
expresses its most basic essence through its faith in an unconditional will to truth.  Section 4.3 
then offers a brief comparison of Nietzsche and Freud that highlights some underappreciated 
methodological differences in their psychological projects.  In Section 4.4, I use the example of 
Copernicus to show that Nietzsche’s concern about threat of meaninglessness posed by a modern 
scientific worldview stands in stark contrast to Freud’s dismissal of traditional concerns about 





naturalism also differs considerably from Freud’s scientism by showing us how we might come 
to understand human meaning and human reality as emergent phenomena that are both wholly 
natural but are now also something more than natural.   
 
4.2 Science and the Ascetic Ideal  
 
A condensed summary of the main themes of the last chapter might run as follows.  
Nietzsche claims that the history of religion and philosophy display an ambitious attitude of 
cosmic optimism towards our place in the universe which holds that some form of ultimate 
reality exists that is receptive to our human aspirations.  While the moods of cosmic optimism 
have taken a variety of forms throughout the history of Western culture, Nietzsche argues that 
the evaluative structure of this worldview reveals our commitment to an ascetic ideal that frames 
our finitude and embodiment in terms of constitutional deficiencies that must be redeemed or 
corrected through recourse to a transcendent ideal that exists apart from the natural world.  The 
history of cosmic optimism, on Nietzsche’s diagnosis, therefore turns out to be profoundly 
pessimistic about, and even masochistic towards, the value of our lives in this world.   
The sheer scope of Nietzsche’s indictment of these hidden habits and pessimistic 
prejudices within the Western tradition is perhaps one of the most impressive features of his 
critique.  Our historically chronic lack of self-esteem in regard to the lived experience of our 
natural lives is evident not only from the explicit arguments of various thinkers throughout the 
tradition but also from the embedded evaluative habits and social institutions that have shaped 
our practical lives for over two millennia.  What binds this evaluative tradition together is a 
renunciation of the value of the natural world: a basic desire to escape the world in which we 
live.  For Plato and Christianity, the escape is offered in terms of a transcendent promise of 





offered through the promise of “European Buddhism” that calls for the dissolution of the self 
into the ideal of nothingness or oblivion.                  
One might respond to Nietzsche’s historical diagnosis of our past pathologies, however, 
by noting that many people in modern society also reject the otherworldly metaphysics of the 
Platonic-Christian worldview and its puritanical fixations on the sinfulness of embodiment and 
its associated desires.  Likewise, many in modern society might claim that it is possible to reject 
the pathological transcendent foundations of cosmic optimism without falling into the equally 
pathological pessimism of a thinker like Schopenhauer.  Have not the pursuits of modern science 
freed us from many of the traditional assumptions of the ascetic ideal that have so significantly 
shaped our past evaluative traditions?   
 Nietzsche addresses this general question towards the end of GM III and offers his 
readers the surprising response that “science [Wissenschaft]” is “not the opposite of the ascetic 
ideal but rather the latest and noblest form of it” (GM III: 23.)122  The idealization of self-denial 
that characterizes the value structure of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche insists, is of more than 
antiquarian interest because it is still present within our overall evaluative stance towards the 
world today.  In fact, Nietzsche claims that our strong tendencies towards the debasement of 
human self-worth have shown little signs of abating as the West began to slowly exchange its 
hair shirt and flails for a scientific lab coat and telescope.   
We are all, according to Nietzsche, “the heirs of the conscience-vivisection and self-
torture of millennia” (GM II: 24.)  Modern science, he suggests, also exhibits a basic desire to 
escape from this world.  Whereas the ascetic priest once sought salvation through the 
                                                      
122 It is worth keeping in mind here Nietzsche’s use of “science [Wissenschaft]” refers quite broadly to many 
cognitive or scholarly disciplines (history, philology, linguistic, philosophy) rather than just to the narrow domain of 






mortification of the flesh in order to renounce the natural world, Nietzsche claims the modern 
scholar now seeks redemption from this world by placing her faith in the transcendent ideal of 
truth as an unconditional value.   
Faith in the ascetic ideal is expressed within science and modern conceptions of scientific 
objectivity through an unconditional will to truth that maintains, “the faith the principle, the 
conviction […]: Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only 
second-rate value” (GS 344.)  While the modern sciences have stripped away the overt claims of 
the ascetic ideal’s traditional framework of transcendent beliefs, superstitions, and rituals that 
once constituted faith in a supernatural world, Nietzsche claims that science has also reinstituted 
a covert faith in the same ascetic ideal through its unconditional faith in truth as a metaphysical 
value.  He goes on:   
No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in 
science presupposes thereby affirm another world than that of life, nature, and history; 
and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’, must they not by the same token deny its 
counterpart, this world, our world?” (GS 344; also quoted by Nietzsche in GM III: 24) 
 
Far from opposing the ascetic ideal, modern science becomes its latest and most sophisticated 
expression.  Truth becomes our modern surrogate for God.   
What binds the saint and the scholar together, according to Nietzsche, is therefore 
discovered in their shared need for the stability and security provided by an unconditional faith 
in another world.  Just as religious faith sets aside the value of this changing ephemeral world in 
favor of a higher realm of unchanging transcendent reality, so too does the modern scholar 
retreat from the world of lived experience, engagement, and passion in favor of the 
contemplation of another higher world of truth and disinterested objectivity.   
It is worth emphasizing here that Nietzsche does not reject the potential prudential value 





practices of self-denial that were discussed in the last chapter.  Normal scientific practice 
(perhaps in some vaguely Kuhnian sense of that term) offers us, according to Nietzsche, “much 
useful work” (GM III: 23.)  His target is once again the idealization of science that attempts to 
transform scientific practice into a “genuine philosophy of reality” (GM III: 23.)  In the case of 
the scholar, this idealization manifests itself in the conviction that it is more important to 
understand the world than to act within it.  The scholar’s ideal detaches itself from an 
engagement with life in order to be transformed into a passive mirror that reflects the truth of the 
world and, in the process, reveals itself as a uniquely modern form of ascetic self-denial that 
employs scientific practice as a “means of self-anaesthetization” (GM III:23.)   
Our brief preliminary consideration of the convergence of ideals within science and 
supernaturalism also returns us back to the topic of traditional assessments of human self-worth.  
For Nietzsche claims that our journey from Plato to Positivism ends up revealing not only a 
remarkable consistency in the tradition’s need for the assurances of the absolute but also a 
remarkable consistency in the tradition’s shared assumption that the natural world and our finite 
natural lives are meaningless.  Modern science, in this sense, ends up offering humanity its own 
ascetic version of a global devaluation of life in this world.   
The form of devaluation that Nietzsche has in mind is perhaps seen most clearly in the 
pretensions of various forms of scientism that hold the only legitimate questions that are worth 
asking about the universe or about human beings are those that can be answered by science.  
Scientism, in the broad sense I employ it here, is intended to represent a certain kind of attitude 
that one might take towards the overriding value of science and scientific discovery in opposition 







4.3 Nietzsche and Freud  
 
Sigmund Freud offers us an interesting example of how the attitudes of scientism tend to 
devalue, even belittle, questions about the meaning of human life.  Freud is an interesting figure 
to compare with Nietzsche for a variety of reasons.  First and foremost, it has become near 
orthodoxy within the history of ideas to interpret Nietzsche’s claims to originality in psychology 
in terms of his anticipation of and possible influence upon Freud and the psychoanalytic 
movement.123  Indeed, a small cottage industry has sprung up over the few last few decades that 
is dedicated to both comparing the conceptual similarities that exist between Nietzsche and 
Freud as well as speculating to what extent that Nietzsche influenced Freud’s thought.124  In 
addition, a number of philosophical monographs written on Nietzsche’s psychology have also 
chosen to describe his main concepts and goals within a broadly psychoanalytic framework and 
vocabulary.125  No doubt, the intrigue of comparison is made all the greater due to the fact that 
Freud adamantly denied that he had ever read Nietzsche seriously in order to preserve his own 
sense of psychological originality.126   
                                                      
123 Thomas Mann was probably the first thinker to offer a direct comparative reading of Nietzsche’s anticipation of 
psychoanalytic thought in his early essay “Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud” in his Essays of Three Decades (1938).  
Walter Kaufmann was one of the first thinkers to introduce a direct comparison between Nietzsche and Freud to an 
American audience.  See, for example, Kaufmann’s interesting but contentious discussion of Nietzsche’s 
anticipation of Freud in his Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber: Discovering the Mind, esp. Ch. 3 (1980.)  See also 
Kaufmann’s essays “Nietzsche as the First Great (Depth) Psychologist” in (ed.) Sigmund Koch and David E. Leary, 
A Century of Psychology as Science (1985) and “Freud and the Tragic Virtues,” The American Scholar, Vol. 29, No. 
4 (1960) pp. 469-481     
124See: David Chapelle Nietzsche and Psychoanalysis (1993); Ronald Lehrer Nietzsche’s Presence in Freud’s Life 
and Thought (1995); Nietzsche and Depth Psychology, ed. Jacob Golomb and Weaver Santanielle (1999); Paul 
Assoun, Nietzsche and Freud (2000); Mattias Risse, “The Eternal Recurrence: A Freudian Look at What Nietzsche 
took to be His Greatest Concept” in ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (2009.)  
125 See: Jacob Golomb’s Nietzsche’s Enticing Psychology of Power (1987) and Graham Parkes’ Composing the 
Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology (1994.)  Golomb relies exclusively on Freudian terminology in his 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s psychology.  Parkes employs both Freudian and also Jungian psychological concepts in 
his analysis of Nietzsche’s own understanding of psychology.  Paul Katsafanas also draws heavily on Freud’s 
conception of the drives and the unconscious in his recent book on Nietzsche’s psychology.  See his The 
Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious (2016.)   
126 As Freud recounts in his The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement: “In later years I denied myself the great 
pleasure of reading Nietzsche’s works with the conscious motive of not wishing to be hindered in working out my 





The general assumption found at work in most comparative studies written on Nietzsche 
and Freud is that the two thinkers are essentially engaged in the same general project within 
psychology, but in different ways.  On this general reading, Nietzsche’s scattered psychological 
insights are best understood in terms of a series of incomplete, speculative, but presciently 
intuitive speculations that Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition then worked out in greater 
theoretical and clinical detail.  Jacob Golomb offers a representative example of this anticipatory 
inference when explaining his use of Freud to assess the originality of Nietzsche’s psychology:      
A psychoanalytic interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought may prove particularly fruitful by 
inviting commentary which makes more coherent many of his thousands of seemingly 
disparate aphorisms and fragments by providing them with a developmental context127 
 
On Golomb’s account, placing Nietzsche within the theoretical framework of psychoanalytic 
theory should help us to both better understand Nietzsche’s concepts while also helping us to 
better understand Nietzsche’s potential influence on Freud.  As Golomb goes on to state more 
explicitly a few pages later, “the analytic comparisons of Nietzsche and Freud will reveal that the 
theoretical core of psychoanalysis is already part and parcel of Nietzsche’s philosophy.”128 
As we already saw in Chapter Two, it is certainly not surprising that commentators would 
want to avail themselves of conceptual resources outside of Nietzsche’s own texts in order to 
make better sense of the many elusive and underdetermined aspects of his writing.  I suggested 
that at least one reason why Nietzsche is held to anticipate such a diversity of theoretical 
positions is undoubtedly due to the fact that the theoretical positions that he is held to anticipate 
                                                      
Nietzsche has been proven to be demonstrably false by a number of sources.  See AH Chapman’s “The Influence of 
Nietzsche on Freud’s Ideas” in The British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 166 (1995) for a nice summation of sources 
that show that Freud not only read Nietzsche but also participated in several psychoanalytic conferences where 
Nietzsche’s ideas where discussed in detail.       
127 Golomb (1987) p. 17. 





might also serve the possibly more subterranean function of helping commentators build 
additional theoretical support and stability into their own readings of Nietzsche’s project.   
None of this is to say, of course, that it is somehow arbitrary to compare Nietzsche with 
Freud.  The two thinkers do employ remarkably similar concepts within their respective 
psychologies.  When we place their concepts side-by-side it is not difficult to see why they have 
so often been read in terms of one another.  In particular, Nietzsche and Freud both emphasize 
the role that various “drives [Treibe]” and their vicissitudes play in our understanding of human 
conduct.  Each thinker also offers us a similar picture of the self as conflicted, prone to self-
deception, and governed by unconscious desires.  At the level of social psychology, Nietzsche 
and Freud also offer similar accounts of the role played by guilt in the formation of culture and 
also the roles that psychological mechanisms such as sublimation and internalization play in both 
the socialization and psychological development of the individual.129   
The same kind of side-by-side conceptual comparisons (Nietzsche and Freud on the 
nature of the unconscious, etc.) that are so often employed to establish key similarities between 
these two thinkers, however, quite often fail to appreciate (or at least tend to minimize) that 
Nietzsche and Freud tend to employ these similar concepts within remarkably different 
methodological contexts.  Freud goes through great efforts to define himself as an empirical 
scientist who grounds his clinical observations in a systematic methodology that is intent on 
establishing a theoretical science of the mind.130  Nietzsche, on the other hand, does not claim 
                                                      
129 See Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche and Freud on Sublimation” in Journal of Nietzsche Studies (2009) for a helpful 
comparison of these two thinkers on the topic of sublimation.   
130 In fact, Freud is quite insistent that he adheres to a scientific methodology even in the course of some of his 
wilder theoretical speculations such as the “death drive,” etc.  He claims, for example, in his An Autobiographical 
Study: “I should not like to create an impression during this last period of my work I have turned my back upon 
patient observation and have abandoned myself entirely to speculation.  I have on the contrary always remained in 





that his psychology aspires to be scientific in the same manner as Freud.  Nor does he avail 
himself of anything like the clinical evidence that Freud claims in support of his various 
metapsychological theories.  In fact, as I argued in Chapter Two, Nietzsche leaves open the 
possibility that not everything that he wrote was even intended to articulate a theory.  It might be 
the case that some aspects of his psychology, and his chosen form of writing, aim for therapeutic 
results rather than truth.        
Sebastian Gardner does a good job of summarizing the worry that arises when one begins 
to compare these thinkers in terms of methods rather than just in terms of decontextualized 
concepts:       
If Nietzsche formed his views without employing the systematic clinical methods on 
which Freud relied, then either Freud’s methods are inessential to his conclusions, in 
which case Freud’s views are on no firmer ground than Nietzsche’s, and his authority 
cannot be appealed to in order to vindicate Nietzsche; or Freud’s methods are what render 
his results epistemologically reliable, in which case Nietzsche’s ‘anticipations’ of Freud 
amount to nothing more than inspired guesses—correct guesses, perhaps, but not ones for 
which Nietzsche had sufficient justification to warrant the enormous philosophical weight 
he put on them. 131 
 
Gardner’s main point is that side-by-side conceptual comparisons do not tell the whole 
story about how Nietzsche is supposed to anticipate Freud.  One must place these conceptual 
comparisons within a larger framework that considers what both thinkers are trying to 
accomplish through their psychological pursuits.  Such an objection does not, of course, 
invalidate the general observation that these two thinkers do share a remarkable number of 
general ideals.  But it does cast some suspicion on the standard narrative that it is obvious that 
                                                      
importance.  Even when I have moved away from observation, I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy 
proper.” SE, Vol. 20, (1925) p. 59.    
131 Sebastian Gardner “Schopenhauer, Will, and the Unconscious” in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer 





Freud’s psychoanalytic project should be viewed in terms of the theoretical fulfillment or 
completion of Nietzsche’s prescient psychological insights.   
As a historical aside, it is also worth pausing on the somewhat odd usage of the word 
“anticipate” when assessing questions of whether Nietzsche anticipated Freud in regard to the 
shared similarities of their concepts.  Freud was only twelve years younger than Nietzsche.  
Rather than viewing Nietzsche as someone who anticipates Freud we could just as easily read 
these two thinkers as two contemporaries who happened to be pursuing similar ideas in the 
service of very different agendas.   
We could also just as easily read Nietzsche and Freud as two thinkers who use similar 
concepts but operate under quite different conceptions about what it means to be a psychologist.  
The meaning of psychology in the latter part of the nineteenth century was still remarkably open-
ended and had not yet codified into most of our contemporary associations and expectations 
about what a psychologist is supposed to do and what the term “psychology” is supposed to 
mean.132  Nietzsche was writing at a time when Wilhelm Wundt had recently founded the first 
experimental psychology lab in Leipzig in 1879.  William James was just about to publish his 
two-volume Principles of Psychology in 1890.  And Sigmund Freud, himself, was still a 
struggling medical doctor who was slowly developing the methods of psychoanalysis and would 
not yet publish his Interpretation of Dreams until 1900.   
But this emerging modern sense of psychology as a discipline that is primarily engaged in 
empirical-descriptive work was still mixed together with a much older sense of the meaning of 
psychology that reaches back to antiquity and make no claim to a distinctive disciplinary 
                                                      
132 See Mathew Bell’s The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought (2009) for an excellent 
historical overview of the diversity of topics that were studied under the banner of German ‘psychology’ in the 19 th 
century.  See also Gary Hatfield’s “Psychology and Philosophy” in The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth 





identity.  Psychology, for much of its long history, was understood to comprise a far more 
general examination of the human psyche that was equally at home in the province of the poet 
and playwright, the historian and the philosopher, as well as in the investigations of the 
burgeoning natural scientist.133 
 Nietzsche’s own thinking, in many ways, stands directly at the crossroads of these old 
and new conceptions about what psychology means.  In fact, he stands just about as close as one 
can get to the line separating psychology in its older and more ambiguous sense from its newly 
emerging professional identity.  But Nietzsche not only stands at the crossroads of the old and 
the new, the crossroad is readily apparent in his own style of thinking.  Sometimes within the 
same book, sometimes within the same paragraph, we can find Nietzsche often blending together 
modern connotations of the sort of theoretical-empirical-descriptive scientific work found in the 
modern sense of psychology with much older connotations of psychology as a normative-
prescriptive practical tradition that focuses primarily on imparting practical wisdom to its 
readers.   
There is little doubt that Nietzsche was interested in many of the scientific debates of his 
day, including the emergence of a more scientifically-minded understanding of psychology.134  
At times, he even appears to have tried to participate in some of the scientific debates of his day.  
For example, in 1887 he instructed his publisher Constantin Georg Naumann to send 
complimentary copies of his Genealogy of Morality to Wilhelm Wundt, Ernst Mach, and 
                                                      
133 See Daniel N. Robinson An Intellectual History of Psychology (1995) for a good account of psychology’s shift 
from a general category of thinking and observing to a specific disciplinary identity. 
134For some representative accounts of Nietzsche’s relationship with contemporary scientific debates and theories of 
his day, see Gregory Moore’s Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor (2002), Christopher Emden’s Nietzsche on Language, 
Consciousness, and the Body (2005), Robin Small’s Nietzsche and Ree (2005) and the edited volume, Nietzsche and 





Herman von Helmholtz, among others.135  But I would also suggest that Nietzsche, unlike Freud, 
still envisions himself as a “psychologist’ in terms of the kinds of pre-disciplinary freedom of a 
thinker who can engage in any number of projects and commitments without suffering any guilt 
for violating allegiance to some specific identity that psychology is supposed to be.  Psychology, 
for Nietzsche, ends up wearing a number of different masks that range from socio-historical 
speculation, physiological-scientific analysis, practical wisdom and advice, and also therapeutic 
psychology.      
Paying closer attention to these kinds of historical and contextual matters when 
comparing figures like Nietzsche and Freud, I would suggest, highlights the need to consider the 
goals that a thinker is trying to achieve as well as the concepts that a thinker employs.  The idea 
that we should compare goals as well as concepts when comparing Nietzsche’s originality to 
other thinkers was already addressed briefly in Chapter Two in our comparative discussion of 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.  There I argued that while Nietzsche and Wittgenstein undoubtedly 
shared a number of conceptual and literary similarities, these concepts and styles are employed 
for the purpose of considerable different goals.  The same holds true, I want to suggest, for 
Nietzsche and Freud.  The differences between them become particularly evident when Freud’s 
scientistic stance towards our newfound place in a disenchanted modern world is compared to 
Nietzsche’s own concerns about the impact of science on questions about human meaning.     
 
4.4 Scientism and Self-Worth: The Case of Copernicus  
 
On multiple occasions, we find Freud reflecting on the ways that the history of science 
has transformed our sense of human uniqueness within the universe.  In his Introductory 
                                                      
135 Cited in Christopher Emden, Nietzsche and the Politics of History (2011) p. 275.  Unfortunately, Nietzsche 





Lectures to Psychoanalysis, for example, Freud proudly proclaims that the history of science has 
enacted “three great wounds” to humanity’s “naïve self-love” in the form of Copernicus, Darwin, 
and his own psychoanalytic project.  Copernicus displaced the earth from the center of the 
universe.  Darwin then displaced human beings from the unique order of creation by showing us 
that we are just one species among others.  And finally, Freud claims that psychoanalysis has 
now struck a third blow to humanity’s self-esteem by displacing human beings from their own 
conscious minds by showing them that, “man is not even master in his own house.” 136  With 
each successive wound inflicted by science, Freud claims that humanity’s traditional 
understanding of its own cosmic significance has not only been deflated but the religious and 
philosophical pretensions that once supported these forms of “human megalomania” have now 
been exposed as mere fantasy.   
While Freud acknowledges that the loss of traditional fantasies supporting humanity’s 
inflated sense of its own cosmic significance may produce a degrading effect on traditional 
accounts of the meaning and purpose of a human life, he also claims that psychoanalysis as a 
science (and by extension, the sciences generally) is not in the business of offering humanity a 
new Weltanschauung that might replace their former grand narratives of meaning.137  In fact, 
Freud claims throughout his writings that traditional questions about the meaning of life make no 
sense from the standpoint of science and are best understood to be mere remnants of an infantile 
form of “naïve self-love” that scientific inquiry aims to eliminate.  In his Civilization and its 
Discontents, for example, Freud claims:   
[t]he question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it never yet 
has received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one…for it seems to 
                                                      
136Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis in The Standard Edition of the Complete Works (cited 
hereafter as SE) Vol. 16 (1917), pp. 284-285.  Freud also repeats the same claim in “A difficulty in Psychoanalysis” 
(1917) SE Vol. 19, p. 221. 





derive from human presumptuousness, many other manifestations of which are already 
familiar to us.  Nobody talks about the purpose of the life of animals…One can hardly be 
wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the 
religious system.”138  
 
According to Freud, if we are going to be honest about understanding ourselves as 
animals then we must relinquish the fairy tales of meaning rooted in our presumptive evaluative 
past.  What justification do we have from the standpoint of science that would offer our own 
species any special axiological considerations?  Freud even goes so far elsewhere as to speculate 
that the obsessive need of philosophers and theologians to continually ask questions that do not 
appear to admit of any definitive answers is best likened to a kind of widespread form of neurotic 
paranoia that has long plagued human history.139  In that regard, Freud claims that the kind 
traditional questions posed by religion and philosophy are immature when compared to the 
maturity of scientific discourse and its quest to understand reality.  As Freud states in regard to 
the status of religious belief in the modern world:  
people cannot remain children forever; they must ultimately go out, into ‘hostile life.’  
One may call this ‘education to reality’ […] And for the great necessities of fate, for 
which there is no remedy, they will simply learn to bear them with resignation.”140 
 
Like many positivists of his day, Freud envisions scientific progress in terms of the elimination 
and replacement of traditional metaphysics.  The goal of psychoanalysis, he tells us, is to 
“transform metaphysics into metapsychology.”141  We must resign ourselves to the reality that 
science has given us, even if science, itself, can offer us no consolation for our loss.   
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Freud’s overall scientistic stance in these passages also offers us a striking example of 
one version of Nietzsche’s ascetic scientist who claims that only science can offer us legitimate 
knowledge about human beings and their place in the world.  Consider, for example, the 
following justification that Freud offers for the priority of science over other disciplines:    
It is not permissible to declare that science is one field of human mental activity and that 
religion and philosophy are others, at least equal in value, and that science has no 
business to interfere with the other two […] it is simply a fact that truth cannot be 
tolerant, that it admits of no compromises or limitations, that research regards every 
sphere of human activity as belonging to it and it must be relentlessly critical if any other 
power tries to take over any part of it.142  
   
Freud’s absolute assurance of the superiority of scientific truth over other forms of knowledge, 
however, raises a problem of justification that Nietzsche was keen to highlight.  As Nietzsche 
points out:  
there is absolutely no science ‘without presuppositions’…a ‘belief’ must always first 
exist in order for science to derive from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a 
right to existence” (GM III: 24.)  
 
To simply assume that science provides us with knowledge to which all other forms of inquiry 
must be subordinate (as does Freud) presupposes an unconditional value that is not provable by 
the authority of scientific discourse.  What Freud fails to acknowledge is that science cannot 
scientifically answer the question of why science is valuable.  To think otherwise, according to 
Nietzsche, is to still maintain faith in a metaphysical value.143          
Nietzsche, as it turns out, also invokes Copernicus when assessing the overall impact of 
our modern scientific worldview on questions about human meaning and significance.  His own 
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But he also claimed that these artists and religious prophets expressed a number of insights about the human 





remarks on Copernicus will therefore serve as a helpful point of contrast to Freud’s views on the 
relationship between science and human meaning.  Towards the end of GM III, Nietzsche poses 
the following question:     
has man perhaps become less needful of a transcendent solution to the riddle of his 
existence because his existence has since come to look still more arbitrary, more 
loitering, and more dispensable in the visible order of things?  Has not man’s self-
diminishment, his will to self-diminishment, been unstoppably progressing since 
Copernicus? Alas, the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in 
the great chain of being, is a thing of the past—he has become an animal, literally and 
without reservation or qualification […] (GM III:25) 
 
Nietzsche, like Freud, acknowledges that the advance of modern science has enacted a blow to 
our traditional conceptions of human esteem.  But Nietzsche also raises concerns about the 
overall implications of a scientistic reduction of our traditional senses of our own self-worth.  
What is missing from Freud’s celebration of the “wounds” inflicted by science on humanity is an 
acknowledgment of the trauma involved in our discovery that humanity is no longer the central 
protagonist of the universe.144   
According to Nietzsche, the narrative shift from being a “child of God” to being just one 
species of animal among others has created a “humiliating and degrading effect” on our 
traditional sense of self-worth (GM III: 25.)  Science, according to Nietzsche, promotes its own 
form of self-diminishment by, “seeking to talk man out of his former self-respect, as though this 
were nothing but a bizarre piece of self-conceit” (GM III: 25.)  In this regard, Nietzsche’s 
assessment of our current sense of self in relation to our modern scientific worldview differs 
considerably from Freud’s counsel to simply resign ourselves to a new reality offered to us by 
science.     
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That Nietzsche registers concern about our modern understanding of the status of human 
self-worth within the context of a scientific worldview does not mean to suggest, of course, that 
he wants us to return to some previously enchanted view of the world where human beings were 
assured their cosmic significance within a divinely ordered world.  Nietzsche agrees with Freud 
that the pretensions of cosmic optimism that are manifest in traditional human aspirations 
towards the transcendent are no more than a collective fantasy on behalf of humanity that seeks 
to escape the world.  But Nietzsche differs from Freud in the realization that this collective 
fantasy cannot simply be dismissed without consequence; it cannot simply be chalked up, as 
Freud suggests, as an inevitable casualty of the progress of modern science.  For these cosmic 
fantasies have also given us the traditional evaluative frameworks that allowed human beings to 
view their lives as meaningful.    
While the progress of modern science has freed us from supernatural superstition, it has 
not generated a newfound sense of esteem for nature and our natural lives.  Scientific inquiry, as 
we saw from Freud’s earlier remarks, does not consider itself to be in the business of offering 
humanity a new evaluative worldview.  Nietzsche agrees with Freud on this point.  As Nietzsche 
states, “a scientific picture of the world is essentially meaningless” (GS 373, cf. GS 7.)  But the 
narratives of science have not replaced the traditional sense of meaning that it has now 
destroyed.  Although we now inhabit a scientific worldview, we still face the practical problem 
of needing a basic orientation of meaning to guide our lives.  Human beings, Nietzsche tells us, 
have “become a fantastic animal that must fulfill one condition of existence more than any other 
animal: man must from time to time believe that he knows why he exists; his race cannot thrive 





It is this practical sense of loss that leads Nietzsche to conclude that the devaluation of 
human meaning through modern science is hardly a new development in the history of our 
already low sense of esteem about our natural lives but is simply one more expression of the 
ascetic will to nothingness.  As Nietzsche acknowledges, this gradual devaluation has been going 
on for some time:     
Since Copernicus, man seems to have been on a downward path,--now he seems to be 
rolling faster and faster away from the center—whereto? Into nothingness?  In the 
‘piercing sensation of his nothingness? (GM III: 25.)   
 
On Nietzsche’s view, supernaturalism and science have each taken different routes to 
reach the same conclusion: life is meaningless.  As he states when assessing the sense of 
meaninglessness created when existence is viewed through a reductive scientific lens, “Well!  
That would be the straight path—to the old ideal!” (GM III: 25.)  As we have seen in the last 
chapter, the traditional ascetic ideal holds that natural life in this world has no meaning and that 
its deficiencies can only be redeemed through a sense of purpose that was given to it by another 
higher world of transcendent ideals.  The unconditional will to truth that characterize the pursuits 
of modern science has now undermined our faith in these transcendent narratives that once 
offered human life a global sense of meaning and purpose.  But the reductive pursuits of science 
offer us only a quantified picture of nature that does not replace our practical need to lead 
meaningful lives.   
In this way, our modern scientific understanding of world only serves to re-enforce the 
already embedded traditional prejudices about the meaninglessness of nature and our own finite 
lives but without the consolations once offered to us by the assurances of traditional forms of 
cosmic optimism.  Our historically problematic sense of our low self-worth in comparison to a 






 4.5 Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Human Reality   
 
The divergent responses offered by Nietzsche and Freud on the legitimacy of questions 
about the meaning of life within the context of a modern scientific worldview also serve to 
highlight the unique role that naturalism plays in Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition.  Nietzsche 
often describes his overall philosophical project in broadly naturalistic terms.  He claims, for 
example, that a central aim of his philosophical project is to engage in the “task of translating 
man back into nature” (BGE 230.)  In the GS, he asks his readers, “when may we begin to 
naturalize ourselves in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (GS 109.)  
In this sense, most commentators agree that Nietzsche is a naturalist.  But his commitments to 
naturalism have also been the subject of considerable debate in regard to the question of what it 
means to translate humanity back into nature.  A full survey of this debate is beyond the scope of 
the present chapter, but the question of Nietzsche’s naturalistic commitments is worth raising in 
a limited fashion in order to highlight, once again, his opposition to a scientistic view of 
humanity and to also offer a preliminary account of why he claims that naturalistic explanation 
and the practical human need for meaning need not be incompatible with one another.       
One reason that Nietzsche’s commitments to naturalism have been the subject of debate 
is undoubtedly due to the fact that the concept of naturalism, itself, is a contested term.  On the 
one hand, naturalism has been defined in quite general terms to express the view that the 
transcendent worlds espoused by traditional metaphysics and the majority of the world religions 
do not exist.  All that exists is a world of naturally occurring phenomena and that world contains 
no Gods, ghosts, or other supernatural things that go bump in the night.   
On the other hand, the commitments of naturalism have also been defined in a far more 





definition of naturalistic explanation that claims that only scientific knowledge can provide us 
with authoritative knowledge about what exists in the world.  W.V.O Quine, for example, offers 
a definition of naturalism in this more restrictive sense when he writes, “[t]he world is as the 
natural sciences says it is…and naturalism only looks to the natural sciences for an account of 
what there is and what what there is does.”145  As it turns out, Nietzsche has been interpreted to 
endorse both a general and also a restricted understanding of the commitments of naturalism.             
Brian Leiter offers an influential reading of Nietzsche as a naturalist in the more 
restrictive sense.  It should not be surprising that Leiter also wholeheartedly endorses the idea 
that Nietzsche should be understood to anticipate Freud’s psychoanalytic project.  At the 
beginning of his book Nietzsche on Morality, Leiter asks his readers, “So who can justifiably 
claim to be heir to Nietzsche’s philosophy.  Freud the ‘naturalist’ or Foucault the 
‘postmodernist?’”146  Leiter’s intention in posing the question is to make a general distinction 
between naturalistic and postmodern readings of Nietzsche.  Is Nietzsche more like Freud the 
empirically minded scientist who aims to uncover basic facts about human nature or is he more 
like Foucault the speculative social constructivist who argues that there are no such things as 
non-interpreted natural facts? 
Leiter goes on to claim that if we look closely at “Nietzsche’s actual practice, i.e., what 
he spends most of his time doing in his books,” we will soon discover that the answer to this 
question is that Freud is Nietzsche’s legitimate heir.147  Nietzsche anticipates Freud, on Leiter’s 
view, by embracing a fundamentally methodological form of naturalism which holds that, 
“philosophical inquiry […] should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences.”148  By 
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“continuous” Leiter means that the claims of philosophy should be understood in terms of their 
“dependence upon the actual results of scientific method” and through “the employment and 
emulation of distinctly scientific ways of looking at and explaining things.”149  Nietzsche’s 
naturalism, on Leiter’s view, therefore aims to treat human nature as a topic that is most 
adequately understood through causal-deterministic explanations that appeal to empirical 
evidence in support of its conclusions.150        
As an aside, one might wonder whether Leiter’s forced choice between Freud and 
Foucault in regard to the topic of naturalism does all the philosophical work that he wants it to 
do.  If naturalism is defined broadly in terms of avoiding supernatural explanations and using 
actual empirical evidence to support one’s theories then Foucault is surely just as much of a 
naturalist as anybody else.151  But if naturalism is supposed to be defined in a more restrictive 
methodological sense, as Leiter surely intends it to be, then Freud might not turn out to be such a 
good choice, at least from our contemporary scientific perspective.  Freud’s appeals to empirical 
evidence in order to justify his various theories have fared the least well out of all of his 
contributions to psychoanalysis.  In recent decades, the status of Freud’s appeals to scientific 
methodology, in particular, have come under increasingly serious scrutiny for their inability to 
adequately admit of verification or replication.152  
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But even if we set aside the questionable assumption that Freud is somehow a paragon of 
sound scientific methodology, Leiter’s overall suggestion that Nietzsche’s naturalist project is 
best understood within the confines of such a restrictive set of methodological commitments 
does not appear to reflect Nietzsche’s “actual practice” (to use Leiter’s own phrase.)  On Leiter’s 
reading, the most original features of Nietzsche’s project would appear to cast him in the role of 
something like a quirky 19th century Quine who just happens to have chosen to write his 
scientific speculations in poetic form.  But there are good reasons to think that Nietzsche’s 
appeal to naturalism is neither so neatly constrained by direct casual explanation nor is it so 
neatly placed under the direct authority of the natural sciences.    
The main focus of Nietzsche’s attempt to translate humanity back into nature does not 
involve an attempt to translate humanity into the reductive languages of the natural sciences.  
Rather, it involves a much more general explanation of human reality that emphasizes both our 
animality and the this-worldly origins of our traditional evaluative lives.  As Nietzsche states, 
“We have become more modest in every respect.  We no longer trace the origin of man in the 
‘spirit,’ in ‘divinity,’ we have placed him back among the animals.” (A 14.)  The naturalist, he 
tells us, must learn to become “deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers” who 
claim, “you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!” (BGE 230.)  As we have 
seen in the last chapter, most traditional depictions of human reality have portrayed human 
beings as a fundamental disunity; they are natural-supernatural hybrid beings with one foot in the 
transcendent beyond.  Nietzschean naturalism, by contrast, seeks to reveal the continuities that 
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exist between humanity and the natural world in order to explain how our highest ideals and best 
selves might have emerged out of natural processes. 
 A full accounting of the various ways that human reality has emerged out of these natural 
processes and our own natural history, however, would be poorly served if it were only described 
in the reductive language of scientific explanation.  For the emergence of human reality is also 
due to a number of sociocultural factors and interpretive frameworks that are not easily reducible 
to the causal-deterministic laws that Leiter maintains are Nietzsche’s primary vehicle of 
naturalistic explanation.  Bernard Williams once made the interesting point that when we study 
other animal species we ask questions like, “what do they eat?” “how do they reproduce?” and 
“where do they live?”  If we were to pose these questions about the human species, Williams 
maintains, we would quickly discover why culture is no mere accessory to a naturalist approach 
to our species, but rather is integral to it.153  Having a culture is part of the natural ethology of the 
species homo sapiens.  What Leiter seems to completely ignore is a developmental history of 
human nature that considers not only our biology but also the various ways that our biological 
animality has become radically transformed through culture, sociality, normativity, and any 
number of other interpretive features that make our species unique.        
Richard Schacht, for example, has long advocated this kind of developmental reading of 
Nietzsche’s naturalism that focuses on human reality as an emergent phenomenon.  In contrast to 
Leiter’s reductive reading, Schacht argues that one of the key features of Nietzsche’s overall 
naturalistic project is that he is able to both view human beings as part of nature while also 
rejecting the scientistic compulsion, “wedded to the view that everything that happens in human 
life…can be adequately explained and fully comprehended in terms of natural-scientific or 
                                                      






natural-scientifically modeled concept and processes.”154  Nietzsche’s naturalistic project, on 
Schacht’s view, involves a commitment that is best understood to constitute a kind of “extended 
naturalism.”  It is extended because Nietzsche aims to not only translate humanity back into 
nature in order to explain our non-supernatural origins but also to translate humanity back out of 
nature in order to highlight the various ways that human reality has become “dis-animalized” and 
is no longer merely a biological affair but now contains cultural, historical, normative, and 
interpretive dimensions as well.155  
A great benefit of Schacht’s developmental reading of Nietzsche’s naturalistic 
commitments is that it opens up a space that allows for the possibility of making sense of the 
practical need for human meaning within an emergent naturalistic understanding of human 
nature and reality.  As we saw earlier in the chapter, one of Nietzsche’s great concerns about the 
reductive mechanistic picture of the world that has been given to us by the natural sciences is 
that it presents us with an essentially meaningless world.  But Nietzsche’s developmental 
approach to naturalistic explanation also reveals why this sense of meaninglessness that is 
revealed by our modern scientific worldview is not somehow a fact of nature itself.  Rather, it is 
the product of the reductive scientific vocabularies that have eliminated meaning in favor of 
causal explanation.  In contrast to Leiter, Schacht suggests that Nietzsche’s naturalism must go 
beyond mere causal explanation in order to incorporate a richer narrative of the acquired 
sensibilities, historical shifts, and unexpected cultural developments that have transformed us 
                                                      
154 Richard Schacht, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity” in ed. Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson in 
Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity (2012) p. 240.  See also Schacht’s essay “Nietzsche Naturalism” in The 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 43 (2012) that includes a detailed criticism of Leiter’s position.   
155 Schacht, (2012), p. 240.  See also Schacht’s essay “Nietzschean Normativity” in ed. Schacht Nietzsche’s 
Postmoralism (2001) for a more in-depth neo-Nietzschean account of how normativity might emerge out of nature 





from purely natural beings into beings who—unlike other species—need to understand the 
meaning and value of their own existence.156           
A focus on developmental themes present in Nietzsche’s extended naturalism also serves 
to highlight some key differences between his own view of the value of our evaluative past in 
contrast to Freud’s attempts at a positivist reduction of our religious and philosophical past.  For 
Freud, our evaluative past is in error about the nature of reality and should therefore be simply 
superseded by scientific fact.  As we have seen, the appeal of religion, and the supersensible 
more generally, is best understood from Freud’s scientistic perspective in terms of a neurosis to 
be cured, or something like a childish fear of the dark that we must simply learn to master.  
Scientific discovery, according to Freud, should allow us to move past the childish beliefs of 
humanity that were once associated with the evaluative framework of the ascetic ideal.          
Nietzsche, by contrast, is more ambivalent about our evaluative past and, consequently, is 
able to both criticize and also appreciate the value of the ascetic ideal in ways that Freud’s 
scientistic stance simply ignores.  As Nietzsche reminds us, “If one disregards the ascetic ideal: 
man, the animal man, has until now had no meaning” (GM III: 28.)  Nietzsche also reminds us 
that the long history of the ascetic ideal has radically transformed us in ways that have increased 
our capacities to be clever and creative, to have inner depth, to be spiritual.  “Humanity,” he tells 
us, would have been, “altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have 
introduced into it” (GM I: 7.)  The ascetic ideal has made us “more interesting” (GM I:6) and 
should be regarded as the “womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena” (GM II: 18.)  Most 
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importantly, the ascetic ideal gave humanity a goal and saved it from the horror vacui of a 
meaningless existence. 
One of the most important features of Nietzsche’s naturalistic project is that it aims to be 
diagnostic as well as descriptive in regard to our evaluative past.  The main problem posed by 
both supernaturalism and scientism is that they have chosen to describe natural life as 
meaningless.  The former because of a higher transcendent world and the latter because of a 
value-less scientific vocabulary.  As Lawrence Hatab once suggested, the modern world is no 
longer in need of a theodicy but now seems to need something like a “biodicy” that would show 
us how meaning is possible within the context of a natural world.157  One of the main tasks that 
Nietzsche is trying to address through his own unique version of naturalism is to show us how it 
might be possible to conceptualize human reality in ways that would allow for a meaningful 
discussion of meaning within a developmental natural context.158         
My critical focus on Freud in the chapter has emphasized how a certain strain of 
scientism at work in his psychoanalytic project aspires to considerably different goals than 
Nietzsche’s own psychology.  But it is worth acknowledging that Freud is an extraordinarily 
complicated figure.  From my own point of view, it is difficult to assess just how committed 
Freud really was to many of his own strongly worded scientistic statements.  Reading Freud’s 
various writings is sometimes like stumbling into someone’s internal debate about whether to be 
a scientist or a poet; a debate that, in Freud’s own inner struggles, often takes the form of 
uncertain wavering between an open-mined commitment to a hermeneutic exploration of the 
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self, on the one hand, and a deep need for objective certainty and scientific validation on the 
other.159   
At times, it appears that Freud’s overt emphasis on scientism seems to aim mostly at an 
attempt to justify his own project among the judge and jury of his scientific peers.  Certainly, 
many of his case studies do not adhere to the same reductive principles as are espoused by his 
more scientifically-minded meta-psychological theories.160  As some have noted, Freud’s overall 
project of psychoanalysis might have looked considerably different had he chosen to openly 
incorporate rather than eschew insights of the philosophers, including, of course, Nietzsche.161   
But Freud did not make that choice.  In that regard, his own version of scientism stands in 
marked contrast to Nietzsche’s own naturalistic project.  Freud once commented that: 
I can at least listen without indignation to the critic who is of the opinion that when one 
surveys the aims of cultural endeavor and the means it employs, one is bound to come to 
the conclusion that the whole effort is not worth the trouble.”162   
 
This attitude of worldly pessimistic resignation, I would suggest, makes Freud closer to  
being the scientistic heir of Schopenhauer’s cosmic pessimism than the completion of 
Nietzsche’s attempt to engage in a fröhlich Wissenschaft that endeavors to interpret human 
existence naturalistically while also attempting to re-invest the natural world with value and 
meaning. 
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The last two chapters have explored the many twists and turns of Nietzsche’s expansive 
critique of the history of the Western tradition through the basic moods of optimism and 
pessimism.  More specifically, we have traced out how his general diagnosis of the West’s grand 
tradition of optimism—what I referred to as cosmic optimism—has provided humanity with 
transcendent assurances of its meaningful place in the cosmos, but at the costly expense of 
inculcating within us a deep pessimism towards the value of life in this world.  As we have seen, 
the root cause of our worldly pessimism, along with our need for transcendent assurances of our 
own cosmic significance, can be traced back to humanity’s deeply rooted habit of viewing 
ourselves as constitutionally deficient beings who stand in need of redemption.  Our historically 
optimistic sense of ourselves as the main protagonist of the universe also reveals our deep 
insecurities about whether we could ever value ourselves without such forms of cosmic 
assurance.        
But if traditional other-worldly forms of optimism turn out to harbor a this-worldly 
pessimism then might the inverse be possible as well?  Could we learn to cultivate a new mood 
of pessimism towards otherworldly assurances that will, in turn, offer new opportunities to be 
more optimistic about the prospects of finding meaning in this world?  In his “Attempt at Self-
Criticism” for the 1886 reissue of the BT, Nietzsche poses the following question to his readers, 
“Is there a pessimism of strength? An intellectual preference for the hard, gruesome, malevolent, 
and problematic aspects of existence that comes from a feeling of well-being, from overflowing 
health, for an abundance of existence?” (BT P 1.)  Within Nietzsche’s question, I want to 
suggest, we begin to find the start of his own constructive view of how we might be able to 





But before we can do so, Nietzsche claims that we must face up to the final conclusions 
of the ascetic ideal that we encountered towards the end of this chapter.  “All great things,” 
Nietzsche informs us, “bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming” 
(GM III: 27.)  The long failure of Socratic optimism to establish our cosmic significance has 
given way to the threat of nihilism and the question of whether the world, now devoid of 
transcendent assurances, and our own lives, also devoid of transcendent assurances, can admit of 
any value at all.  The journey from Plato to Positivism has moved from a mood of optimistic 
cosmic assurance about the status of human meaning to a mood of cosmic anxiety about whether 
human life admits of any meaning at all.  The next chapter will focus on questions about an 
emerging sense of the meaninglessness of modern life through an analysis of one of Nietzsche’s 



















 GOD IS DEAD: A MODERN CRISIS OF MEANING 
 
“To sacrifice God for nothingness—that paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty has been 
reserved for the race that is now approaching; by now we all know something about 




The last two chapters offered a broad sketch of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the history of the 
ascetic ideal and its relation to humanity’s own sense of its self-worth.  Our inherited evaluative 
history, on Nietzsche’s diagnosis, has harbored a dark secret that has taken well over two 
millennia to begin to come to light.  The highly ambitious and hopeful attitudes of cosmic 
optimism which maintain that humanity’s unique sense of self-worth can be discovered in our 
connection to some species of the transcendent reveals, upon close scrutiny, a deeply pessimistic 
attitude towards our assessments of the value of our finite and embodied selves and the natural 
world in which we reside.  An affirmation of our highest traditional ideals, on Nietzsche’s 
account, comes at the cost of a systematic devaluation, even a masochistic hatred, of the 
experience of the lived natural constitution and conditions of human existence.     
Despite this immense psychological cost, however, Nietzsche claims that the evaluative 
framework of the ascetic ideal has been the only ideal that humanity has known and that it has 
historically “saved the will from suicidal nihilism” (GM III: 28) by offering us a global sense of 
the purpose and meaning of life.  But it would appear that even this problematic narrative of 
humanity’s sense of its own cosmic significance is now coming to an end.  The modern world 
has become skeptical of claims that knowledge of eternal essences, divine commands, and 
universal definitions can offer humanity a cosmic assurance of the meaning of their own lives.  





that an unconditional will to truth, now fully detached from existential questions about human 
meaning, has laid bare the evaluative core of the ascetic ideal: the will to nothingness.  
Supernaturalism and scientism have both converged on the conclusion that the natural world is 
meaningless.  The question we must now face is whether life without any transcendent 
assurances can have any meaning at all?      
Nietzsche dramatically describes the culmination of our realization that modern life 
might be meaningless in terms of an event that he refers to as “the death of God.”  This chapter 
will trace out some significant aspects of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of this axiological event and will 
proceed as follows.  In section 5.2, I show that Nietzsche’s engagement with God’s death 
assesses not only our modern loss of belief in a transcendent reality, but also expresses a much 
deeper worry that the moods of cosmic optimism that once supported this historical way of life 
are now failing, dying, becoming impossible to live.  Sections 5.3 and 5.4 take up two possible 
pathological responses to the death of God as a failure of a cultural way of life through an 
investigation of two well-known figurative images in Nietzsche’s writings: the madman and the 
last man.  I conclude with the observation that what unites both of these figures in their 
pathologies is discovered in their lack of risk-taking.  The madman’s melancholic nostalgia lacks 
the imagination to risk envisioning new possibilities after God’s death.  The last man’s quest for 
a comfortable life lacks even the requisite desire to risk confronting the basic problems of 
meaning posed by the death of God.    
 
5.2 The Death of God 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the “death of God” is arguably one of the most famous 
images presented within his philosophy.  The phrase itself is only found a handful of times 





Zarathustra (Z Prologue 2), and once later on (Z IV ‘On the Higher Men.)  Despite its relative 
infrequency of use, however, the saying “God is dead” has now become virtually synonymous 
with a general understanding of Nietzsche’s overall project and, particularly, with his diagnosis 
of the problematic status of meaning in modern human life.163                
This is not to say, however, that there is a settled view of what Nietzsche’s diagnosis of 
the death of God is supposed to mean.  If God’s death is supposed to express a specific argument 
within Nietzsche’s overall philosophy, then those passages that announce his demise leave us 
with few precise details.  Most commentators tend to agree that whatever else Nietzsche means 
by this phrase he is not attempting to inform us about the literal death of an omnipotent 
supernatural being.  As Robert Pippin notes, “if there had been a god, we could not have killed 
him.  If we could have killed him, he could not have been a god in anything like the Judeo-
Christian sense.”164  Though it is worth noting that one of the most fascinating movements of 
twentieth century theology emerged out of an inspired attempt to take Nietzsche’s claim at face 
value.  According to Thomas Altizer, and a number of other thinkers associated with the “death 
of God” theology movement of the 1960’s, God literally did die when he incarnated himself on 
earth in the figure of Jesus Christ and was hung on a cross in Calvary over 2000 years ago.165   
Most interpreters have opted to take a more figurative approach to Nietzsche’s statements 
about God’s demise.166  It is not God but rather our belief in God that has died.  What Nietzsche 
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attempts to highlight through this dramatic phrase is something important about the waning 
epistemic status of our belief in God as a kind of possible transcendent reality and, more 
expansively, something important about our general loss of belief in the possibility of any form 
of transcendent reality that exists apart from this world.  Martin Heidegger offers what has 
perhaps become the canonical reading of the death of God in this general sense:            
God is the name for the realm of ideas and ideals.  This realm of the supersensory has 
been considered since Plato, or more strictly speaking, since the late Greek and Christian 
interpretation of Platonic philosophy, to be the true and genuinely real world […] The 
pronouncement ‘God is dead’ means: The supersensory world is without effective 
power.167  
 
Bernard Reginster offers us a more recent example of a similar reading of God’s death 
that focuses on a general loss of belief.  According to Reginster, “To say that ‘God is dead’ […] 
is simply to recognize that the belief in God, and in another metaphysical world, has become 
‘unworthy of belief,’ which amounts to saying that it has been discredited.”168  There can be little 
doubt that the kind of general epistemic readings offered by Heidegger and Reginster captures an 
important aspect of what Nietzsche means by the death of God.  In GS 343, for example, 
Nietzsche also invokes belief when he informs us quite directly that, “The greatest recent 
event—that ‘God is dead’; that belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable—is already 
starting to cast its first shadow over Europe.”   
Framing the death of God in terms of a historical and cultural “event [Ereignis]” that 
reveals the unworthiness of our former transcendent belief systems also fits together nicely with 
a number of critical themes in Nietzsche’s later writings that were discussed in the last chapter.  
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As we have briefly seen, Nietzsche offers a number of genealogical accounts of the various ways 
that belief in God and transcendent reality have become undermined by virtue of the tradition’s 
own normative commitments.  In GM III, for example, he offers us a psycho-historical account 
of how the cultivation of a moral conscience inaugurated by Christianity created a strong 
psychological need to be truthful about one’s own intentions and desires in order to evaluate 
when one had been sinful and when one had been saintly.  This distinctly moral need, however, 
eventually led to an overvaluation of truthfulness that set the background cultural conditions for 
the emergence of the natural sciences and the Enlightenment.  A commitment to the institutions 
of the natural sciences, in turn, eventually led to an erosion of our traditional faith in the 
authority of the metaphysical foundations of Christianity and the existence of a transcendent 
God.169     
We have killed traditional belief in God, on this reading, by making an unconditional 
will-to-truth via science our new conception of the divine.  As Nietzsche states, “Atheism…is the 
awe-inspiring catastrophe of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids 
itself the lie involved in the belief in God” (GM III: 27.)  Nietzsche’s emphasis on the genealogy 
of the credibility of a transcendent or supersensory world also helps to explain why he 
consistently shows so little interest in most traditional debates for or against the existence of 
God.  As he explains, “Previously one sought to prove that there is no God.—Today one shows 
how the belief that there is a God was able to arise, and in what way this belief has acquired its 
weight and importance: thereby the counter-proof that there is no God becomes superfluous [..]” 
(D 95.)       
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 If Nietzsche were only trying to offer his readers a deflationary genealogical-
anthropological narrative that explains the historical cessation of belief in a supersensory world, 
however, one might wonder why he would have chosen to portray this “event” in such a 
grandiose literary fashion.  After all, the nineteenth century was already rife with various 
anthropological reductions of the divine.  Ludwig Feuerbach and a variety of other thinkers prior 
to Nietzsche had already argued that the God-idea, and its transcendent associations, are best 
understood in terms of an anthropological projection of human concepts and interests into the 
beyond.   
One might plausibly claim that Nietzsche’s own genealogical speculations add a 
considerable amount of philosophical and psychological sophistication to some of these earlier 
anthropological accounts of religion and religious belief, but the general epistemic story, itself, 
remains largely the same.  All of these psycho-historical reductions fit quite comfortably within a 
standard Enlightenment narrative, as we saw in Freud and others, that explains how our 
disenchanted modern worldview has emerged out of and has now replaced the previously 
enchanted viewpoints of the ancient and medieval worlds.      
When we turn to the structure of those passages in the GS where Nietzsche discusses the 
death of God, however, we are given some clues that point to a number of themes that quickly 
complicate any straightforward understanding that this death is best understood solely in terms of 
a failure of epistemic credibility.  Perhaps the most obvious clue is that all these passages (GS 
108, 125, and 343) offer readers a set of cautionary notes that call into question whether 
Nietzsche’s message has even been understood.170  We already noted, for example, that in GS 
343 Nietzsche announces God’s death in terms of an event in which a traditional belief has 
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become unworthy of belief, but the passage then immediately goes on to caution his readers that, 
“the event is itself too great, distant, and out of the way even for its tiding to be thought of as 
having arrived yet. Even less may one suppose many to know at all what this event really means 
[…]”  Likewise, in GS 108, Nietzsche informs us that “God is dead” but he once again cautions 
us, “but given the way of people are, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his 
shadow will be shown—and we—will still have to vanquish his shadow too!”171   
In characteristic fashion, Nietzsche does not inform us explicitly in either passage what 
the supposed shadows that will endure God’s death are supposed to mean.  But the general 
context of these passages implies that these shadows represent a number of entrenched 
assumptions and sensibilities about the value of transcendence that do not operate only at the 
level of explicit belief but rather also constitute something like the shared historical and cultural 
background of our evaluative lives.   
As we saw in the last chapter, one prominent example of a shadowy surrogate for God’s 
divine authority is found in the unconditional value of truth.  Another potential shadow that we 
will explore in more detail in the next chapter is discovered in our modern residual faith in grand 
narratives of meaning.  Even those who explicitly reject belief in God and a supersensory world 
may still consciously, or perhaps even unconsciously, assign a telos or ultimate purpose to 
human life.  Modern faith in the progress of civilization, or rationality, or morality, or politics, or 
scientific discovery, according to Nietzsche, all reveal an implicit faith that still serves the 
transcendent function of assuring us that there is some definitive standard to assess the conduct 
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of life that remains insulated against the contingencies of our own practices, cultures, and 
histories.  Moreover, these structures of transcendent faith have become so deeply habituated 
into our various institutional practices, moral judgments, and general modes of experiencing the 
meaning of our lives that they have become second-nature and, for the most part, are simply 
taken for granted as common sense.     
As long as we continue to experience our lives and the world through the assurances of 
absolute standards of value, Nietzsche claims that will never become fully aware of the extent of 
the hidden implications and shadows of God’s death.  Learning to appreciate the death of God is 
consequently a task that amounts to something more basic and also more challenging than simply 
changing our explicit framework of beliefs.  Nietzsche claims that in order to fully work through 
these various shadows of God we must learn to “de-deify” both ourselves and nature (GS 109) in 
order to free ourselves from our inheritance of habituated transcendent needs and all of their 
metaphysical analogues.   
But the task of de-deification in this general sense is, as Nietzsche well knows, easier said 
than done precisely because the loss of transcendence entails not only the loss of explicit belief 
but also the loss of trust in a historical way of life.  The inheritance of cosmic optimism, in all of 
its formulations, has always given us some assurance that there is a plan or some definitive 
narrative that will offer guidance for living a human life.  This inheritance of trust, according to 
Nietzsche, has deeply penetrated our basic experience of who we are and the practical ways that 
we have come to recognize our lives as meaningful, our goals as worthwhile, and our hopes as 
worth pursuing.  What would it mean if this basic sensibility of trust that has been woven so 
deeply within the historical framework of our social institutions and individual evaluative 





not only the impossibility of traditional systems of belief, but also in terms of the impossibility of 
a traditional way of life?     
What these questions reveal about Nietzsche’s diagnosis, I want to suggest, brings to 
light a number of themes that involve an analysis of moods as much as they involve an analysis 
of metaphysics.  One of Nietzsche’s most pressing practical concerns involves questions about 
how our loss of basic trust in the Western tradition as a historical way of life might be 
experienced in a variety of ways.  What mood is most appropriate when working through the 
death of God as a form of cultural death?  In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will explore 
what it might mean to experience the news of God’s death as a cheerful event, a new risk, a new 
adventure.  But for the remainder of this chapter I want to turn to other more pathological 
experiences of this event.   
 
5.3 The Madman and Nostalgic Melancholy  
 
We will begin with one of the most fascinating and elusive passages in all of Nietzsche’s 
work: his famous depiction of God’s demise in the character of the madman.  In GS 125, 
Nietzsche presents us with the following parable:    
The madman.—Haven’t you heard of that madman who in the bright morning lit a lantern 
and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, ‘I’m looking for God!  I’m looking 
for God!’  Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together 
just then, he caused great laughter.  Has he been lost, then? asked one.  Did he lose his 
way like a child asked another.  Or is he hiding?  Is he afraid of us?  Has he gone to sea?  
Emigrated? — Thus they shouted and laughed, one interrupting the other.  The madman 
jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.  ‘Where is God?’ he cried; ‘I’ll 
tell you! We have killed him—you and I!  We are all his murderers.  But how did we do 
this?  How were we able to drink up the sea?  Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the 
entire horizon?  What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?  Where 
is it moving to now?  Where are we moving to?  Away from all suns?  Are we not 
continually falling?   And backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions?  Is there still 





breathing at us?  Hasn’t it got colder?  Isn’t night and more night coming again and 
again?  Don’t lanterns have to be lit in the morning?  Do we still hear nothing of the noise 
of the gravediggers who are burying God?  Do we still smell nothing of the divine 
composition?—Gods, too, decompose!  God is dead!  God remains dead!  And we have 
killed him!  How can we console ourselves, the murder of all murderers!  The holiest and 
mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will 
wipe this blood for us?  With what water could we clean ourselves:  What festivals of 
atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves:  Is the magnitude of 
this deed not too great for us?  Do we not ourselves have to become gods merely to 
appear worthy of it? […] (GS 125) 
 
This passage is cited so frequently and is invoked so often as evidence of Nietzsche’s definitive 
position on the modern human condition that it is easy to overlook the sheer oddness of this little 
parable.  The first oddity, no doubt, can be gleaned from the title of the parable itself.  It is not 
Nietzsche, himself, who informs us directly that we have “killed” God, but rather the message is 
given to us by a “madman” or a “crazy person [Der tolle Mensch.]”  From the start, we are 
forced to confront a variety of questions about just who we are dealing with in this parable, 
whether this person should be considered a reliable narrator, or whether perhaps we should 
exercise some caution when assessing the overall meaning of his pronouncement.   
If the first oddity is found in the messenger, then the second odd feature of the passage is 
discovered in the audience to whom this crazy person has decided to impart his message.  The 
crowd, we are told, is composed entirely of people “who do not believe in God” (GS 125.)  Here 
too some caution may be in order when assessing what the madman is trying to accomplish.  
After all, the group of chortling village atheists who have gathered around the madman do not 
think his message is saying anything profound at all.  They take him, instead, to be offering a 
mere platitude, something quite obvious, an eccentric reference to an accepted and quaint fact.  





The structure of Nietzsche’s parable and the overall failure of the village atheists to fully 
appreciate the deeper implications of the madman’s message provides more insight into why an 
exclusively cognitive reading of the death of God might fail to fully capture the crisis of this 
historical event.  The madman and the village atheists, after all, share the same metaphysical 
belief: both maintain there is no God.  But because the villagers view the concept of God as only 
a matter of belief they fail to recognize why the madman’s anxieties should reflect something 
important about their own view of the world.  James Conant offers an excellent summary of this 
failure of recognition:            
Those who do not believe in God are able to imagine that the death of God marks nothing 
more than a change in what people should now ‘believe.’  One should now subtract the 
belief in God from one’s body of beliefs; and this subtraction is something sophisticated 
people (who have long since ceased going to church) can effect without unduly upsetting 
how they live or what they value.”172 
 
The madman’s anxieties, by contrast, imply that the process of subtracting the divine from one’s 
overall worldview amounts to something subtler and more complicated than merely placing 
one’s beliefs in the propositional categories of the true and the false.  The failure of the villagers, 
from the madman’s perspective, is not a failure of belief but a failure of vision.  They only see 
the Judeo-Christian tradition in terms of a set of explicit beliefs rather than as historical and 
cultural institution—a social and evaluative worldview—that has significantly shaped the ways 
that they describe, assess, and experience their lives.  But Christianity, as Nietzsche suggests 
elsewhere, has always been more influential as “a new way of living, not a new belief” (A 33.)  
Even those who explicitly deny belief in God, or even repudiate religion entirely, still adhere to 
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general evaluative narratives, reflected most obviously in their ethical judgments and behavior, 
that they have inherited from the Judeo-Christian tradition.   
Those in the crowd who would not endorse traditional doctrines of human exceptionalism 
that define our cosmic uniqueness in terms of the possession of an eternal soul would likely still 
endorse any number of secular forms of human exceptionalism that celebrate various universal 
doctrines of self-worth, equality, dignity, and respect that are also grounded in unconditional 
standards of value.173  In this way, Nietzsche claims the cosmic assurances once offered by 
traditional forms of cosmic optimism have simply been repackaged as a new secular optimistic 
faith in the universality of our moral and political institutions.  All of these narratives—
supernatural and secular—are still beholden to the transcendent function of assuring humanity 
that there is a general purpose and meaning to life.    
What is at stake in the failure of communication between the madman and his audience 
becomes considerably greater, I want to suggest, when our understanding of the death of God is 
expanded from the loss of a particular belief to the potential loss of an inherited evaluative 
background that supports our current norms, beliefs, and way of life.  What the madman so 
vividly predicts, and what apparently nobody else can comprehend, is the possibility that an 
entire cultural and historical way of life might be dying, or perhaps, is already dead.  What the 
village atheists fail to appreciate is that the practical standards that they have simply taken for 
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granted when assessing the purpose and value of their lives might rely upon evaluative 
foundations that are, themselves, no longer intelligible.   
A number of commentators have also emphasized the experience of the loss of a 
framework of intelligibility as a key feature of the madman’s message.  Stephen Mulhall, for 
example, proposes that we should think of the death of God in terms of the loss of “an 
atmosphere or framework that orients us in everything we say, think, and do.”174  James Conant 
argues that Nietzsche is showing us that, “the process of divine decomposition is one in which 
many words which name the old values are gradually drained of their meaning.”175 Robert Pippin 
claims that the madman’s message is best understood in terms of an assessment that, “A form of 
life (or better some pre-reflective agreement in a form of life) has failed, or as in the metaphor, 
‘died.’”176  My own view stands in broad agreement with these readings and, overall, I think 
there are compelling reasons to view the madman’s experience of God’s death in terms of the 
loss of a general framework of meaning, or general orientation towards a way of life, rather than 
as the loss of an explicit belief.     
One benefit of reading the death of God in terms of the loss of a basic evaluative 
framework, or shared way of life, is that it helps to make better sense of the general theme of 
disorientation that pervades the madman’s experience of the world.  The world of the madman, 
in contrast to the world of villagers, is filled with images of disorder, disintegration, and decay 
when describing God’s death.  The earth has been separated from the sun, the whole horizon has 
been obliterated, we have lost all sense of direction, the universe is getting colder, and so on.  It 
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is also worth noting that the status of the madman’s own beliefs about this event remain 
speculative and uncertain.  His disorientating descriptions are hardly presented from the 
standpoint of a confident narrator who is simply informing us about a definitive state of affairs.  
Instead his whole description is presented to us in terms of a battery of questions (seventeen of 
them to be exact) that underscore just how much of the event is still unknown, even to the 
madman himself.  The madman, after all, offers us no answers to any of his questions.  The 
questions, themselves, appear to be diagnostic and reflect his own recognition that this loss of 
intelligibility might be so close to us that it is extraordinarily difficult to articulate.  
Nietzsche’s parable, of course, is pitched at such a high level of abstraction that the 
question of what this loss of intelligibility might look like in historical or cultural terms is not 
spelled out in significant detail.  But the parable, itself, does offer a good example of Nietzsche’s 
tendency to frame his evaluation of concepts in terms various images of life and death, sickness 
and health, vitality and enervation, and so on.  Taken together, we might claim that all of these 
images constitute Nietzsche’s organic history of ideas.  By “organic history,” I mean that 
Nietzsche often frames his critical analysis of various concepts in terms of a guiding idea that 
they are the sorts of entities that can admit of a life span, that can display degrees of sickness and 
health, and that can die various ways ranging from violent conceptual revolutions to the gradual 
fading away due to old age.   
We already encountered one prominent example of Nietzsche’s use of organic history in 
Chapter Three in his analysis of the victory of Socratic theoretical optimism over an older 
tradition of Greek tragic pessimism.  Socrates’ victory is not framed in terms of the replacement 
of one set of explicit beliefs or arguments for another set.  Rather, Nietzsche presents it in terms 





embraces contingency, suffering, and change and the subsequent birth of a new perspective—
Socratic optimism—that eschews the tragic elements of existence in favor of permanence, purity, 
and transcendent ideals.  Nor did Nietzsche claim that the tragic worldview died a gentle death.  
It committed suicide when Euripides changed the structure of tragic drama through the influence 
of Socrates.  The result of this cultural shift, according to Nietzsche, was not just the loss of a 
series of explicit beliefs but the loss of a certain cultural possibility.                            
But one does not have to go all the way back to Greek antiquity to find examples of the 
death of a cultural possibility in this general sense.  Suppose, for example, that I were to say to 
you that “disco is dead.”  Presumably you would not take this statement to be offering a literal 
description of the status of an explicitly held belief.  I am not informing you, after all, that all 
people who have ever participated in disco were suffering from a cognitive defect or that disco 
never actually existed.  Rather, you would most likely interpret my statement to be telling you in 
colloquial fashion about the current state of disco, and particularly, that it is no longer something 
that you can do; it is not a live cultural possibility.     
There was a time not so long ago in American culture, roughly between the mid 1970’s 
and early 1980’s, when people had the opportunity to do the Hustle, wear mint green leisure 
suits, and spend one’s weekend nights at Studio 54.  But the cultural and experiential 
opportunities that allowed for these kinds of participation in disco life have undergone an 
institutional death.  The discotheque clubs are all closed, nobody makes that kind of music 
anymore, and good luck trying to find a quality leisure suit these days.   
The loss of the cultural possibility of disco does not, of course, mean that the concept of 
disco (or belief in disco) has become wholly unintelligible.  We can still talk about it.  We might 





parts of the disco life out of a sense of nostalgia or irony.  I might wistfully do the Hustle in my 
living room and attempt to relive those glorious days of disco’s past.  Or I might dress up as a 
disco person in some ironic sense for Halloween (I have actually done that.)  But the meaning of 
the nostalgia or irony within these present moments is created in reference to a framework of 
cultural activity that is no longer possible in the present day.  People don’t do that anymore.  The 
historical moment has passed.  Disco is dead.     
The death of disco offers us a minor or local example of cultural death in so far as the 
loss of this possibility takes place against a much larger framework of cultural meaning that 
remains very much alive.  The cultural practices and social institutions that constitute 
entertainment, musical appreciation, dancing, and so forth have all remained intact and offer us 
new cultural possibilities for participation, even if living the disco life is no longer one of those 
possibilities.  And, of course, countless deaths like this occur in music, in academics, in fashion, 
in entertainment, in every generation, perhaps even in every year.   
But it is also possible for cultural death to occur at a more global level.  Jonathan Lear’s 
book Radical Hope, for example, offers us an account of the widespread death of cultural 
possibility—what he calls the possibility of “cultural devastation”—in his analysis of the fate of 
the Crow Indian tribe of the late 19th century.177  The Crow were a Northwest plains nomadic 
tribe that were forcibly placed on a government reservation in the spring of 1884.  The relocation 
of the Crow, according to Lear, raises an ontological question about what happens when an 
entire culture dies but the people who have inhabited that culture survive.  Lear’s answer to this 
question is brought out poignantly in his analysis of an interview in the 1920’s with Plenty 
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Coups, the last recognized chieftain of the Crow tribe.  When asked to describe Indian life on the 
reservation, Plenty Coup responds that his people continue to physically exist, “But when the 
Buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up 
again.  After this nothing happened.”178 
Plenty Coup’s remark that “nothing happened,” according to Lear, reveals a loss that is 
transcendental rather than simply sociological or historical.179  The remark highlights how the 
conditions for the possibility of experiencing traditional Crow life have died.  To say that 
“nothing happened,” in this ontological sense, is not the same thing as saying that no events 
happened on the reservation.  The Crow people still woke up every day and engaged in the 
various activities of life: eating, conversing, caring for children, tending to one’s daily affairs.  
But the meaning of these activities could no longer be derived from the possibilities once offered 
by a traditional understanding of a Crow way of life.  The traditional Crow conception of the 
good life involved a nomadic lifestyle of migration with no fixed home, the hunting of buffalo 
and its associated sacred hunting rituals, as well as near constant warfare with other tribes that 
gave members of the Crow an opportunity to display the virtue of bravery.   
But now the Crow were confined to a sedentary lifestyle on a government reservation, 
hunting was strictly regulated by the government and, as Plenty Coups mentions, the buffalo had 
all but gone extinct anyway.  Warfare between tribes was outlawed by various government 
treaties and the virtue of “bravery,” as once understood by the Crow, was now treated as a 
prosecutable crime.  According to Lear, the core institutional activities and experiences that 
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constitute what it means to maintain a traditional Crow identity had become practically 
unintelligible.180  An entire way of life no longer made sense.  As Lear states:    
Their problem, then, was not simply that they could not pursue happiness in the 
traditional ways.  Rather their conception of what happiness is could no longer be lived.  
The characteristic activities that used to constitute the good life ceased to be intelligible 
acts.181   
 
To lose the possibility of happiness, in this sense, constitutes the loss of a distinct kind of 
lived experience rather than the loss of a concept.  The threat of unintelligibility faced by the 
Crow tribe does not involve an inability to remember or understand their past values, concepts, 
and culture.  Countless interviews with various members of the tribe reveal them to be doing just 
that: recounting their past in detail.  It is just that these concepts can no longer be meaningfully 
lived.  The Crow have lost the opportunities and evaluative background upon which their 
previous acts would have shown up as intelligible acts of participation within a form of life.  
That possibility is now gone.182  Likewise, on a smaller scale, music aficionados and cultural 
studies faculty can study the history of disco and debate the relative merits and demerits of its 
place in American culture.  But the possibility of the lived experience of disco is gone.       
My hope is this brief discussion of these two examples helps to make some sense of the 
claim that a part of culture, or possibly even an entire culture, can die.  The scope and 
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seriousness of the cultural deaths undergone by each example are obviously quite different.  In 
the case of disco, we are offered the loss of one possibility within culture that shows up within a 
much larger history of music and pop culture.  In the case of the Crow, we are offered a more 
expansive and far more heartbreaking example of the loss of the possibility of a whole way of 
life that shows up within the context of the history of American imperialism.  But each example 
highlights, in its own way, how one might lose the possibility to experience the world in a certain 
way that was once historically possible.     
Can the madman’s disoriented experience of God’s death and his sense of loss be 
interpreted in ways that are analogous to these examples of cultural death?  The madman’s 
purported loss, of course, takes place on a much grander scale than either the examples of the 
death of disco or even the death of Crow culture.  But the point of comparison I am interested in 
here has less to do with the scope of the loss than it has to do with how these examples might 
shed light on the madman’s unique experience of no longer being able to live a certain kind of 
life that requires God.  It is worth noting that the madman does not claim that the concept of God 
has become unintelligible.  Rather, the madman’s sense of disorientation seems to result from his 
experience of a world in which God no longer seems relevant.  It is this unchained world and this 
disorientating experience that seems wholly unintelligible to him.  And it is also this sense of 
unintelligibility that he is utterly unable to share with the village atheists.   
One of the reasons, of course, that the madman is unable to share his experience with the 
village atheists is because they still view the world through the evaluative lens of God’s shadows 
and a reality whose sense of stability is still structured by assurances of transcendence, even if 
they have chosen to reject explicit belief in the concept of God.  Only the madman is able to see 





experiences is less the loss of a belief in value than it is the loss of the basic evaluative 
framework out of which traditional valuations make sense.   
In Chapter Three, I invoked John Hick’s definition of cosmic optimism as a mood that 
invokes, “an ultimate trust and confidence that the universe has meaning even in life’s darkest 
moments of suffering and sorrow.”183  One might claim that what the madman experiences is 
something like a basic loss of trust and confidence in the universe.  The universe has become 
wholly unintelligible to him as a place where one can experience a human life in a traditional 
way.    
The madman’s parable and his experience, of course, also differs significantly from both 
the death of disco or Crow culture.  The latter two examples offer us accounts of the 
unintelligibility of a certain collective cultural experience after full institutional death has already 
occurred.  The madman’s experience of God’s death, by contrast, is singular in its future-
directedness.  The full implications of God’s death have not yet happened.  The earth has not yet 
become unchained from the sun.  Many of the social institutions that support our faith in 
transcendence still exist but the experience of cosmic assurance that once pervaded them is 
waning.  Indeed, the very last sentence of the parable has the madman running through several 
churches yelling, “What then are these churches now if not the tombs and sepulchers of God?” 
(GS 125.)   
In this regard, the disorientation that the madman envisions is perhaps just the experience 
of one possible future for humanity.  An emphasis on the future-orientated meaning of the event 
is stated clearly at the end of the parable with the madman’s realization that he has come to early.  
As he states, “This deed is still most distant from them than the most distant stars—and yet they 
                                                      





have done it to themselves.” (GS 125.)  Part of the failure of communication was not just due to 
the inability of the village atheists to understand the message but also that the message itself still 
needs time to develop; it will take time to be realized.   
As an aside, it is worth noting that while the madman may have come too early for his 
own audience, his own sense of anxiety, alienation, and melancholy is certainly emulated by 
many of the great artists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Dostoevsky’s Grand 
Inquisitor, T.S Eliot’s description of the modern world as a wasteland, Franz Kafka’s world of 
bureaucratic meaningless, Samuel Beckett’s endless waiting for Godot (to name just a few) all 
reflect some sense of the madman’s sense of disorientation as well as a sense of melancholic 
nostalgia for a past that will never return. 184             
Despite my own efforts to connect Nietzsche’s parable with other experiences of cultural 
death, however, we should take care to not transform the madman’s experience of loss into 
something that sounds like a series of sociological observations about cultural anomie, 
conceptual unintelligibility, and the breakdown of social norms.  To do so would be to ignore 
what is perhaps the oddest feature of the whole parable: the sheer graphic nature of the 
madman’s loss.  The whole event is presented to us as a bloody spectacle with visceral graphic 
descriptions.  God has been stabbed multiple times with bloody knives, his corpse is 
decomposing, and there is even a stench.  We are further informed that this murder was a 
tremendous deed, an unfathomable crime, that should be accompanied by our own collective 
sense of guilt and deep need for atonement. 
To claim that the madman’s experience offers a neutral assessment of God’s death would 
be like claiming that the best social explanation for why people no longer believe in the Easter 
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Bunny after a certain age is to berate one’s relatives for being complicit in the reality of his 
decomposing bloody bunny corpse.  One can, of course, interpret the bloody flourishes of the 
madman’s speech as mere rhetorical ornaments that adorn key parts of Nietzsche’s arguments.  
But we would be wise not to do so.  For there is something about the way the madman presents 
his experience that is instructive of not only his message but also his own state of mind.  He sees 
no alternative to the loss of our past assurances of transcendence.  All he sees is a God-shaped 
void in the universe with no hope for replacement.  There is no plan B.185         
It is worth noting again that Nietzsche presents us with different experiences of God’s 
death throughout his work.  His presentation of the madman’s melancholic stance in GS 125, for 
example, stands in contrast to the cheerful sense of adventure in the face of God’s death that is 
presented to us in GS 343.186  We must consequently be careful to not simply equate the 
madman’s nostalgic melancholia with Nietzsche’s own views on the death of God.  The mood of 
the madman might be a pathological evaluation that Nietzsche is trying to diagnose rather than 
emulate or encourage.  Both Richard Schacht and Robert Pippin are careful to highlight this 
point.  According to Schacht, “the pathos of the madman section is a pathos Nietzsche may have 
experienced; but it is one that […] he  himself has overcome and left behind.”187  Pippin suggests 
that the parable does not, “represent Nietzsche’s expression of his own or the appropriate 
response” but rather seeks to “draw attention to, rather than express or identify with, the 
melancholic tone [of the madman]”188   
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But if the madman’s melancholic experience is not Nietzsche’s own experience then why 
bother to present it in such vivid detail?  I had suggested in Chapter Two that, despite their 
differences, an affinity shared by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche is found in the idea that the 
goal of philosophical therapy is to help us to break free from the grip of a certain picture of how 
we view the world.  Our pathology is constituted by our habits and we can easily be accustomed 
to viewing the edges of our picture frame for the edges of reality.  The madman’s sense of 
disorientation illustrates one way that someone might experience the breakdown of an evaluative 
framework that has simply been taken for granted to constitute the edges of reality.  The reason 
the madman sees the future prospects of a post-transcendent world in terms of a disaster is 
because he is only capable of viewing the meaning of the world from the nostalgic standpoint of 
past transcendent assurances of cosmic stability, security, and purpose.   
Our disenchanted worldview can only show up to someone as a dumping ground for the 
decomposing corpse of God if it is nostalgically compared to a former enchanted point of view.  
As James Conant suggests, “Nihilism is Nietzsche’s name for the condition of melancholia we 
enter into when we are unable to properly mourn the death of God”189  We have to learn 
experience the world in a different way.  But this is precisely what the madman is unable to do.  
His melancholic nostalgia for past forms of transcendence prevent him from imagining a new 
future of meaning.  Nietzsche’s therapeutic project aims to open up his readers to the possibilities 
of new kinds of experiences of the world and God’s death that are able to both free themselves 
from a traditional picture of transcendent assurance and absolution while also avoiding the fate 




                                                      





5.4 The Last Man and Depressive Hedonism  
 
We might claim that part of the madness that informs the madman’s condition in GS 125 
is due to a failure of imagination.  Not only does the madman experience God’s death in terms of 
the total collapse and subsequent impossibility of traditional forms of transcendent assurances of 
meaning but he is also unable to imagine any alternative evaluative outlook that might replace 
the traditional ideals that have perished.  In this way, the madman’s nostalgic melancholy offers 
an example of a failed response to the problem of meaning posed by God’s death.  Despite this 
pathology, however, there is something that remains admirable about the madman’s point of 
view.  His sense of absolute loss, in contrast to the village atheist’s obliviousness, reveals his 
awareness of the importance that past ideals have played in offering humanity a sense of their 
own self-worth and assurance of their meaningful place in the universe.  The problem the 
madman now faces is the prospect that the realization of these traditional assurances and senses 
of self-worth have now become impossible.     
Another possible failed response to God’s death might be to simply ignore the problem of 
meaningfulness altogether.  In one sense, the village atheists already presented us with one 
version of this response.  They were simply unable to hear the madman’s message in terms of a 
problem that they must confront.  But the non-response response to God’s death is perhaps 
portrayed most vividly in Nietzsche’s depiction of the “last man [der letzte Mensch]” in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.190  If the madman confronts the problem of God’s death directly with his 
overwrought sense of melancholy then the last man simply turns away from the problem in 
pursuit of a pleasurable and comfortable life.  Here is how Zarathustra describes the last man:  
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The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small.  
His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest.  ‘We have 
invented happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink.  They have left regions where it 
was hard to live, for one needs warmth.  One still loves one’s neighbor and rubs against 
him, for one needs warmth […]  Becoming sick and harboring suspicion are sinful to 
them: one proceeds carefully […] One still works, for work is a form of entertainment.  
But one is careful less the entertainment be too harrowing.  One no longer becomes poor 
or rich: both require too much exertion.  Who still wants to rule?  Who obey?  No 
shepherd and one herd!  Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever 
feels differently goes into the madhouse […] One has one’s little pleasure for the day and 
one’s little pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for health.  We have invented 
happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink (Z Prologue 5.) 
 
Before turning to an examination of why Nietzsche holds the last men’s pursuit of 
happiness in such low regard it is worth noting an interesting parallel between his presentation of 
the last man and the madman.  Both messages are delivered to entirely unreceptive audiences.  In 
the case of the madman, the local village atheists receive the message of God’s death as no more 
than an eccentric banality.  In the case of Zarathustra, the villagers that surround him are also 
completely indifferent to the content of his speech.191  The madman concludes his message with 
the announcement that his time has not yet come.  Zarathustra likewise claims of his audience, 
“they laugh, they do not understand me, I am not the mouth for these ears” (Z Prologue 4.)  One 
might claim that what unites these two figures is discovered in their respective failure of 
communication with their audiences.   
But the differences between the two figures is equally important.  The madman, after all, 
is the messenger while the last man is one who utterly fails to get the message.  The madman’s 
experiential crisis is induced by a vision of a nihilistic world in which nothing has value because 
our traditional evaluative frameworks have collapsed into disorientation and chaos.  The last 
man, by contrast, does not experience the world in terms of any disruptions at all.  In fact, any 
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form of disruption is purposely kept as minimal as possible.  What’s more, the last man has 
plenty of values to live by.  Paul Katasfanas does a good job of summing up the evaluative life of 
the last men, “They value comfort, satiety, warmth, happiness, mild and diverting work, lack of 
quarrel, and so on.”192  If the madman is defined by his discontent with our present state of 
affairs then the last man seems downright cozy and comfortable in the context of the modern 
world.   
As already stated, the madman’s demand for cosmic assurances is probably pathological 
but it is a pathology that at least aspires to a higher level of human significance.  The whole 
parable, itself, serves as a case study of how one might respond to a world that has become 
profoundly diminished in its overall significance.  The last man’s pathology, on the other hand, 
presents a subtler and possibly far more concerning path to nihilism.  For the last man’s own 
vision of contented mediocrity turns out to be remarkably insulated against the stark threat of 
value-less cosmic nihilism that was pronounced by the madman.  The connection between 
happiness and blinking that characterize the last man’s response to the world should not go 
unnoticed here.  The problem posed by the last man is the problem of someone who is no longer 
receptive to significant questions about the meaning of human life.  If the madman reacts to the 
threat of nihilism in the wrong way, then the last man chooses to simply not react.      
One last point of comparison between the madman and the last man is discovered in the 
fact that both images have probably taken on a philosophical significance that far exceeds their 
function within the actual passages in which Nietzsche presents them.  In the case of the last 
man, this image has taken on the function of portraying Nietzsche’s overall critical views on 
modern life as characterized by hedonism, petty desires, low-mindedness, hypocrisy, and mass 
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consumerism.  In the figure of the last man we are shown how our modern conceptions of 
happiness run the risk of devolving, to borrow Zarathustra’s words, into lives of mere “wretched 
contentment” (Z: Prologue 3.)   
Despite its singular occurrence within Zarathustra, however, the concept of the last man 
features prominently in a number of twentieth century critical assessments of the debased status 
of culture and modern secular life.  Leo Strauss offers a representative example of an 
appropriation of the last man in his assessment of the future of Marxist theory:   
The last man, the lowest and most decayed man, the herd man without any ideals and 
aspirations, but well fed, well clothed, well housed, well medicated by ordinary 
physicians and psychiatrists, is Marx’s man of the future seen from an anti-Marxist point 
of view.193 
 
Strauss’s remarks offer us an incredibly uncharitable and very poor assessment of the merits of 
Marx’s philosophy, but they offer us an excellent example of the ways that Nietzsche’s last man 
has been employed in the culture wars of the last century.  A similar use of the last man is 
employed by Allan Bloom in his criticisms of the shortcomings of contemporary political 
liberalism.  In an early review of A Theory of Justice, for example, Bloom claims that John 
Rawl’s book lays out the groundwork for a political theory that is best understood in terms of a 
“First Philosophy for the Last Man.”194  Bloom’s former student and fellow conservative cultural 
critic, Francis Fukyama, also invokes Nietzsche’s concept in his The End of History and the Last 
Man where he claims that the last man embodies the low-minded political values of “typical 
citizens of a liberal democracy.”195  
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But the invocation of the last man as symbol of mediocrity, comfort, and a lack of 
ambition within modern culture is hardly confined to the reactionary conservative criticisms of 
culture articulated by Strauss and his followers.  Max Weber, for example, concludes his 1905 
The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism with an assessment of modern culture 
that also invokes Nietzsche’s last men as members of a complacent bourgeois middle class who 
conceive of themselves as the highpoint of Western civilization but, in actuality, are merely 
“specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.”196  In fact, one might claim the general 
worry about the bland leveling of culture that is exemplified by the figure of the last man 
pervades twentieth century thought every bit as much as did the madman’s anxieties over the 
loss of tradition.  Everywhere in the last century one finds deep concern that our aspirations to 
human greatness have now given way to mere kitsch, lives of petty vanity and placid 
contentment, and a passive acceptance of what Nietzsche once called the “green-pasture 
happiness of the herd” (BGE 44.)   
In his book, Amusing Ourselves to Death, Neil Postman offers an interesting summation 
of some of the general worries expressed by the figure of the last man through a comparison of 
two famous twentieth century dystopian novels, George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World.197  What should we most fear, Postman asks, the totalitarian future predicated 
by Orwell or the brainwashed hedonism predicted by Huxley?                   
What Orwell feared were those who would ban books.  What Huxley feared was there 
would be no reason to ban a book, for there would be no one who wanted to read 
one…Orwell feared the truth would be concealed from us.  Huxley feared the truth would 
be drowned in a sea of irrelevance…Orwell feared we would become a captive culture.  
Huxley feared we would become a trivial culture, preoccupied with some equivalent of 
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the feelies, the orgy porgy, and the centrifugal bumblepuppy…. In short, Orwell feared 
what we fear will ruin us.  Huxley feared what we will desire will ruin us.198  
 
Postman’s main concern in the book is an assessment of how the modern media has 
pacified the populace through bland entertainment and low-impact pleasure seeking to the point 
that it is no longer able to critically engage with its own culture.  It is hard to imagine a better 
realization of Nietzsche’s fears of the emergence of the last man than in Huxley’s dystopian 
vision of happy nihilism as portrayed in Brave New World.  There Huxley presents us with a 
society of docile, compliant, and utterly uninquisitive beings who rely on the drug soma to cure 
all forms of displeasure, discomfort, and pain.199   
Our present society, of course, has not fulfilled Huxley’s prophesy of the bland 
hedonistic future that was sketched out in Brave New World.  But one might wonder if there are 
not traces of our own versions of soma at work in our culture today.  The role that modern 
technology and the entertainment industry play in our present-day lives offers us a possible 
contemporary example of an image of the last man that might well lurk within all of us.  Cultural 
critic Mark Fisher, for example, has recently argued that the pervasive influence of digital media 
has created a new kind of depressive condition in many young people (but certainly not limited 
to young people.)  Standard clinical accounts of depression are generally associated with states 
of anhedonia, or the inability to derive pleasure from the activities of life.  But Fisher claims that 
over the last decade or so he has observed a phenomenon closely associated with digital culture 
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that is better described as “depressive hedonia.”  A condition that Fisher claims is, “constituted 
not by an inability to get pleasure so much as it is by an inability to do anything else but pursue 
pleasure.”200   
According to Fisher, our digital age now offers individuals a near constant exposure to a 
kind of monotonous low-impact hedonism that results in a “soft narcosis” of continually 
distributed bits of pleasure that inhibit the cultivation of imagination and ambition.  He goes on 
to claim, somewhat tendentiously, that this narcosis is most evident in the college classroom 
where students no longer want to be directly challenged by the discomfort of engaging with the 
great ideas of the tradition but rather can only interact with easily digestible and pleasurable bites 
of information (a YouTube clip vs. a lecture, etc.)  As he observes, “Some students want 
Nietzsche in the same way that they want a hamburger; they fail to grasp—and the logic of the 
consumer system encourages this misapprehension—that the indigestibility, the difficulty is 
Nietzsche.”201 
Fisher’s analysis, of course, completely neglects any of the positive features that 
emerging forms of technology and social medial might play in people’s lives today.  Despite my 
own neo-luddite tendencies, I see no reason to believe that new technologies and social media 
cannot be used in creative, ambitious, and inventive ways as well for the purposes of self-
induced narcosis.  Despite all the worries about technology going around at the end of nineteenth 
century, people did continue to write good novels after the typewriter was invented.202  But 
Fisher does raise an interesting point about how the development of recent technology might 
serve to stultify the desire to pursue anything other than these daily doses of monotonous 
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hedonism.  The image he seems to have in mind is something like the philosophy professor who 
is desperately trying to teach his students Plato’s allegory of the cave only to discover that none 
of them are paying attention to the lecture because they are all immersed by their cell phones.203   
Academic curmudgeons aside, the aspect of Fisher’s worries about depressive hedonia 
that is perhaps most relevant to Nietzsche’s own worries about the last man is found in their 
shared sense of the weariness or fatigue that characterizes these lives that have dedicated 
themselves solely to the pursuit of easily attainable low-grade pleasures.  Certainly, one of 
Nietzsche’s main criticisms of modern culture is found in its lack of vitality and the overall sense 
of enervation that characterizes the present age.  As Nietzsche writes, “The sight of man now 
makes us tired—what is nihilism today if it is not that?...We are tired of man…” (GM I:12.)   
Nowhere is this concern about enervation and lack of ambition portrayed more vividly 
than in Nietzsche’s image of a bow that has lost its tension and can no longer shoot for distant 
goals.  Right before he begins his speech about the last man, Zarathustra warns us, “Beware! The 
time approaches when human beings are no longer able to launch the arrow of their longing 
beyond the human, and the string of their bow will have forgotten how to whir!” (Z P 2.)  
Zarathustra’s most basic worry is that the modern self has lost the ability to maintain strong 
desires and commitments that might push them to pursue new lofty goals.   
Robert Pippin has argued convincingly that we should pay more attention to these 
descriptions when worrying about the prospects for the future threat of nihilism.  The real threat 
of meaninglessness in modern life, according to Pippin, is not posed by the failure of a particular 
set of beliefs but rather by a failure of desire.  As Pippin comments:               
the problem Zarathustra confronts seems to be a failure of desire; nobody wants what he 
is offering, and they seem to want very little other than a rather bovine version of 
                                                      





happiness.  It is that sort of failure that proves particularly difficult to address, and that 
cannot be corrected by thinking up a ‘better argument’ against such a failure.204  
 
The real problem posed by the last man, on this account, is not the problem of a justification of 
modern life but a problem of inspiration within it.  As already noted, the last man undoubtedly 
has goals and values.  It is just that he lacks goals and values that require effort to attain.  He 
only desires what is immediate and easily attainable.  Pippin has elsewhere characterized the 
failure of desire in modern life in terms of an inability to form strong erotic attachments to our 
own ideals.205  What we love, according to Pippin, is expressive of not only what we value but 
also of how we value ourselves.  What we choose to love says something important about who 
we are.  At least part of the problem confronting the last man is that his desires are so banal, and 
his concerns are so muted that he has lost the ability to aspire to become a higher or a better self 
than his current state of satisfaction. 206  Perhaps the last man has even lost the ability to conceive 
of a higher self.  To love is to take risks, and the madman takes no risks.     
Perhaps Zarathustra’s most damning description of the last man is that he, “is no longer 
able to despise himself” (Z P 5.)  While our evaluative past may have given us the pathological 
experience of constitutional deficiency and psychic disunity, it also gave human beings the gift 
of being able to be dissatisfied with one’s own self; of holding oneself in contempt, of 
envisioning oneself as something higher than one’s present state.207  But in contrast to even the 
                                                      
204 Robert Pippin, “Introduction,” Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Cambridge ed. (2006.)  
205 See Pippin (2010) esp. Chapter 1. 
206In this way, the last man is perhaps a close cousin to a figure that Nietzsche refers to as the “maggot man” in the 
GM.  The “maggot man” is “the hopelessly mediocre and unedifying man, [who] has already learned to feel himself 
as the goal and zenith, as the meaning of history” (GM I:11.) 
207 Nietzsche presents a slightly different version of the same worry at the end of the GM: “What is to be feared, 
what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound 
nausea; also not great fear but great pity.  Suppose these two were one day to unite. They would inevitably beget one 
of the uncanniest monsters: the ‘last will’ of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism.  And a great deal points to this 






hysterical nostalgic energy of the madman, the last man is unable to recognize the implications 
of the death of God to be able to even take that risk.  The madman may no longer see the goals of 
his old world.  But the last man has no worthwhile goals.  And as Zarathustra inquires, “But tell 
me brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal—is humanity not still lacking too? (Z 60)  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that Nietzsche’s presentation of the death of God invites us to 
experience the event in a variety of different ways.  The madman and the last man offer us two 
case studies of possible pathological responses to God’s death.  The madman experiences the 
death of God as an acute axiological crisis where all past reverences are now called into 
question.  The last man, on the other hand, experiences no crisis at all.  The madman’s pathology 
emerges from his failure to imagine new possibilities after the death of God.  His melancholic 
nostalgia for the stability of a transcendent past deprives him of the ability to envision an 
alternative future where human life could be meaningful without the traditional assurances of 
cosmic optimism.  The last man, by contrast, avoids the madman’s direct confrontation with 
problem of modern nihilism and opts instead for the pathology of comfort, pleasure, and minimal 
ambition.   
What unites these two figures, I want to suggest, is discovered in their inability to take 
new risks in the wake of God’s death.  Each pathology is unable to engage in the kind of open-
minded sensibilities that will be necessary for discovering new alternatives of human valuation 
that both eschew cosmic assurances of transcendence while also retaining an aspiration for 
human greatness.  Both images also serve as examples of a kind of Nietzschean therapy that 





arguments but rather through a more indirect means that invites us to call into question some of 
our deeply rooted evaluative habits.   
What is needed, according to Nietzsche, is a new self-image for humanity that more 
accurately reflects the natural and cultural dimensions of who we are and who we might become.   
If nihilism is to be only a transitional stage for humanity and not a permanent state, then we must 
learn to see ourselves in a new way.   In order to do so, Nietzsche claims that we need to 
cultivate a new sensibility towards our unknown future.  The final chapter of this dissertation 
will explore some of Nietzsche’s own thoughts on what an affirmative response to God’s death 
might look like.  In particular, our focus will be on his attempts to cultivate a new sensibility of 
adventure, risk-taking, and radical open-mindedness in his readers that will allow them to 
revalue many of the inherited evaluative habits of the tradition in order to set the stage for the 
possibility of new forms of higher humanity and higher spirituality that he envisions for our not 
























ADVENTURE AND NIETZSCHE’S AFFIRMATIVE IDEAL 
 
As for us, new philosophers, we feel inspired by the news of the death of God as if 
greeting a new dawn…and although the horizon is not clear, it seems clear enough for 
our ships to set sails again and venture outward towards new perils: the sea of knowledge 
is re-opening itself to new pioneers; maybe the open sea has never offered so many new 





The last three chapters of this dissertation have traced out the contours of two general 
diagnostic questions at work in the background of Nietzsche’s overall philosophical project: 1) 
how did it come about that humanity’s traditional sense of its own self-worth has been 
historically beholden to transcendent narratives of meaning? and, 2) what is the modern status of 
human meaning and self-worth now that our faith in these traditional narratives has begun to 
collapse?  As we have seen, Nietzsche’s response to the first question takes the form of a 
sweeping genealogical reconstruction of the evaluative history of the Western tradition that 
uncovers a deeply-rooted compulsion to envision our values and beliefs, our way of life, and 
even our place in the universe, as guaranteed by unconditional, unassailable, and cosmic 
assurances of meaning.   
But we have also seen that Nietzsche is keen to emphasize what a tremendous gamble our 
traditional adherence to these optimistic narratives of cosmic assurance have always represented 
for humanity.  On the one hand, the traditional narratives of cosmic optimism offered us a sense 
of purpose and meaning in the face of an uncertain natural world, our own finitude, and the 
pervasive experience of human suffering.  On the other hand, the ascetic ideal that underlies the 





the form of an unprecedented masochistic self-loathing towards our experience of natural 
existence. 
Nietzsche’s answer to the second diagnostic question emerges out of his investigations of 
the modern implications of our relation to the first question.  The traditional project of cosmic 
justification that began over two millennia ago with the optimistic Socratic hope that a 
transcendent reality not only exists but that this reality would also be receptive to, and even 
redemptive of, human aspiration has been transformed within the modern era into an 
unconditional will to truth that has, in turn, begun to erode away the foundations of our 
transcendent faith in the traditional religious and philosophical narratives that once sought to 
offer us cosmic comfort.  The ideals of self-scrutiny, critique, and truthfulness so often upheld as 
defining features of the ethos of enlightenment have introduced a new kind of uncertainty about 
the legitimacy of modern life that now raise basic questions about whether any set of values, or 
any historical way of life, could possibly offer us guaranteed assurances about our ultimate 
purpose or our meaningful place in the universe.  In short, we now face a modern world in which 
the question of the status of human meaning has, itself, become questionable.  
Nietzsche sums up the various cognitive and cultural failures that have emerged out of 
this internal collapse of our traditional axiological standards in terms of his dramatic 
pronouncement that God is dead.  As we have also seen, however, his assessment of just what 
exactly has “died” within modern life reaches out much farther and extends much deeper than 
any simple acknowledgement of the waning credibility of various transcendent beliefs in an 
increasingly modern and secular world.  As it turns out, God’s demise is a historical event that is 
as much a matter of moods as much as it is a matter of metaphysics.  The loss of the transcendent 





uniquely modern orientation towards human reality that is characterized by anxiety, emptiness, 
and enervation.  On Nietzsche’s diagnosis, the most profound implications of God’s death are 
therefore not just revelatory of the loss of a particular set of beliefs within the Western tradition 
but also, and perhaps much more importantly, are also revelatory of the loss—the “death”—of a 
historical form of life that now reveals itself through the distinctly modern experience that 
everything has become smaller, more contingent, less certain, less meaningful.     
Nietzsche’s wide-ranging critical diagnosis of the Western tradition’s long journey from 
axiological absolutism to axiological anomie—from cosmic optimism to the death of God—
represents a key component of what he refers to as the “no-saying” part of his overall 
philosophical project (EH ‘Books’ BGE.)  A significant aspect of Nietzschean no-saying, as we 
have seen, is discovered in his critical identification of the various ways that the inherited 
evaluative habits of our past have contributed to the contemporary failure of meaning of our 
present.  But Nietzsche is also clear that his overall project aims to do something more than 
simply highlight how the failures of modern life have emerged out of humanity’s own 
intertwined history of cosmic wishes and masochistic tendencies.  In addition to these various 
critical histories, Nietzsche also provides us with an affirmative project—a “yes-saying”—that 
aims to help us find a pathway through our present situation.    
Nietzsche’s constructive project, however, turns out to be every bit as protean as his 
critical project.  Just as numerous candidates have been put forward that purport to capture the 
key to Nietzsche’s critique of the Western tradition, so too have numerous candidates been put 
forward that purport to capture the key to his affirmative solution to modernity’s problems.  My 
own view in what follows is that there are many different kinds of Nietzschean yes-saying and 





that Nietzsche thinks will solve the problems of modern life but rather to offer a reading of one 
possible affirmative ideal found in his thinking that has remained underappreciated in the 
literature.   
This final chapter will argue that one of the most original and underappreciated ideals 
that Nietzsche attempts to cultivate in his readers is a sense of cheerful risk-taking adventure 
towards the new unexplored axiological possibilities that now lay open to us in the wake of 
God’s death.  The chapter will proceed as follows.  In section 6.2, I refine the concept of 
Nietzschean therapy that I had provisionally outlined in Chapter Two.  I argue that the most 
original aspects of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project are best understood in terms of his attempts to 
address a fear of the unknown that lies at the heart of the Western tradition’s deep need for 
cosmic assurances.  Section 6.3 then turns to Nietzsche’s claim in GS 343 that it is possible to 
experience the news of God’s death as a cheerful event, a new risk, and a new adventure.  I 
propose that we take seriously Nietzsche’s numerous descriptions of his own project in terms of 
an adventurer setting forth for unknown destinations and suggest that the experience of the 
adventurer functions as a kind of master metaphor for making sense of a future-orientated 
affirmative ideal that he is trying to facilitate in his readers.  In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, I turn back 
to a general consideration of Nietzsche’s psychology and explore how the motif of adventure 
might also help us to make better sense of his otherwise puzzling claim that he is the “first” 
psychologist among the philosophers.  The activity of psychology, in this novel sense, promotes 
inaugural experiences that aim at self-cultivation rather than truth in an attempt to help 









6.2 Philosophical Therapy and the Unknown   
 
I had suggested earlier in this project that we might draw loosely upon Wittgenstein’s 
famous therapeutic image of being held captive by a picture in order to help describe Nietzsche’s 
therapeutic project in terms of his attempts to break the hold that a traditional picture of human 
self-worth has exercised over us.  The general picture that Nietzsche has in mind does not, itself, 
take the form of an explicit argument about human self-worth but rather exists in the background 
of the tradition as a general framework of tacit assumptions and evaluative habits that have 
become so deeply interwoven into the fabric of our everyday evaluations and institutional 
practices that they have, for most of our history, simply shown up to us as ordinary features of 
human intuition and basic common sense.   
Aspects of this traditional picture, for example, emerge out of our traditional preference 
for the eternal over the ephemeral, our strong aversion to contingency, our need for purity, our 
preference for the stable over the precarious.  It is also found in our basic traditional assumption 
that the objects of our ultimate concern must be located in the safety and security of a 
transcendent realm rather than in the natural world.  In turn, most thinkers have sought to 
describe our self-worth through the articulation of various doctrines of human exceptionalism 
that hold our species to be cosmically unique in light of our possession of eternal souls, a rational 
essence, or a universal set of values that maintain some connection to this transcendent realm.   
Much of Nietzsche’s thinking is dedicated to the task of calling various parts of this 
transcendent picture of human meaning and human self-worth into question.  One of the most 
interesting features of Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition, I have suggested, aims to make the 
familiar unfamiliar by disrupting our habitual evaluations.  In order to learn to envision ourselves 





and norms that we have simply taken for granted as authoritative and inevitable could have been 
otherwise.  We see this kind of emphasis on defamiliarization, for example, at work in 
Nietzsche’s various genealogical attempts to show us that our traditional inherited understanding 
of morality, human agency, and truth are not eternal verities but concepts that have their own 
contingent histories.208   
But Nietzsche also, at times, tries to defamiliarize the picture itself, rather than focusing 
on any particular features that are discovered within its frame.  That is, we often find him raising 
a quite general question about why human beings have found it so necessary throughout most of 
their history to frame their lives within all-encompassing narratives (the narrative of cosmic 
optimism, for example) that provide absolute assurances that there is some cosmic plan or 
definitive framework within the universe that will allow them to ascribe significance to their 
lives.  We might refer to this deep background assumption in the tradition as the ‘picture’ 
picture: a need to view our lives from within the framework of a singular synoptic narrative of 
meaning.  It is worth noting, for example, that Nietzsche not only criticizes the ascetic ideal for 
its life-denying masochistic tendencies but also for its dogmatic character that excludes all other 
possible interpretations in favor of its own.  As Nietzsche comments on the narrative framework 
of the ascetic ideal:        
The ascetic ideal has a goal—a goal so universal that all other interests of human 
existence, measured by it, appear petty and narrow.  It stubbornly interprets epochs, 
peoples, humans in relation to this one goal, it permits no other interpretations, no other 
goal; it casts aside, denies, affirms, sanctions only in accordance with its interpretation. 
[…] The ascetic ideal believes that no power exists on earth that has not first received 
from it a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as a tool to its work, as a path to its goal, to its 
one goal. (GM III:23) 
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One of the main reasons that the ascetic ideal became the dominant evaluative narrative within 
human history is because it offered an interpretation of existence that presented itself as the only 
interpretation of human life available and the goal that it offered to human life as the only goal 
worth pursuing.  The dominance of the ascetic ideal, however, is just the most dramatic and 
influential example of a particular picture of human meaning that is found throughout the 
Western tradition that demands not only absolute certainty but also insular completeness from 
the narratives that we employ to explain ourselves and the world.  What unites the Socratic quest 
for essential definitions with the Cartesian quest for clear and distinct ideas as well as the modern 
scientific quest for unconditional truth is discovered in a basic need:                  
To solve everything at a stroke, with a single word—that was the secret desire: the task 
was thought of in the image of the Gordian knot or that of the egg of Columbus; one did 
not doubt that in the domain of knowledge too it was possible to reach one’s goal in the 
matter of Alexander or Columbus and to settle all the questions with a single answer (D 
547.) 
 
But this quest for absolute certainty and consilience, according to Nietzsche, is not only 
untenable but also reveals itself as a kind of deep pathology exhibited by our traditional 
experience of the world.  He claims that, “Everything unconditional belongs to pathology” (BGE 
154.)  The fundamental rule of history so far, Nietzsche tells us, is that “Humanity must have 
something that it can obey unconditionally” (D 207.)  As we have seen, our need for the 
unconditional has been motivated primarily out of our fear of the unknown that has manifest 
itself historically through a fear of uncertainty, a fear of change, a fear of contingency, and a fear 
of death.  In fact, Nietzsche often claims that the Western tradition, itself, is best understood as 
symptomatic of a collective fantasy that has historically sought to avoid uncertainty and the 
unknown by placing its trust in grand narratives of meaning that claim to offer an absolute 





Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of 
happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, a final state of some 
sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, 
Above, permits the question whether it was not illness that inspired the philosopher” (GS 
P: 2; cf. GS 357; GM III 27.) 
 
I want to suggest in this chapter that one of the most interesting features of Nietzsche’s 
affirmative project is discovered in his attempts to cultivate a new evaluative standpoint that 
would allow us to face up to the problem of human existence without need of the absolute 
assurances of a transcendent Apart, Beyond, Above, or Outside.  Iris Murdoch once asked a 
similar question when she wondered whether philosophy would ever be able to face up to the 
fact, “that we are what we seem to be, transient mortal creatures subject to necessity and 
chance.”209  Nietzsche would undoubtedly agree with the importance of thinking through 
Murdoch’s question as well as the challenge that it poses to traditional philosophy.  But he is also 
careful to realize that asking this question is a different philosophical task than learning how to 
answer it.  Unlike Murdoch, Nietzsche ruminates, on occasion, about how easily the serious 
pursuit of this question might result in disillusionment with our modern experience of the newly 
disenchanted state of the world.  He offers an example of this experience in the GS:          
Excelsior—You will never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in endless 
trust; you refuse to let yourself stop to unharness your thoughts before any ultimate 
wisdom, goodness, or power; you have no perpetual guard and friend for your seven 
solitudes…Man of renunciation, all of this you wish to renounce?  Who will give you the 
strength to do so: No one yet has the strength! (GS 285) 
 
One implication of God’s death, as Nietzsche’s own concerns in this passage indicate, is that 
some basic sense of trust in universe is coming to an end.  The universe, itself, has become less 
familiar to us as we, ourselves, have become less faithful.  Our traditional quest for unconditional 
                                                      





standards that began over two millennia ago has begun to slowly, and by its own convictions, 
reveal that its own foundations are, and always were, conditional, uncertain, and all-too-human.   
But God’s death, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, is a historical event that turns 
out to be a matter of moods as much as it is a matter of metaphysics.  As we have seen in our 
analysis of the general narrative of cosmic optimism, for example, this traditional picture of our 
self-worth within the universe not only involved a quest to discover the truth of some higher 
reality but it also involved a basic trust in the fact that this higher reality would love us back in 
some way: that the universe would somehow be responsive to our highest hopes and aspirations.  
The loss of trust that emerges out of the death of God therefore represents a new fear of the 
unknown that is not just epistemological but is also erotic.  According to Nietzsche, we have 
inherited a tradition that has habituated us to need deep assurances of wholeness, completeness, 
and cosmic security from a picture of the universe that, like the comfort of a beloved, was 
expected to answer our most basic questions about the meaning of our lives.  But this tradition is 
now dying, and we currently stand in the position of unrequited lovers who keep asking the 
universe to love us back but receive no response.   
Nietzsche does, at times, offer us a sense of what it might look like to love the world and 
our lives without assurances.  Towards the end of his 1886 Preface to the GS, for example, 
Nietzsche offers us one of his most elusive and most profound assessments of our modern status 
as unrequited lovers.  Nietzsche writes, “the trust in life is gone: life itself has become a 
problem” (GS P:3.)  But he then goes on, “Yet one should not jump to the conclusion that this 
necessarily makes one sullen.  Even love of life is still possible—only one loves differently.  It is 





Everything about this passage, of course, hinges on just what “differently” (anders) is 
supposed to mean in this context.  What special features, capacities, or commitments do our new 
Nietzschean lovers of life possess that are absent from the purported failed eroticism of their 
traditional philosophical predecessors?  What would it mean to love a life, a world, that is no 
longer trustworthy, that still gives us doubts? 
One of the most original features of Nietzsche’s therapeutic project, I will argue, is found 
in his many attempts to help us work through the erotic implications of our newfound modern 
lack of trust in the cosmos.  Nietzschean therapy, as I envision it, is therefore not a therapy that is 
directed at a particular type of person or a particular type of philosophical orientation so much as 
it is a therapy that is directed towards a particular type of general experience that might be taken 
up by various individuals in a variety of ways.  In particular, it is a philosophical therapy that is 
directed towards our modern liminal experience of being stuck between two worlds: a traditional 
world that is dying and a new world that has not yet come into being.     
What is clear is that Nietzsche thinks that a solution to this problem cannot be answered 
by simply offering his readers a new argument or theory about life or the world.  In order to 
overcome our need for traditional assurances of cosmic security, Nietzsche claims that we must 
learn how to engage in new kinds of risk-taking and adventure.  We must learn to experience our 
fear of the unknown and the death of God in new, more cheerful, ways.    
          
6.3 Adventure and Nietzsche’s Cheerful Unknown  
 
In the last chapter, I suggested that Nietzsche invites us to experience the death of God in 
different ways.  The figurative images of the madman and the last man offer us two possible 
pathological experiences of God’s death.  In the case of the madman, the death of God is 





disorder and chaos.  The placid contentment of the last man, by contrast, avoids any direct 
confrontation with the axiological problems posed by God’s death by adopting a view of the 
world that values only comfort, easy pleasure, and minimal ambition.  If the madman 
neurotically fears the unknown consequences of God’s death, then the last man ignores the 
unknown impact of God’s death by remaining utterly oblivious to the crisis.             
Despite their differences, however, I suggested that both figures share an inability to take 
risks that would allow them to envision alternative possibilities of meaning after God has died.  
We might claim that the madman and the last man both inhabit impoverished worlds.  The world 
of the madman’s melancholic nostalgia lacks the imagination to risk envisioning a life of 
meaning that could exist independently from traditional assurances guaranteed by the absolute.  
The world of the last man’s depressive hedonism lacks the requisite desire and higher aspirations 
to even risk acknowledging the loss of traditional forms of meaning that are posed by God’s 
death.     
Nietzsche does, however, suggest that it is possible to experience the death of God in 
ways that are quite different from the experiences of either the madman or the last man.  In 
particular, he suggests that it is possible for us to learn to experience the unknown implications 
of God’s death in ways that are, at once, both cheerful and adventurous.  Section 343 of the GS 
entitled “How to Understand our Cheerfulness” opens Book V (Book V is, itself, entitled, “We 
Fearless Ones”) with a sweeping characterization of what this new experience might look like.  
The passage begins with its own announcement of God’s death:  
The greatest recent event—that ‘God is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian God has 
become unbelievable—is already starting to cast its first shadow over Europe.  To those 
few at least whose eyes—or the suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough for 
this spectacle, some kind of sun seems to have set; some old deep trust turned into doubt: 
to them, our world must appear more autumnal, more mistrustful, stranger, ‘older.’  But 





far too great, distant, and out of the way even for its tidings to be thought of as having 
arrived yet.  Even less may one suppose many to know at all what this event really 
means—and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because 
it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it—for example, our entire 
European morality.  This long, dense succession of demolition, destruction, downfall, 
upheaval that now stands ahead: who would guess enough of it today to play the teacher 
and herald of this monstrous logic of horror, the prophet of deep darkness and an eclipse 
of the sun the like of which has probably never before existed on earth?   
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the opening of this passage is discovered in how many 
structural features that it shares with the madman’s announcement of the death of God in GS 
125.  Here too we find descriptions that focus on the experience of disorder and disorientation: 
the sun is now setting, trust has turned to doubt, the world appears autumnal, everywhere we see 
“demolition, destruction, downfall, upheaval.”  The description of the event of God’s death in 
GS 343 also parallels the event described in GS 125 in terms of its shared emphasis on the 
unknown.  God’s death is an event that is once again described as too distant from us to fully 
appreciate and too opaque to currently comprehend the full implications of its meaning.  GS 343 
even seemingly invokes the figure of the madman, himself, with the question: “who could guess 
enough of it today to be compelled to play the teacher…the prophet of a deep darkness.” (GS 
343.) 
 The reason that the madman felt compelled to become a prophet, as we have seen from 
the last chapter, was due in part to his obsession with the idea that the death of God would 
inevitably result in a catastrophic disorientation of a traditional way of life that has historically 
guaranteed that human life has meaning.  Without a foundation of absolute assurances to support 
our values, the madman expresses grave worries that our modern lives are destined to be aimless, 
our highest aspirations to be meaningless, and everything that we traditionally value will begin to 
break apart (“what were we doing when we unchained the earth from the sun” (GS 125).)  In 





consider a radically different experience of God’s death that invokes not gloom, but a sense of 
cheerfulness, liberation, even lightheartedness.  He goes on:                           
Even we born guessers of riddles who are so to speak on the lookout at the top of the 
mountain, posted between today and tomorrow and stretched in the contradiction between 
today and tomorrow, we firstlings and premature births of the next century, to whom the 
shadows that must soon envelop Europe really should have become apparent by now—
why is it that even we look forward to this darkening without any genuine involvement 
and above all without worry and fear for ourselves?  Are we perhaps still not too 
influenced by the most immediate consequences of this event—and these immediate 
consequences, the consequences for ourselves, are the opposite of what one might 
expect—not at all sad and gloomy, but much more like a new and barely describable type 
of light, happiness, relief, amusement, encouragement, dawn…Indeed, at hearing the 
news that the ‘the old god is dead’, we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel illuminated by 
a new dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, forebodings, expectation—
finally the horizon seems clear again, even if not bright; finally our ships may set out 
again, set out to face any danger; every daring of the lover of knowledge is allowed 
again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; maybe there has never been such an ‘open sea’  
(GS 343)  
 
The same structural experience of disorder, disorientation, and growing lack of trust that had 
provoked the madman’s anxiety in GS 125 is now greeted in GS 343 as an invitation to venture 
out onto the “open sea.”  Likewise, the “deep darkness” that characterized the madman’s mood 
towards his own sense of loss is now described in terms of a series of radically different moods: 
“happiness, relief, amusement, encouragement.”  Perhaps most importantly, the overall message 
of GS 343 informs us that it is possible, at least for some, to learn how to adopt new evaluative 
attitudes towards the unknown.  It is worth emphasizing that Nietzsche’s voice in GS 343 does 
not claim to know something more than the madman knows about what our future will hold after 
God’s death.  But Nietzsche’s image of the “open sea” suggests that incompleteness, uncertainty, 
and instability no longer need to be experienced as deficiencies, failures, or something we must 
fear.  Rather, Nietzsche and other like-minded “free-spirits” are able to experience God’s death 





therefore not just any kind of cheerfulness but a cheerfulness towards the unknown that also 
serves as an invitation to a new kind of adventure.     
 Nietzsche often characterizes his overall philosophical project in terms of the imagery of 
a risk-taking adventurer who has set forth on open seas towards unknown destinations.   In the 
GS alone, he refers to his project in terms of an adventurer and discoverer of new lands on 
numerous occasions (GS P 1, 46, 124, 283, 289, 343, and 382, as well as in the verse “Towards 
Open Seas” listed in the appendix.)  In particular, we often find him drawing a specific analogy 
between nautical exploration and axiological exploration (HH I: 447; D 37, 432, 575; GS P 1, 
124, 283, 343, 382; BGE 23.)  I want to suggest in what follows that Nietzsche’s frequent use of 
the figurative image of the adventurer who cheerfully sails into unknown seas is no mere 
ornamental metaphor that poetically adorns the more serious aspects of his writing and thinking.  
Rather, Nietzsche’s figurative language of adventure is much better understood as a basic 
orientating metaphor that offers his readers guidance on how they might approach some of his 
most important claims to originality.210          
Nietzsche is not, of course, the only thinker to employ figurative imagery as a guide to 
help his readers understand what is most original about his philosophical project.  In fact, most of 
the great philosophers of the tradition have used what we might call a central orientating 
metaphor that condenses their various arguments and philosophical positions into one specific 
                                                      
210 To be sure, the adventurer is not the only figurative image that might lay claim to the role of central orientating 
metaphor that offers guidance to readers on how to read Nietzsche.  Various martial and medical images also seem 
to serve a similar function in his texts.  Nietzsche often describes his thinking in terms of war and warfare.  For 
example, he claims that his books should be understood in terms of a “campaign against morality” and as a 
“declaration of war” (EH ‘Books’ D and TI.)  Likewise, Nietzsche often employs medical imagery that diagnose the 
Western tradition in terms of various organic metaphors of sickness, disease, digestion, convalescence.  As we saw 
in Chapter Two, for example, Nietzsche informs us that his “cure” from Platonism is Thucydides.  But I would 
argue that these martial and medical images capture, for the most part, the critical and diagnostic features of his 
project.  His maritime imagery, by contrast, offers us guidance on his therapeutic project in terms of what types of 
attitudes and experiences that we might need to adopt in order to affirm our lives absent of the assurances that are 





image.  Plato’s cave, Locke’s blank slate, Kant’s Copernican revolution, and Wittgenstein’s 
ladder all come to mind as well-known examples of figurative claims that have been employed in 
an effort to help readers grasp the overall originality of a philosophical project.  Perhaps the main 
difference between Nietzsche and most other thinkers within the history of philosophy (with the 
possible exception of Plato) is due to the sheer number of images that are discovered in his 
writings.  Nietzsche not only offers us figurative images of adventurers on the high seas, but also 
(to name just a few) a God who has died, truth as a woman, whispering demons, blonde beasts, 
jumping dwarves, troubadours, Apollo and Dionysus, the pale criminal, nobles and slaves, the 
last man, the madman, and, of course, the character of Zarathustra himself. 
It is surprising that the figure of the adventurer has not received more attention as a 
central orientating metaphor that might allow us—like Plato’s cave or Wittgenstein’s ladder—to 
better understand Nietzsche’s goals.211  Perhaps one reason that the theme of adventure is so 
often overlooked is precisely because it illuminates a side of Nietzsche’s writing that tends to 
focus on experiences rather than arguments.  We saw in GS 343, for example, an attempt on 
Nietzsche’s behalf to convey to his readers a particular experience of cheerfulness in the face of 
the unknown rather than an specific argument about the unknown.  In this case, the absence of 
God is no longer experienced as a deficiency but rather as an invitation to discovery.  The image 
of the adventurer, in this sense, attempts to convey how new experiences of our values are like 
the great discoveries made by explorers throughout history.  Both forms of adventure have the 
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Tracy Strong, Nietzsche’s New Seas (1984.)  For a fascinating overall treatment of the metaphor of the explorer and 
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Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence (1996.)  Blumenberg makes numerous references to Nietzsche’s 





potential to radically change one’s own inherited attitudes towards beliefs and traditions that had 
been taken for granted.     
This emphasis on transformational images of adventure occur frequently in Nietzsche’s 
writings.  Take for example, the following passage where Nietzsche fancies himself as a new 
kind of conceptual Columbus:   
The moral earth too is round!  The moral earth too, has its antipodes!  The antipodes, too, 
have their right to exist!  There is still another world to be discovered—and more than 
one!  Board the ships, you philosophers! (GS 289; cf. GS 291) 
 
In this passage, Nietzsche invites his readers to consider how a radical exploration and 
reorientation of our traditional inherited values might be akin to the shocking experience of a 
traveler who first discovers that the world is round rather than flat.  That the earth is round and 
not flat is obviously not shocking today.  But imagine that you were living long ago when the 
round earth/flat earth debate was still very much a live concern.  To suddenly discover that the 
earth is round would be no mere pedestrian fact to be simply added to one’s catalogue of beliefs.  
It would involve a dramatic change of belief, of course, but it would also involve a radically new 
experience of the world that would open up new possibilities, new anxieties, and new horizons 
for exploration.212   
In the ‘Preface’ to the GM, we also find Nietzsche using the language of exploration and 
the discovery of new lands to convey what it might be like to experience our inherited values in a 
radically new and unfamiliar way.  He writes of his own task of genealogical investigation: “it is 
a matter of traveling the vast, distant, and so concealed land of morality […] with a completely 
                                                      
212 As a note of historical fact, most historians do not support the folk story that one of the reasons that Columbus 
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the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians (1991.)  In this passage, we might claim that Nietzsche is 
invoking a popular image of the riskiness of the adventure that Columbus undertook rather than an actual account of 





new set of questions and as it were with new eyes: is this not virtually to discover this land for 
the first time?...(GM P 7.)  In this case, it is the risk of asking dangerous new questions (what is 
the value of our traditional values?) that become an adventure into new lands that might, in turn, 
radically reorient the way we experience the tradition.  
 But Nietzsche not only employs the language of adventure and risk to convey his own 
experiences of his philosophical project.  We also often find him using similar images when 
describing the types of experiences that would be present in his ideal readers.  As he states in 
EH, “When I imagine a perfect reader, he always turns into a monster of courage and curiosity; 
moreover, supple, cunning, cautious; a born adventurer and discoverer” (EH Books 3.)  In ‘On 
the Vision and the Riddle,’ the character of Zarathustra introduces the thought of the Eternal 
Return as a kind of risky adventure and exhorts those who would choose to follow his line of 
thinking: “You daring ones around me!  You venturers and adventurers, and whoever of you 
have embarked with cunning sails on unexplored seas!  You enigma-enjoyers” (Z Part III ‘On 
the Vision and the Riddle.’)  Here too Nietzsche offers us an invitation to view our experience of 
the unknown as something not to be feared but rather as a new adventure to be undertaken.    
What this emphasis on adventure reveals, I would suggest, is Nietzsche’s attempt to show 
his readers, in various ways, what an experience of meaningfulness might look like that no 
longer requires the assurances of transcendental guarantees, final destinations, or absolute 
resolutions.  Nietzsche confides in his readers, “For—believe me—the secret for harvesting from 
existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously!—[…] 
Send your ships into uncharted seas!” (GS 283.)  Here we find a kind of affirmative ideal that 
does not promise its readers a distinctive resolution or definitive answer to the modern problem 





transform our traditional fear of doubt and the unknown into a new kind of affirmative 
experience.  Like the love of a woman who gives us doubts, we can learn to love life in ways that 
no longer require cosmic assurances.                
Nietzsche’s adventurous imagery also offers his readers guidance on how they might 
learn to read him in ways that would help to facilitate the therapeutic dimensions of this new 
affirmative ideal.  As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Nietzsche’s claims to originality have often 
been interpreted by his commentators in terms of his formulations and anticipations of a series of 
distinct philosophical and psychological positions.  But the theme of adventure and the unknown 
found throughout Nietzsche’s work invites us to read him not just as a missionary who is 
bringing an already fully worked out message to new believers but also as an explorer who is not 
fully certain of where his various inquiries and investigations will ultimately land.  The idea that 
reading Nietzsche’s texts can be understood, at times, in terms of an ongoing journey or 
adventure that a reader undergoes with him, experiences with him, offers valuable insights into 
why he might have chosen to write in a variety of literary forms.   
Richard Schacht, for example, describes Nietzsche’s Zarathustra in terms of a, “A kind 
of spiritual Bildungsroman, akin perhaps to Goethe’s Faust and to Hegel’s Phenomenology, but 
more radical than either of them.”213  As Schacht points out, one would do poor justice to 
Zarathustra as a text if one simply portrayed it as a motley assemblage of philosophical ideas 
and arguments that just happened to be expressed in a literary way.  I would venture to extend 
Schacht’s point even further and contend that there are many literary elements, and potential 
experiences of those literary elements, at work in Nietzsche’s texts that are not done justice if 
they are only framed in terms of various arguments and explicit theories in his writings that just 
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happened to be expressed in a literary way.  The theme of adventure, I would contend, is an 
example of a literary element within Nietzsche’s writing that is poorly understood if it is simply 
reduced to an argument.  The orientating metaphor of the adventurer, as I have been describing 
it, does not represent some distinct philosophical position within Nietzsche’s thinking that he is 
trying to convince us to believe.  Rather, he is offering us an experience through his writing that 
he hopes will help his readers begin to view their own lives and his own works in a different 
way.214        
Nietzsche once wrote that his books should be understood in terms of a “first language 
for a series of new experiences” (EH ‘Good Books’ 1.)  The problem for many of his 
commentators who only focus on arguments, however, is that the nature of these inaugural 
experiences is not easily articulated or summarized into economic arguments or precise 
propositional statements.  Brian Leiter, for example, comments in regard to Nietzsche’s literary 
style that, “there is no principled reason why one cannot, as a commentator, state with 
excruciating clarity and precision what an author means, even as one determines that meaning by 
considering both what he says and how he says it.”215  I would suggest that Leiter’s emphasis on 
“excruciating clarity and precision” falls prey to what we might refer to as the fantasy of 
philosophical paraphrase.  This fantasy simply assumes that we can efficiently reduce all 
philosophical texts down to a set of clearly stated arguments.  As I argued in Chapter Two, 
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Nietzsche.  It is an experience that not only describes his philosophical projects but also an experience he, himself, 
has undergone.  Take, for example, his retrospective analysis of his own attitudes that emerged out of the GS after a 
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permitted again, believed again (GS P 1, my emphasis.)   





however, this amounts to the view that Nietzsche’s unconventional style of writing is merely 
accidental rather than integral to the goals that he is trying to achieve.  
To reduce the experience of reading Nietzsche to nothing but a set of clearly stated 
arguments or anticipations of future theoretical positions is akin to reducing a good piece of 
literature to a mere plot summary.  If I were to tell you that Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost 
Time amounts to no more than a rather a longwinded story about an asthmatic recluse who one 
day ate a cookie that, in turn, reminded him that he was once upon a time a young boy, I have 
certainly not said anything false about the plot summary of that novel.  But I have also 
completely failed to account for the rich experience of reading Proust.  My arguments here (as in 
Chapter Two) are once again not that one can find no such things as theories or explicit 
arguments in Nietzsche’s writing.  It is to suggest, however, that there are elements of 
Nietzsche’s writing that are meant to be experienced in novel and adventurous ways that do not 
easily survive standard attempts at philosophical paraphrase.     
 
6.4 Inaugural Psychology and Axiological Adventure  
 
I have suggested so far that the figurative image of the adventurer remains an 
underappreciated guide to reading Nietzsche.  Perhaps most importantly, I have been suggesting 
that Nietzsche’s emphasis on adventure offers us guidance on how we might understand a certain 
ideal at work in his writings that attempts to convey an experience of cheerful risk-taking 
towards destinations that are unknown.  The aim of Nietzschean therapy is not to offer his 
readers a definitive resolution to the problems posed by modern life.  Rather, he asks them to, 
“send your ships into uncharted seas!” (GS 283.)  In this section, I will now turn to a 
consideration of how the general themes of adventure, experience, and risk discussed so far 





Nietzsche, himself, leaves little doubt that he wants us to experience some aspects of the 
originality of his new psychology in terms of the experience of an adventure.  At the end BGE 
23, for example, he exhorts us:     
if you are ever cast loose here with your ship, well now! come on!  clench your teeth!  
open your eyes! and grab hold of the helm!—we are sailing straight over and away from 
morality; we are crushing and perhaps destroying the remnants of our own morality by 
daring to travel there—but what do we matter!  Never before have intrepid voyagers and 
adventurers opened up a more profound world of insight: and the psychologist who 
“makes sacrifices” (they are not the ‘sacrifice of the intellect’—to the contrary!) can at 
least demand in return that psychology again be recognized as queen of the sciences, and 
that the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for it.  Because, from now on, 
psychology is again the path to the fundamental problems! (BGE 23)    
 
It would be difficult not to notice the general motif of adventure that runs throughout this 
passage.  In this case, the adventure of psychology is likened to the imagery of a dangerous 
seafaring voyage that has set sail towards a “a more profound world of insight.”  Moreover, 
Nietzsche also informs us that the adventure that psychology must undertake will elevate it to the 
status of “queen of the sciences” and that his new queen—psychology—is now on the path to 
“fundamental problems.” 
Nietzsche’s claim for the priority of psychology has been interpreted in a variety of 
different ways.  For the most part, however, the focus on passages like BGE 23 has usually been 
on questions about what this new priority means—that is, on what it might mean to elevate 
psychology to be a “queen”—rather than on questions about what the term “psychology 
[Psychologie]” itself, is supposed to mean in such passages and whether Nietzsche’s own 
understanding of psychology might, at times, differ in significant ways from our ordinary 
conceptions of psychology.   
A straightforward reading of BGE 23, for example, might interpret Nietzsche’s claims for 





relation to other traditional areas of inquiry.  For example, Nietzsche’s new queen of psychology 
shall supplant the old queen of metaphysics (a discipline traditionally understood as the “queen 
of the sciences.”)  On this straightforward reading, Nietzsche is claiming that psychology has 
traditionally been considered to be ancillary to metaphysics (or epistemology or ethics) and his 
announcement intends to transform the tradition by placing psychology at the top of this 
traditional hierarchy of knowledge and inquiry.   
A number of commentators have read Nietzsche’s royal claims to originality for 
psychology in terms of this rather straightforward elevation of psychology to the apex of our 
ordinary categories of inquiry and knowledge.  Brian Leiter, for example, claims that, “Today 
Nietzsche’s claim that psychology is the queen of the sciences demands that we move towards 
attending to the results of actual psychology”216  Likewise, Paul Katsafanas also does not find 
anything particularly elusive about Nietzsche’s new claim for the priority of psychology or about 
the “fundamental problems” that this new psychology will pursue.  Katsafanas writes, “Nietzsche 
tells us that psychology is ‘the path to fundamental problems.’  Included among these 
‘fundamental problems’ are the nature of agency, freedom, selfhood, morality, and 
evaluation.”217  According to Leiter, Nietzsche’s new queen of the sciences happens to embrace 
the results and methods of contemporary psychology as practiced today.  For Katsafanas, the 
“fundamental problems” that Nietzsche pursues through psychology just happen to be the basic 
categories of moral psychology as they are presented to us and discussed within most 
contemporary debates in ethics.  
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An assumption shared by both Leiter and Katsafanas, however, is that Nietzsche means 
the same thing by “psychology” in this passage that they do.  I have been arguing throughout this 
project, however, that simply equating Nietzsche’s proposals for the originality of his own 
psychology with our contemporary understanding of psychology is unsatisfactory for a number 
of reasons.  As we have already seen in our critical comparisons of Nietzsche and Freud in 
Chapter Four, it is worth noting again that “psychology” meant many different things in 
Nietzsche’s own time.  To limit his own understanding of psychology to his possible anticipation 
of the behavioral-scientific-empirically grounded discipline that psychology has become in the 
last century, or to his possible anticipation of current debates in moral psychology, would 
seemingly risk the kind of anachronistic worries that I raised at the beginning of Chapter Two.   
Another reason that we might choose to exercise some caution before reducing 
Nietzsche’s understanding of psychology to our own contemporary understanding is because he 
explicitly tells us that there is something singularly unique about his own claims to originality in 
psychology.  In the Introduction to this project, I proposed that we investigate Nietzsche’s claims 
to originality in the context of his claim, “Psychology did not exist until I appeared—To be the 
first here may be a curse; it is at any rate a destiny” (EH ‘Destiny’ 6.)  These sorts of flamboyant 
assessments of his own originality, however, have always sat rather uneasily with many of his 
commentators attempts to understand him.  Consequently, many have simply relegated 
Nietzsche’s bolder feats of braggadocio to those aspects of his writing that might hold some 
rhetorical interest for his readers, or might possibly be understood as parody, but probably 
contain little of philosophical significance.218  
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Perhaps one reason that most commentators have not taken Nietzsche’s inaugural claims 
seriously is due to the fact that “psychology” is an ordinary word that they presume to already 
understand.  Walter Kauffmann, for example, dismisses Nietzsche’s claim that he is the first 
psychologist among the philosophers as rhetoric because of the seemingly obvious fact that 
thinkers like Spinoza and Schopenhauer, Bentham and Hume, even Aristotle, are also entitled to 
lay claim to the general title of philosophical psychologist.  Kaufmann does go on to suggest, 
however, that if we were to change Nietzsche’s question from, “Who was the first psychologist 
before me?” to “Who was the first depth psychologist before me?” then Nietzsche’s inaugural 
claim would be correct given his anticipation of the basic theoretical insights of 
psychoanalysis.219   
Phillipa Foot offers a similar example of how our ordinary understanding of psychology 
impacts an assessment of what can count as a claim to originality when assessing Nietzsche’s 
thinking.  Foot praises Nietzsche’s originality as a psychologist but then offers the following 
qualification: “Nietzsche saw himself as a wonderful psychologist, but the truth is that he was 
partly a wonderful psychologist and partly a mere speculating philosopher far exceeding any 
plausible basis for his speculations”220  A good working definition of a plausible psychology, for 
Foot, evidently must exclude any indulgences in the flamboyant realm of mere speculation.   
Nietzsche’s claim that he is the first psychologist is undoubtedly flamboyant but no more 
so than the flamboyance that often accompanies his claims to originality for most of his own 
coined neologisms such as: will to power, the eternal return, the revaluation of all values, and the 
Übermensch.  He informs us, for example, that the will to power is, “the primordial fact of all 
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history” (BGE 259.)  Or he informs us that his project of a “revaluation of all values” is 
“humanity’s greatest task become flesh and genius in me” (EH ‘Destiny’ 1.)  All of these 
concepts and ideas are still taken seriously by many scholars even though Nietzsche engages in a 
fair amount of braggadocio when promoting them.  So why not psychology?  Could it be the case 
that there is a special sense of originality at work in Nietzsche’s understanding of psychology 
that has been ignored because it appears to us as just an ordinary word whose originality has, so 
to speak, been hiding in plain sight?  What if his inaugural boasts are not meant to elevate 
psychology to the top of the hierarchy of the sciences but rather to facilitate the types of 
adventurous experiences in his readers that were described in the previous section?     
As a brief aside, it is also worth noting that Nietzsche often uses the same term to mean 
different things in different contexts.  Sometimes a term is employed by Nietzsche in ways that 
invoke its common inherited meaning within ordinary practice and, at other times, he might also 
employ the same word to indicate a reformed meaning for that term or his attempt to show his 
readers what he aspires for that term to mean.  Nietzsche’s use of “science [Wissenschaft]” offers 
a good example of this kind of dual usage.  One finds that Nietzsche both criticizes and promotes 
science in his writings.  But the meaning of “science” in these various critical and constructive 
passages is often quite different.  The Wissenschaft for which his new psychology will one day 
be queen will presumably mean something quite different from the meaning of the life-denying 
practices of the traditional sciences who are still beholden to the framework of the ascetic ideal.   
Likewise, Nietzsche often employs terms like “truth,” “morality,” and “value,” in ways 
that invoke both their inherited meaning that he criticizes and also their possible future or 
reformed meanings that he advocates.  Paying closer attention to the different senses of meaning 





way to exonerate his philosophy from longstanding charges of inconsistency that are so often 
leveled against him (his philosophy is contradictory because it is both for and against “truth,” 
etc.)     
Nietzsche’s use of the term “psychology,” as it turns out, also admits of dual senses that 
reflect both an ordinary and inaugural meaning.  We often find Nietzsche criticizing 
“psychology” and “psychologists” within the context of our traditional or ordinary understanding 
of the meaning of these terms.  He criticizes “psychology so far” (BGE 47.)  He groups 
psychology along with metaphysics, theology, and epistemology as a “pre-science” (TI ‘Reason’ 
3.)  He informs us that we must chase away, “the clumsy psychology of before” (BGE 229) and 
also warns us that, “the superficiality of psychological observation has set the most dangerous 
traps for human judgments and conclusions and continues to set them” (HH I: 37.)  We also find 
him spending considerable effort criticizing specific psychologists and psychological movements 
of his own day.  For example, he criticizes the “English Psychologists” such as Bentham, Mill, 
Spencer, and his onetime friend, Paul Rée, as “old, cold, boring frogs” who have yet to learn to 
incorporate actual historical considerations into their various hedonistic and utilitarian 
reconstructions of the history of human value (GM I:1.)       
But we also find Nietzsche quite often praising a certain conception of “psychology” 
within the tradition as well.  Despite his claim that psychology did not exist before him, 
Nietzsche actually refers favorably throughout his writings to a number of “psychologists” in the 
history of Western thought.  In fact, Nietzsche’s designation of someone as a “good 
psychologist” is generally a sign of his highest praise.  We find him, for example, admiring good 





Pascal, LaRouchefoucauld, and especially, Montaigne.221  Nietzsche also expresses admiration 
for the psychological insights of both Spinoza and Schopenhauer even if he rejects in Spinoza, 
and comes to reject in Schopenhauer, the metaphysical systems in which their psychology is 
encased.222  Then there are the literary figures ranging from Aeschylus and Sophocles to 
Shakespeare, Goethe, Byron, Swift, Dostoevsky and Stendhal who also do good psychology.  
Nietzsche praises Dostoyevsky, for example, for being “the only psychologist who had anything 
to teach me” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 45) and Stendhal also comes in for high praise as a “deep 
psychologist” (EH ‘Good Books, ‘Wagner’) and as “France’s last great psychologist” (BGE 
254.)223 
What shall we make of Nietzsche’s claim that he is the “first” psychologist given that he 
clearly admits in both critical and constructive ways that any number of psychologists have 
existed before him?  The opening line of BGE 23 offers us an initial clue about why Nietzsche 
thinks that his own inaugural endeavors in psychology separate him from all other psychologists 
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who came before him.  He informs us, “All psychology so far has been stuck in moral prejudices 
and fears; it has not ventured into the depths” (BGE 23.)  In the previous section, I argued that an 
important aspect of Nietzsche’s affirmative therapeutic ideal is discovered in his attempts to 
cultivate a new experience of adventurous open-mindedness in his readers towards their fear of 
the unknown and their experience of a growing axiological crisis in modern life.  Perhaps it is the 
unwillingness or inability of all past psychologists—both criticized and praised—to confront the 
unknown and to engage in these new axiological adventures that grants Nietzsche the right to 
call himself an inaugural psychologist among the philosophers.      
The idea that Nietzsche’s inaugural claims in psychology could be understood in terms of 
an invitation to engage in a new kind of adventurous axiological experience becomes more 
plausible if we turn our attention to the example that Nietzsche offers to us in BGE 23 of one of 
the “fundamental problems” that he claims his queen psychology will pursue.  He writes:   
The power of moral prejudice has deeply affected the most spiritual world, which seems 
like the coldest world, the one most likely to be devoid of any presuppositions—and the 
effect has been manifestly harmful, hindering, dazzling, and distorting.  A genuine 
physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious resistances in the heart of the 
researcher, it has the “heart” against it.  Even a doctrine of the reciprocal dependence of 
the “good” and “bad” drives will (as a refined immorality) cause distress and aversion in 
the strong and sturdy conscience—as will, to an even greater extent, a doctrine of the 
derivation of all the good drives from the bad.  But suppose somebody considers even the 
affects of hatred, envy, greed, and power-lust as the conditioning affects of life, as 
elements that fundamentally and essentially need to be present in the total economy of 
life, and consequently need to be enhanced where life is enhanced,--this person will 
suffer from such a train of thought as if from sea-sickness.  And yet even this hypothesis 
is far from being the most uncomfortable and unfamiliar in this enormous, practically 
untouched realm of dangerous knowledge:--and there are hundreds of good reasons for 
people to keep out of it, if they—can!   
 
The example of a “fundamental problem” that Nietzsche offers us in this passage does not 
appear, at least at first glance, to be the kind of problem that could be easily assimilated into our 





Nietzsche is presenting us with a philosophical psychology that appears to focus on a series of 
normative questions about the ways that our traditional values have been experienced and the 
dangers that may be involved in our attempts to learn to experience our values in radically new 
ways.   
A more far elusive question, however, arises when we ask just what Nietzsche is trying to 
tell us about our values in this passage?  One can read this passage in such a way that elevates 
Nietzsche to the status of an epistemically privileged narrator who is posing a series of questions 
to us about our traditional values for which he has already formulated answers.  John 
Richardson, for example, has argued that BGE 23 offers evidence of Nietzsche’s commitment to 
a theory of value monism that seeks to replace our traditional dualist theories of value.224  But to 
treat this passage as just offering us a new theory of value that Nietzsche has already worked out 
neglects the pervasive themes of danger, disruption, uncertainty, and risk-taking that also run 
throughout the entirety of BGE 23.   
It is worth noting that Nietzsche proposes the idea of the reciprocal dependence of the 
once opposed drives of “good” and “evil” in terms of a dangerous hypothesis rather than a settled 
conclusion.  It is also worth noting that he also proposes that an experience of the interrelated 
dependence of “good” and “evil” might be very unsettling.  It might even result in a kind of “sea-
sickness” that would provoke a deep inner resistance for anyone—including his new 
psychologists—who even dare to entertain this radical new experience.  Seen in this light, it 
might be the case that BGE 23 is not offering us a theory at all but rather is proposing an 
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invitation to consider a new kind of “thought experiment [Gedankenexperimente]” about 
alternative ways that we might experience our values.    
Nietzsche informs us in BGE 2 that, “the fundamental faith of metaphysicians is faith in 
the opposition of values.”  In Chapter Three, we saw a highly influential example of this 
prejudicial dualistic faith in the various ways that the evaluative narrative of the ascetic ideal 
structured a particular experience of human existence in terms of a fundamental disunity.  
According to Nietzsche, we have traditionally experienced ourselves as natural-supernatural 
hybrid beings who live our lives with one foot in the transcendent beyond.  Moreover, the 
normative structure of the ascetic ideal rigidly maintains that the fundamental goal of a human 
life is discovered in the will to overcome the natural components of human existence in order to 
achieve a transcendent ideal.  The animal elements of human life that are most often associated 
with “evil” must be overcome through the employment of the non-natural components of human 
existence (the soul, reason, morality) that are most associated with “goodness.”  Our animal 
bodies, earthly desires, and even the natural world itself, are interpreted primarily in terms of a 
series of worldly trials that must be overcome in order to achieve higher transcendent goals and 
values.   
In the previous section, we saw how Nietzsche invokes the adventurous experience of the 
discovery that the flat earth is round in GS 291 in order to try and convey to us what a radical 
transformative experience in regard to our traditional attitudes towards morality might look like.  
The psychology at work in BGE 23, I would suggest, also invites us to entertain a similar kind of 
radical transformative axiological experience that seeks to disrupt a fundamental prejudice that 
underlies our traditional understanding of human self-worth.  The questions posed by BGE 23 





new experiences would have upon our lives.  In particular, Nietzsche asks us to consider whether 
new ways of experiencing those aspects of human existence once thought to be “evil” might turn 
out to contribute to the overall enhancement and economy of our species.  It is worth noting that 
Nietzsche’s response to these questions is not that we should now embrace his hypothesis as a 
definitive restructuring of the categories of “good” and “evil.”  Rather, his response is that his 
proposed experiential hypothesis would be dangerous and uncertain for most of us because we 
are still fare too deeply invested in our traditional moral prejudices and evaluative habits when 
assessing our own self-worth.   
It is important on the adventurous reading that I am proposing to treat Nietzsche as a 
thinker who does not already know the answers to the questions he is asking.  One of the reasons 
that Nietzsche claims that his new questions are risky, dangerous, and unsettling is precisely 
because we have ventured into unknown territories of evaluation and he does not know how his 
inquiry will turn out.  Moreover, Nietzsche often claims that asking these sorts of dangerous 
questions that challenge our traditional conceptions of who we are will constitute an integral 
aspect of a new kind of self-cultivation that could lead to new ways of valuing ourselves.  As he 
states in the GM:   
We violate ourselves nowadays, no doubt of it, we nutcrackers of the soul, ever 
questioning and questionable, as if life were nothing other than nutcracking; and thus we 
must necessarily become day-by-day always more questionable, worthier of asking 
questions; and thereby perhaps also worthier—of living? (GM III:9)   
       
Let us now return to the question of why Nietzsche might claim that his new psychology 
should be understood as a “queen of the sciences.”  In what way does Nietzsche want his new 
queen to rule over other forms of knowledge and inquiry?  As we saw earlier, the hierarchical 
reading of Nietzsche’s claim proposes that our ordinary understanding of psychology should now 





proposes otherwise.  Psychology, in Nietzsche’s inaugural sense, is not intended to be a category 
of philosophy that should now take its place at the top of the traditional philosophical hierarchy 
composed of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on.  Rather, what is “first” about 
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is discovered in a new kind of interrogation of the 
traditional categories of philosophy that he hopes will open up new kinds of experiences in his 
readers by calling into question our inherited assumptions.  Nietzsche’s psychology aspires to the 
practical purpose of enabling modern selves to begin to see themselves in a new way that has 
broken free from our now failed picture of human self-worth.  As he states:   
The human soul and its limits, the range of inner experiences reached so far, the heights, 
depths, distances of these experiences, the whole history of the soul so far and its as yet 
unexhausted possibilities—that is the predestined hunting ground for a born psychologist 
and lover of the ‘great hunt’ (BGE 45) 
 
The adventures and “great hunts” invoked by Nietzsche’s new psychology can also be 
understood to be embrace a new kind of experimental attitude towards human experience.  The 
themes of experiment and adventure are, in fact, often closely allied in Nietzsche’s writings.  He 
informs us of, “the dangerous privilege of living experimentally and of being allowed to offer 
itself to adventure” (HH P: 4.)  Nietzsche also often invokes the concept of experimentation in 
terms of the cultivation of a new kind of adventurous curiosity (HH I: 224, GS 51; BGE 42, 205, 
210) 
By “experimental philosophy” I do not mean, of course, to align Nietzsche with the 
contemporary philosophical movement that now proceeds under that name.  The speculative 
nature of Nietzsche’s kinds of experiments would appear to be ill-suited for the language of 
surveys, graphs, and quantitative analysis.  Nietzsche’s experimentalism, by contrast, focuses on 





answer by trying to live according to it.”225  Richard Schacht has also helpfully explained 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on experimentalism as follows:   
Experimental here is not to be understood in the sense of empirical research.  It rather 
refers to trying out different ways of viewing things, and exploring the implications and 
consequences of different possible ways of structuring and living life, with a view to 
determine which of the former are most fruitful and illuminating, and which of the latter 
are the most conducive to the general ‘enhancement of life.226  
 
Graham Parkes also offers the apt suggestion that, “His [Nietzsche’s] psychological insights are 
presented in the same spirit: not as ultimate truths about the human condition but as a hypothesis 
to be tested in one’s experience, as experiments to be conducted in the ‘laboratory of the 
psyche’”227   
It is beyond the scope of this present chapter to engage in a detailed comparison of the 
relation between my own adventurous reading of Nietzsche’s psychology and the role that 
experimentalism plays in his thinking.  But I would argue that the themes of adventure and 
experimentalism are fellow travelers found in a certain way of understanding what Nietzsche is 
doing that has remained underappreciated and would be worth pursuing in more detail in a future 
project.       
   
6.5 Conclusion: Being First Revisited 
 
Six months prior to the mental collapse that would end his productive intellectual life, 
Nietzsche remarks in an 1888 letter to his friend Karl Fuchs:   
Unfortunately, no one has yet been clever enough to characterize me…I have never yet 
been characterized—either as a psychologist, or as a writer (“poet” included), or as the 
inventor of a new kind of pessimism (a Dionysian kind, born of strength…)  It is not at 
all necessary, and not even desirable, to side with me: on the contrary, a dose of 
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curiosity, as if confronted with some strange plant, and an ironic resistance would seem 
an incomparably more intelligent attitude towards me.”228  
 
Nietzsche touches on a number of themes in this letter that have been explored throughout this 
dissertation.  He informs his friend that he has not yet been properly characterized as either a 
psychologist or a writer.  He suggests that nobody has yet to understand his thinking in terms of 
the invention of a new kind of pessimism.  But what is perhaps most striking about Nietzsche’s 
self-description is discovered in his admission that he is not necessarily trying to convert his 
readers over to some distinct set of theoretical views or philosophical positions.  Rather, he 
suggests that his readers would be better off approaching his writing with an air of curiosity and 
even with an attitude of ironic resistance to his thinking.   
Philosophers can be original in a variety of ways.  For example, a thinker might claim to 
be original by proposing a new solution to a well-worn and longstanding philosophical debate.  
Or she might claim to be original by expanding a pre-existing argument into some new area of 
philosophy that opens up the field in novel and exciting ways.  One might also be original in an 
attempt to synthesize two philosophical positions that had previously been held to be 
fundamentally opposed to one another.  Nietzsche’s claims to originality have in fact been 
interpreted in all of these ways.  But a thinker might also lay claim to philosophical originality by 
asking a question or offering a perspective or experience that nobody else has ever thought to ask 
before; that nobody else has yet to consider.   
In this last chapter, I have attempted to show that Nietzsche’s claims to adventure and 
inaugural psychology offer us claims to originality that reside in this last category.  No doubt, 
this is a different way to understand Nietzsche’s claims to originality in psychology.  The idea 
                                                      






that Nietzsche’s most original ambitions for his new psychology might constitute a radical 
axiological therapy or a modern form of experimental writing all sounds a bit strange and elusive 
to our contemporary ears.  These ambitions, as noted, would certainly fit rather uneasily within 
the circumscribed vocabulary and disciplinary framework that informs our contemporary 
associations about what psychology means in the present day.  This is not to say, of course, that 
we cannot also read Nietzsche’s psychology in terms of how his insights and observations have 
anticipated our own understanding of psychology today.  My goal was to highlight some of the 
unique features of Nietzsche’s own vision of himself as an original psychologist that may remain 
underappreciated precisely because we tend to approach his texts with the uncritical assumption 
that we already know what psychology means.   
The reading of Nietzsche’s claims to originality that I have presented, however, remains 
incomplete for a variety of reasons.  My focus on a particular set of evaluative and adventurous 
attitudes that are found throughout his later writings only present an aspect of the overall critical 
and constructive ambitions of his philosophical project.  In particular, my own attempts to 
highlight some of these underappreciated features of Nietzsche’s originality have excluded, for 
the most part, an attempt to show how these attitudes might relate to some of his most well-
known concepts: will to power, eternal return, perspectivism, Übermensch, etc.  My rationale for 
doing so, however, was not based on vulgar or ignorant negligence but rather, I hope, a 
negligence of a more sophisticated variety.   
One theme that I have been trying to develop in this project is a recognition that one of 
the most original features of Nietzsche’s thinking is discovered in his general avoidance of 
dogmatic thinking and in his general embrace of a form of inquiry that is experimental, 





any skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let’s try [versuchen] it!’  But I no longer wish to hear 
anything of those things and questions that do not permit of experiment” (GS 51.)  In doing so, I 
have chosen to place some of Nietzsche’s well-known concepts into the background of my study 
in order to bring some of the background attitudes within his philosophical project into the 
foreground.  But my hope is that an emphasis on the provisional and experimental stance that 
Nietzsche’s recommends for our new approach to the philosophical tradition is also applicable to 
and compatible with an understanding of his own major concepts.  As Nietzsche, himself, 
reminds us in BGE:  
…know that no philosopher so far has been proved right, and that there might be a more 
laudable truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words 
and favorite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all of the solemn 
gestures and trumps before accusers and law courts (BGE 25.) 
 
In future projects, I plan to explore how one might come to understand some of Nietzsche’s 
major doctrines from within the framework of a therapeutic ideal that also recommends an 
attitude of open-minded adventure in regard to inquiry and evaluation.  To put the same point in 
a slightly different ways, I think it is possible to view some of Nietzsche’s most well-known 
concepts as adventures in themselves rather than as rigid doctrines.229  Many of Nietzsche’s 
ideas, I would suggest, would be approached more fruitfully if they were approached as 
provisional perspectives rather than attempts to build a Nietzschean system of philosophy.      
I noted at the beginning of this project that Nietzsche’s claim that his thinking marks a 
radically new beginning for philosophy was not, in itself, a particularly distinctive claim to 
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originality.  The history of philosophy is a history of a long line of thinkers who claim that their 
thinking is the new beginning for philosophy.  But most of these traditional claims to new 
beginnings in philosophy still held closely to the conviction that their new beginning for 
philosophy was justified because of some assurance that might guarantee they were heading 
down the right road.  A basic theme that emerges out of our considerations of Nietzsche’s 
pursuits, I would suggest, is that we have to learn to mark new beginnings without the 
consolation of these kind of cosmic assurances.  Learning to go on without this assurance, I 
would also suggest, is something that Nietzsche applies to his own project in ways that highlight 
what are perhaps some of the most original features of his philosophical project.  Amidst all of 
the bluff, bluster, and braggadocio of a thinker who constantly informs us of his own originality, 
I want to suggest that Nietzsche also exhibits an unprecedented humility in his own 
acknowledgement that his endeavors might fail.   
I have tried to suggest that if Nietzsche is the first psychologist, then his sense of being 
“first” is unique in so far as he does not already know the final destination of his inquiries.  There 
is nothing assured in philosophy or in life in the wake of God’s death.  The possibility of a higher 
humanity that Nietzsche envisions for his philosophy of the future is by no means assured.  
Shipwrecks can happen to even the greatest of adventurers.  All could be lost.  But Nietzsche’s 
faith in the open-mindedness of our new future holds out faith even within the possibility of 
failure.  As he states, “the hidden yes in you is stronger than all the no’s and perhaps from which 
you and your age are sick; and if you have to sail the seas, you wanderer, something also 







List of Abbreviations: 
I cite Nietzsche’s texts using an abbreviation and section number. Full publication detail is found 
in the works cited. 
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BGE  Beyond Good and Evil 
BT  The Birth of Tragedy  
D  Daybreak 
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GM  On the Genealogy of Morality 
GS  The Gay Science 
HH  Human, All Too Human  
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TI  Twilight of the Idols 
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